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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Capital sources, financing and investment are among the highly relevant topics of 
financial economics since they are at the basis of economic prosperity and growth. Each of 
these topics deserves thorough analysis and consideration in order to understand the dynamics 
of the corporate world and business environment. In this thesis some of the corporate finance 
and capital market issues are addressed ranging from financing constraints to corporate 
diversification and institutional investors’ influence on stock market anomalies.  
The focus of this study is the euro area, the UK and Eastern European countries, in 
particular Poland and Hungary. The selection of European countries is motivated by the fact 
that the findings of the empirical literature that focus mostly on the US market may not be 
relevant for the European case and that the underlying theories fail to explain the European 
financial system.  A detailed study of the non-financial corporations and institutional investors 
of these European countries may give valuable insights into some particularities of the 
European corporate world and stock markets. 
The thesis consists of four articles that can be read individually. They explore different 
streams of the empirical literature documenting new results that shed light on several aspects 
overseen by the previous research. The results of the present research appear to challenge 
findings documented in the previous literature and propose some new approaches of 
investigation. The first article deals with the constraints of financing sources, given imperfect 
market conditions. The second article explores the access to finance especially by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that could be the engine of economic growth. The third 
article investigates not only the financing but also the investment side of the corporations in a 
special case, when a company diversifies its investments in alternative industry sectors. The 
fourth article focuses on the efficiency of the stock market. A well-functioning and efficient 
financial market makes possible the channelling of financing sources to the best investment 
opportunities and in this way facilitates economic prosperity and growth. 
Corporate finance theory suggests that financial market imperfections, like asymmetric 
information or managerial agency problems, constrain the ability of firms to fund their 
investment projects. Some firms forgo investment rather than access capital markets and 
consequently the firm will under-invest relative to its first best level.
1
 Access to finance is a 
                                                 
1
  For theoretical discussion see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Williamson (1986), Bester 
(1985). 
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significant growth constraint and research of this field has a number of important policy 
implications. A special interest is oriented towards small and medium-sized enterprises, given 
their large share in the private sector and the premises that they could be the engine of growth if 
they are not inhibited by market imperfections and institutional weaknesses (see Beck et al., 
2005). 
The literature focusing on financing constraints is mostly based on different measures of 
investment-cash flow and growth-cash flow sensitivities, which are assumed to indicate 
financing constraints. The sensitivity should show how extensively a firm needs to rely on 
internal funds to finance its investment projects. However, following the Kaplan and Zingales’ 
(1997, 2000) critique, it has been shown that the higher sensitivity of corporate investment to 
cash flow is not an appropriate indicator of financing constraints. The sensitivity may be 
magnified not only by the presence of financing constraints but also by growth opportunities 
and by the debt financing of the firm (see, for instance, Ericson and Whited (2000), Alti (2003), 
Cleary, Povel and Raith, 2004; Moyen, 2004). Having these caveats in mind, other indicators of 
financing constraints need to be considered.  
In the first article, “Financing Constraints and Firms’ Cash Policy in the Euro Area,” a 
more recent methodology is used. This methodology is proposed by Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004), and focuses on the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings. This article 
contributes to the above literature by developing a new firm classification based on micro data 
that can be used to detect the presence of financial constraints in the euro area. The 
classification distinguishes between unconstrained, relatively and absolutely constrained firms. 
Moreover, the sources of the correlation between corporate cash flow and cash savings are 
checked by conducting the analysis in a dynamic framework.  
Contrary to previous evidence based mainly on US firms, the results of this study suggest 
that the propensity to save cash out of cash flows is significantly positive regardless of firms’ 
financing conditions. This implies that even for firms with favourable external financing 
conditions, the internal cash flow is used in a systematic pattern for inter-temporal allocation of 
capital. The results indicate that the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings cannot be used for 
testing financing constraints of euro area firms. 
The second article, entitled “Is the growth of euro area SMEs constrained by financing 
barriers?,” deals with the same issue as the first article. However, in this study the financing 
constraints are investigated with a new methodology and applied to a much larger data set 
including micro and small firms.  The relationship between financing conditions and firms’ 
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growth across firm sizes is analysed on the basis of newly created indicators particular to the 
euro area, which reflect the sector-specific financing need and growth opportunities. It is 
noteworthy that our sample is one of the most comprehensive euro-area balance-sheets 
databases, relying on more than one million firm-years in the period from 1993 to 2004.  
This study presents new evidence for generally worse financing conditions of micro and 
small firms. The correlation between sector-specific growth opportunities and firms’ realised 
growth increases by size, which suggests that, in the short run, larger firms can adapt faster to 
the time-varying industrial growth opportunities, given that they are not restricted by the 
availability of financial resources. In the long run, the time-invariant technological need of 
external finance plays a larger role in explaining the relative importance of the firm size across 
sectors. Small firms generally do not specialise in sectors with a high inherent reliance on 
external financing. Based on this we can also conclude that they tend to be more financially 
constrained than large firms.      
The next topic of this thesis deals with a firm’s investment across business segments. 
Theoretical arguments suggest that when firms are operating in more than one industry it may 
have both value-enhancing and value-reducing effects. One potential benefit of corporate 
diversification can be a more efficient resource allocation through an internal capital market, 
especially when the external capital market is relatively less developed (Hubbard and Palia, 
1999; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). Other arguments include the greater debt capacity as a 
result of the coinsurance effect, lower taxes arising from the tax code’s asymmetric treatment 
of gains and losses, managerial economies of scale and increased market power resulting from 
cross-subsidized predatory pricing (Maksimovic and Philips, 2002; Burch, Nanda and 
Narayananuse, 2002). The potential costs of diversification are value-decreasing investments, 
inefficient allocation of capital among divisions of diversified firms and cross-subsidization of 
less profitable subsidiaries (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000). The theoretical and empirical 
research with contradicting results stresses the need for further empirical investigations. 
The third article of this thesis, “Discount or Premium? New Evidence on Corporate 
Diversification of UK Firms,” investigates whether the corporate diversification in the UK is a 
profitable investment and beneficial for shareholders. It is shown by this study that previous 
results on the UK conglomerates relying on the standard pooled OLS technique are biased 
caused by the endogenous diversification decision. The empirical results indicate that the 
diversification status is determined by firm characteristics, changes in mergers and acquisitions 
activities as well as macroeconomic developments. After controlling for the endogeneity of 
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diversification in its effect on the market value, it turns out to be beneficial to diversify, 
increasing the firm value by about 30%. Moreover, while US studies with similar positive 
findings explain the lower market value of conglomerates relative to undiversified firms by 
firm-specific characteristics, we find for the UK conglomerates significant macroeconomic 
effects. In particular, less favourable macroeconomic conditions hinder firm’s growth, decrease 
their market value and affect positively their decision to operate as a diversified firm. 
The last topic of this thesis explores a special case of stock market efficiency. Since the 
late 1970s, researchers have discovered several seasonal patterns in stock returns that constitute 
a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis. Institutional investors can be characterized as 
informed traders who speed up the adjustment of stock prices to new information, thereby 
rendering the stock market more efficient. Institutions can obtain an informational advantage 
by exploiting economies of scale in information acquisition and processing. The marginal costs 
of gathering and processing information are lower for institutional than for individual traders. 
In addition, institutional investors may be better trained and have superior resources than 
individual investors. Moreover, for many years it has been common practice of companies to 
inform securities analysts in advance about company-specific news, and only recently have 
regulatory measures been launched (namely the SEC’s Regulation FD) to prevent this habit. 
Hence, institutional investors’ trading decisions may be more strongly information-driven than 
those of individual investors. 
The fourth article, “Institutional Investors and Stock Market Efficiency: The Case of the 
January Anomaly,” was motivated by the history of the Hungarian and Polish stock markets, 
which provides a unique institutional environment to investigate the influence of individual and 
institutional investors on the January anomaly. In Poland, the pension system reform in May 
1999 separates the history of the stock market into a period of predominantly individual trading 
and a period dominated by institutional trading. Similarly, in Hungary, private pension funds 
were founded in 1997 and started their financial activities in 1998. Before 1998, primarily 
small individual investors populated the Hungarian stock market.   
This last article focuses on some aspects of stock market anomalies. If stock returns 
exhibit exploitable regularities, then smart traders, who are institutional investors, are expected 
to take advantage of these patterns, thereby earning abnormal profits. Consequently, on stock 
markets with a sufficiently large number of smart traders, anomalies are supposed to disappear 
as the trading of this investor group arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns. 
Based on the findings of this study, it is empirically confirmed that there is a significant 
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January effect in Polish and Hungarian stock returns driven by the trading behavior of 
individuals. Due to the lack of capital gains taxes we cannot rely on the tax-loss-selling 
hypothesis as a rational explanation for the January effect. Instead, the findings suggest that 
higher stock returns in January during the period before the pension system reforms in both 
countries are the result of possibly sentiment-driven investment decisions by individual 
investors. The empirical results also show that the increase in institutional trading on the Polish 
and the Hungarian stock markets had a significant dampening effect on the magnitude of the 
January anomaly. This evidence is comparable to the results found in Kamara (1997) and Chan, 
Leung, and Wang (2004) for the Monday effect as well as Gompers and Metrick (2001) for the 
size effect in the U.S. The price effect of irrational trading patterns seems to be partly 
eliminated by rational investors. 
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2  FINANCING CONSTRAINTS AND FIRMS’ CASH POLICY IN THE EURO 
AREA  
 
2.1  Motivation and literature overview on financing constraints 
 
The effect of financing conditions on corporate behaviour has been extensively 
investigated in the finance literature. The theoretical model of Myers and Majluf (1984) shows 
that firms may give up valuable investment opportunities when internal sources of funds are 
not sufficient (see also Myers, 1984). Opposite to the perfect market environment of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958)
2
, in the real world firms make investment decisions not only 
looking at the profitability of the project, but also on the availability and costs of external 
financing. The amount of external sources may be limited or may not even exist and, in 
extreme cases, the amount of investment may even be limited by the availability of internal 
sources. Consequently, a considerable number of empirical studies argue that the fluctuation of 
internal sources helps to explain the investment decisions of companies. More specifically, the 
higher sensitivity of investment or firms’ growth to internal sources was taken as evidence for 
the presence of financing constraints (see for instance Fazzari et al., 1988 and 2000, and 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). However, after the contradicting results presented by Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997 and 2000), several studies have criticised the empirical test based on the 
cash flow sensitivity. One of the arguments has been that the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
is non-monotonic and therefore a higher sensitivity cannot be interpreted as evidence for the 
presence of higher financing constraints. Even financially successful firms may rely 
systematically on internal sources of financing because of factors not related to the 
unavailability of low cost external funds and consequently they may exhibit high investment-
cash flow sensitivity. Additional critiques have been put forward by Ericson and Whited 
(2000), Alti (2003) and Bond et al. (2004), all arguing that the cash flow already contains 
information about a firm’s investment opportunities. The significance of the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment may then provide additional information on expected profitability 
rather than on the severity of the financing constraints.  
Having these caveats in mind, we search for an alternative way of testing the presence of 
                                                 
2
  In a perfect market environment, investment decisions are taken exclusively on the 
basis of the expected profitability of the investment project. 
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financing constraints. We follow the methodology of Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004, 
hereafter ACW) that focuses on the analysis of the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings. ACW 
argue that their approach overcomes the problem of the previous literature in the sense that the 
predictions of the model for financially unconstrained firms are not influenced by future 
investment opportunities. In particular, in their theoretical model the unconstrained firms’ 
change in cash holdings should depend neither on current cash flows nor on future investment 
opportunities. Therefore, the liquidity demand of unconstrained firms is indeterminate and this 
constitutes the basis for empirical predictions to be tested. However, it is important to notice 
that their model is not able to test the degree of the financing constraints, as is recognised by 
the authors themselves.
3
 
In this paper, we implicitly investigate the usefulness of the financial constraints model 
proposed by the ACW for a sample of euro-area firms. First, we identify a priori groups of 
firms experiencing different financing conditions. Then we look for the firms with the best 
financing conditions and check whether the liquidity demand test is able to distinguish them 
from the rest of the sample. Hence, we challenge the link between the outcome of the ACW’s 
(2004) theoretical model and the empirical test hypothesis. Our approach is similar to the 
investigation conducted by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). By selecting firms under different 
financing conditions, we give a higher importance to the a priori classification of firms 
according to their respective degree of financing constraints. In the second stage of our 
investigation, we check the determinants of the liquidity demand under alternative financing 
conditions. While Kaplan and Zingales (1997) use information from the firms’ management 
reports and financial statements for their a priori classification, we define different scenarios by 
combining information on the financing gap and on the firms’ reliance on external capital. 
Based on this information, we distinguish absolutely constrained, relatively constrained and 
unconstrained firms.  
Our approach, similar to the Kaplan and Zingales’ investigation, is subject to the 
criticism that endogenous variables are used for the classification. The variables used in our 
classification can be affected by the same factors that determine firms to be constrained. This 
could influence the empirical results in the sense that only those firms that we defined a priori 
as constrained should assign a positive cash flow sensitivity, if the empirical test hypothesis is 
                                                 
3  Formulated as follows: “… The reason why the degree of financial constraints does not 
affect cash levels is that varying the degree of constraints affects both benefits and the costs of 
holding cash in an offsetting manner, so a relatively more constrained firm will not necessarily 
save any more or less cash than a less constrained one.” See ACW, p. 1785-1786. 
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properly defined. An additional problem, resulting from the endogenous character of the 
variables and present in general in the financing constraints literature, is that variables are 
determined by more than one factor. For example, lower investments could be the result of 
unavailable external financing sources but also of worse investment opportunities. We try to 
reduce such problems by combining several financial variables for three consecutive years. For 
example, if a firm has a financing gap (i.e. total investment is higher than its cash flow) but it 
decreased its leverage for three consecutive years, it hardly could be the case that this firm does 
not need external financing because of a lack of profitable projects. Neither can it be argued 
that this firm has decided to reimburse credit because it has a surplus left after covering the 
financing costs of all profitable projects with its retained earnings. Therefore, we consider such 
a firm as absolutely constrained since it is most probably unable to get new external financing 
and therefore it is forced to allocate its internal sources to the reimbursement of its debt. In the 
regression analysis, the endogeneity problem is controlled with instrumental variables and 
system GMM estimation.  
Following the ACW theoretical model, we define a priori as unconstrained those firms 
that are able to get new external financing or whose internal funds are sufficient for all their 
investments. The ACW theoretical model assumes that unconstrained firms can always invest 
under their first best level and that there is no use and no costs of holding cash. However, such 
perfect market conditions are hard to achieve in reality. Even firms under the best financing 
conditions operate in an imperfect market environment and, just as predicted by the theoretical 
model in the constrained case, the sensitivity is positively determined by future investment 
opportunities. We also find that constrained firms hold higher cash reserves than other firms, 
consistent with the precautionary motive of holding cash. But despite the differences in cash 
level, all firms in our sample exhibit significantly positive cash flow sensitivity and have a 
mean reverting cash balance, regardless of their financing conditions.  
Our results suggest that all firms save cash out of their cash flow in a systematic way, 
since they operate under market imperfections where liquidity is relevant for the intertemporal 
allocation of capital. This is in line with the transaction cost motive of holding cash. The fixed 
costs of borrowing induce firms to raise external funds infrequently and to use cash holdings as 
a buffer. Hence, regardless of the financing constraints, there is an optimal amount of cash 
holdings. In the theoretical model proposed by ACW, unconstrained firms are defined as firms 
operating in perfect market conditions where liquidity reserves as well as financing decisions 
become irrelevant. The explanation of our findings is that none of the firms in our sample 
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operates in such a perfect market environment and that not even firms with the best financing 
conditions can be considered as “unconstrained” based on the definition used by the theoretical 
ACW model. The sensitivity measure is positively related to growth opportunities captured by 
the cash flow variable and is not influenced by the degree of financing constraints. 
Consequently, we conclude that the empirical model proposed by ACW cannot be used as a test 
of the financing conditions of euro area firms, since it cannot be interpreted in the light of the 
corresponding theoretical model. 
Our study also contributes to the empirical cash holdings literature that focuses mostly on 
the determinants and implications of holding cash (see for instance Opler et al., 1999, and 
Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). We try to capture the importance of different variables on the 
sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flow under different financing conditions. While the ACW 
model takes into consideration only the effect of short-term debt on cash savings, we 
investigate the effect of several types of external sources, i.e. trade credit, short-term debt and 
long-term debt. Complementary to the ACW’s instrumental variables approach, we develop a 
system GMM model (see Arellano and Bond, 1991, and Blundel and Bond, 1998), which 
controls for biases due to unobserved firm-specific effects and endogenous variables through 
the lagged values of the variables taken as instruments. The system GMM model checks also 
the mean reverting pattern of cash savings, which could suggest a desired level of cash 
positions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources 
and sample characteristics. Section 3 presents the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings based 
on the ACW methodology. Section 4 describes the new scheme to identify financially 
constrained firms. It also investigates the relationship between financial constraints and firms’ 
cash policy. The final section is the conclusion. 
 
2.2  Data description 
 
Our analysis is based on a sample of non-financial corporations in the euro area.  Data on 
balance sheets as well as profit and loss statements are collected from the AMADEUS database 
of Bureau van Dijk. We select firms that provide consolidated balance sheets for the period 
1994-2003. Furthermore, we select only firms that provide data on the variables used in the 
classification criteria for at least three consecutive years. After having applied several quality 
checks, the final sample consists of 2,190 firms with a total of 10,927 observations (see the 
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appendix for detailed sample construction). However, the number of observations in the 
regression analysis is reduced to 8,737 when we include in the model the lagged values of some 
variables. 
We take into consideration the inter-group relationships specific to European companies 
by using consolidated accounts.
4
 It is important to mention that for a huge number of European 
firms, especially for small firms, only unconsolidated balance sheets are available. We are 
aware of the limitation of our sample coverage in terms of firm size, which may introduce some 
selection bias (see the appendix for more information on the sample composition). 
 
2.3  ACW’s cash flow sensitivity of cash; the case of euro-area firms 
 
ACW propose a theoretical model of corporate demand for liquid assets where firms are 
concerned about present and future investments. The authors show that firms that have 
limitations regarding their capacity to raise external finance hedge their future cash flow by 
saving cash. They derive that, in the presence of asymmetric information, cash holdings are 
increasing if future investment opportunities are more profitable relative to current 
ones: ,
)()(
)(
10
0
0 IgIf
If
c
C
′′′′
′′∗
+
=
∂
∂
 (1) 
 
where ∗C  is the optimal cash policy, 0c  is the current cash flow of existing assets, )( 0If  and 
)( 1Ig  define the cash flow from the current and future investment respectively.  
 
,)()( 000 qIIFIf +≡   (2) 
,)()( 111 qIIGIg +≡  (3) 
 
where )( 0IF  and )( 0IG  define the production functions, that are increasing, concave and 
continuously differentiable, q  is the pay-off rate of investment liquidation and the investment 
levels 0I  and 1I  are less than their first best level because of financial constraints. 
                                                 
4
  For example, inter-company transactions of accounts payables/receivables and bonds 
payables/receivables could change totally the capital structure of the company, just as the inter-
company profit could change the income statement.  
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Moreover, they argue that the financially unconstrained firms’ value is not affected by 
their financial policy and there is no systematic relationship between changes in cash holdings 
and their current cash flows. The testable empirical implication of the “irrelevance of liquidity” 
suggested by the authors is that the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings is not significantly 
different from zero. They also mention that the level of cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings 
for constrained firms does not quantify the degree of financial constraints and that it is more 
related to investment opportunities (see equation 1). 
In this section, we test the empirical predictions of ACW’s (2004) theoretical model for 
our sample of euro-area firms. For the sake of comparison, we use similar a priori 
classifications to those proposed by the ACW model to group firms with similar characteristics. 
We use firms’ average real asset size over the sample period to rank them, and we define as 
small (large) firms those on the bottom (top) three deciles of the size distribution. However, we 
are aware of the sample selection bias, which is due to the use of consolidated balance sheets. 
Accordingly, in addition to asset size, we also use the size classification such as that adopted by 
the European Commission Standards. Firms are considered small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) if they satisfy two out of the following three conditions: 1) the number of 
employees is equal or less than 250, 2) a maximum turnover of EUR 407 million and 3) a 
maximum balance sheet total of EUR 275 million. Since the payout ratio and bond and 
commercial paper ratings are not always available for unlisted firms, we use quotation as an 
alternative classification criterion to proxy rating. Firms listed at the stock exchange need to 
satisfy certain listing requirements, dispose a higher solvability and consequently should have 
more easy access to external finance from both financial institutions and markets. 
The change in cash holdings is modelled as a function of a number of sources and uses of 
funds: 
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 (4) 
where the dependent variable is the annual change in cash and marketable securities ( tiCH ,∆ ) 
scaled by the amount of total assets at the beginning of the year ( 1, −tiTA ). Cash flow ( tiCF , ) is 
defined as the earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation. The amount of sales is a 
proxy for output and tiS ,log∆  as well as 1,log −∆ tiS  are the first differences of the natural 
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logarithm of sales. tiTFA ,∆ , tiIFA ,∆  and tiFFA ,∆  represent the changes in tangible, intangible 
and financial fixed assets respectively as a proxy for investment. The depreciation 
expenditures, denoted by tiDepr , , are also taken in consideration in the tangible investments.
5
 
tiNWC ,∆  denotes the change in non-cash net working capital and is calculated as the annual 
change in inventory stocks and debtors (trade receivables) minus the change in trade credit 
(trade payables). tiSD ,∆  is the annual change in short-term debt. The above-mentioned 
variables are scaled by the beginning of the year total assets. The natural logarithm of total 
assets ( tiTA ,log ), is a proxy for size. iλ  and tµ  are the parameters of the firm- and year-fixed 
effects and ti,ν  represents the error term.  
Table 2.1, Panel A, describes the main variables used in the regression estimation of 
equation (4). The median firm has a yearly increase in cash holdings equal to 0.1% of total 
assets, a cash flow of 8.6% of total assets and a sales growth of 6.7%. From the set of fixed 
investment variables, the investment in tangible assets is the highest, representing 6% of the 
total assets. Investment in intangible and financial fixed assets is lower than 1%.  The annual 
growth of net working capital represents on average 2.3% of total assets. Mean and median do 
not differ significantly which suggests that the coefficient estimates of the regression cannot be 
influenced significantly by the presence of outliers.  
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the variables used in regression analyses 
Variables Mean Med. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max 
Panel A      
Change in cash holdings: 
1, −
∆
ti
it
TA
CH
 0.006 0.001 0.063 -0.593 0.998 
Cash flow: 
1−it
it
TA
CF
 0.091 0.086 0.070 -0.497 0.499 
 Change in logarithm of sales: itSlog∆  0.079 0.067 0.199 -0.998 0.970 
Investment in tang. fixed assets: 
1−
+∆
it
itit
TA
DeprTFA
 
0.082 0.060 0.104 -0.642 1.017 
Investment in int. fixed assets: 
1−
∆
it
it
TA
IFA
 0.009 0.000 0.057 -0.598 0.989 
Investment in fin. fixed assets: 
1−
∆
it
it
TA
FFA
 0.007 0.000 0.053 -0.736 0.892 
                                                 
5
  These variables correspond to the investment expenditures and acquisitions used by 
ACW (2004). 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the variables used in regression analyses (Continued) 
 
Variables Mean Med. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max 
Change in net work capital: 
1−
∆
it
it
TA
NWC
 0.023 0.012 0.105 -0.847 2.682 
Change in short term debt: 
1−
∆
it
it
TA
STD
 
0.019 0.004 0.103 -0.791 0.897 
Logarithm of total assets: itTAlog  11.641 11.323 1.570 3.045 19.150 
Panel B      
Change in debtors +inventory: 
1−
∆
it
it
TA
DI
 0.044 0.025 0.138 -0.872 2.812 
Change in trade credit: 
1−
∆
it
it
TA
Cred
 0.015 0.008 0.078 -0.591 1.592 
Changes in long-term debt: 
1−
∆
it
it
TA
LTD
 0.010 0.000 0.088 -0.782 0.985 
 
Note: The sample comprises 2,190 firms from the euro-area with a total of 8,737 observations in the 
period 1994-2003. Panel A describes the main variables used in the regression estimation described by 
equation (4). The cash holdings refer to cash and marketable securities. Cash flow is defined as the 
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation. The first differences of the natural logarithm of 
sales capture the growth opportunities faced by the firm. The changes in tangible, intangible and 
financial fixed assets and the depreciation expenditures are the measures of investment. The change in 
non-cash net working capital is calculated as the annual change in inventory stocks and debtors minus 
the change in trade credit. Short-term debt is defined as liabilities to credit institutions or other 
borrowing (except trade credit) with a maturity of less than one year. Size is defined as the natural 
logarithm of assets. Panel B describes the additional variables used in the regression estimation 
described by equation (5). Long-term debt represents the financial debt with maturity above one year. 
 
The main hypothesis to be tested through equation (4) is that small, unquoted firms face 
worse financing conditions relative to large, quoted firms. The empirical implication of this test 
hypothesis proposed by ACW is based on the cash flow sensitivity measures under alternative 
financing conditions. The hypothesis would be accepted if we find a significant positive 
sensitivity for the group of small, unquoted firms and an insignificant sensitivity for large, 
quoted firms. Expected profitability is controlled by current and past sales growth (see 
Manigart et al., 2002 and Bond et al., 2004).
6
 We expect an increase in cash holdings whenever 
                                                 
6
  In ACW’s (2004) equation, future investment opportunities and expected profitability 
are captured by Tobin’s Q. Since market value cannot be defined for unlisted firms, we use 
sales growth instead. 
 
  
 
17 
 
 
the expected profitability of future investments is higher. As a proxy for investments, changes 
in tangible, intangible and financial assets plus depreciation are used. Firms can draw down on 
cash reserves in a given year in order to invest and we expect the estimates of 4α , 5α  and 6α  to 
be negative. The changes in net working capital and in short-term debt are included because 
they can be substitutes for cash. Consequently we expect that the net working capital to be 
negatively related to cash holdings’ changes reflected by 7α  and that short-term debt 
coefficient ( 8α ) to be positive. Based on the predictions of economies of scale in cash 
management, it is usually assumed that bigger firms hold relatively less readily available cash, 
and therefore we expect a negative coefficient estimate for size variable ( 9α ).  
We test the presence of endogeneity using the Hausman test, which is based on the 
difference between the OLS and the instrumental variables estimators. The null hypothesis can 
be rejected at the 1% significance level, which suggests that endogeneity should be controlled 
for. The set of instruments used in the regression are the country, time and industry dummies, 
the first and second lags of tangible fixed assets, the lagged intangible assets, the lagged 
financial fixed assets, lagged net working capital, lagged short-term debt and the lagged sales. 
We control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity by firm-fixed effects. 
Table 2.2 presents the results of the regression. The first two columns present the 
estimates for small and large firms based on their total assets. Alternatively, columns three and 
four present the estimates for the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and large 
enterprises (LE), classified on the basis of the European Commission Standards. The last two 
columns report the results for firms that have been selected on the basis of their listing at a 
stock exchange. 
The cash flow sensitivity of cash savings ( 1α ) is significant for all firm-groups of size 
and quotation, (the group of unquoted firms is significant only at 10% level). The highly 
significant cash flow sensitivity of all firm-groups implies that the hypothesis of relatively 
worse financing conditions for small, unquoted firms is rejected. Growth opportunities captured 
by sales growth variables ( 2α  and 3α ) do not seem to affect liquidity demand. However, this 
result must be interpreted with caution. Future investment opportunities might be important for 
cash holding variation, but it could be captured by another variable than sales growth. In 
particular, the cash flow seems to be a better proxy for growth opportunities. This is in line 
with the ACW findings of the theoretical derivations in the presence of asymmetric information 
(see equation 1) suggesting that all firm-groups of size and quotation, to some degree, face 
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market imperfections. The coefficients of the different types of investments ( 4α , 5α  and 6α ) 
have the expected negative signs, but they are not significant, except for the estimate for the 
small and SMEs samples where some coefficients are significant under the 10% level. The 
coefficient of net working capital ( 7α ) has the expected negative sign and is significant for the 
sample of small firms, implying that net working capital is used as a substitute for cash 
holdings. Firms’ cash savings are positively affected by an increase in short-term leverage 
( 8α ). The coefficient is significant for most of the firm-groups with the exception of SMEs and 
unquoted firms. This implies that, for most of the firms, external financing plays an important 
role in their liquidity management. Contrary to our expectations, we find a positive significant 
size effect ( 9α ) for the small and SMEs sample indicating a higher growth in cash reserves for 
larger firms within the samples. One explanation could be that the large firms in our sample 
grow faster in general and consequently the increase in cash holdings is also higher. However, 
it is more likely that the size proxy captures some other effects not controlled in the regression. 
The significant coefficients of the intercepts of these two samples suggest also that some 
important variables could be omitted. For the sake of comparison we use in this section the 
empirical model proposed by ACW, however as a solution for omitted variables we propose in 
the next section a dynamic model with additional variables. 
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Table 2.2: Cash flow sensitivity based on size and quotation 
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Dep. Var.: 
Cash savings 
Small Large SME LE Unquoted Quoted 
0α  -0.524 -0.476 -2.191 -0.282 -0.009 -0.453 
 (-2.83)*** (-0.54) (-2.93)*** (-0.67) (-0.01) (-0.72) 
1α  0.320 0.376 0.314 0.319 0.247 0.444 
 (8.18)*** (2.78)*** (2.86)*** (3.01)*** (1.69)* (2.88)*** 
2α  0.005 -0.010 -0.044 0.012 0.092 -0.034 
 (0.15) (-0.10) (-0.42) (0.17) (0.48) (-0.35) 
3α  -0.066 0.005 -0.135 0.028 0.048 -0.009 
 (-1.68)* (0.03) (-1.46) (0.25) (0.25) (-0.06) 
4α  -0.097 -0.011 0.056 -0.011 -0.028 -0.039 
 (-1.80)* (-0.16) (0.20) (-0.18) (-0.23) (-0.46) 
5α  -0.075 -0.114 -1.404 -0.057 -0.219 -0.114 
 (-0.51) (-0.65) (-1.67)* (-0.41) (-1.17) (-0.61) 
6α  -0.102 -0.303 0.313 -0.258 -0.411 -0.236 
 (-1.31) (-1.50) (0.81) (-1.44) (-1.20) (-0.92) 
7α  -0.232 -0.117 0.057 -0.121 -0.137 -0.108 
 (-6.62)*** (-1.07) (0.40) (-1.48) (-0.86) (-0.90) 
8α  0.186 0.170 -0.391 0.162 0.089 0.177 
 (6.01)*** (1.65)* (-1.36) (1.80)* (0.55) (1.78)* 
9α  0.053 0.033 0.223 0.021 -0.002 0.033 
 (2.74)*** (0.49) (2.85)*** (0.58) (-0.02) (0.65) 
Hausman 39.64 57.37 45.21 133.11 120.17 36.47 
(prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2444 2810 1294 7443 6337 2400 
R
2 
0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 
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Table 2.2: Cash flow sensitivity based on size and quotation (Continued) 
 
Note: The sample comprises 2,190 firms from the euro area with a total of 8,737 observations in the 
period 1994-2003. Firms are defined as small (large) firms allocated in the bottom (top) three deciles of 
the size distribution. SME and LE define small- and medium-sized enterprises and large enterprises based 
on the European Commission Standards. IV estimates with t statistics corresponding to heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are reported. The used instruments are the country and industry dummies and 
the initial stock of each asset: the first and second lag of tangible fixed assets, lagged intangible assets, 
lagged financial assets, lagged net working capital, lagged short-term debt and lagged sales. All 
regressions include time dummies (not reported in the table). The unobserved individual heterogeneity is 
controlled for by the firm-fixed effect. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively.  
 
The significant estimate for the cash flow sensitivity of cash for the sample of large and 
quoted firms is in contradiction with the American evidence. ACW find insignificant cash flow 
sensitivity for the large US firms, with high payout ratios and with bonds or commercial paper 
having been rated during the sample period. However, the firms defined as unconstrained using 
the Kaplan-Zingales (hereafter KZ) index seem to exhibit significant sensitivity.
7
 Furthermore, 
more recent studies bring supporting evidence that the KZ index is more reliable for the a priori 
financing constraints classification than other firm characteristics, like dividend payout ratio or 
size. Moyen (2004), for instance, by using a simulated sample of 2000 firms over 10 years, 
shows that the constrained model produces similar results to those presented by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). Also Cleary (1999) supports Kaplan and Zingales’ results for a larger sample 
of firms and with a classification scheme based on an index of financial constraints. All these 
results indirectly cast some doubts on the interpretation of the empirical findings of the ACW 
model.  
The estimated significant cash flow sensitivity of large and quoted firms could be 
interpreted in two ways. First, large and quoted European firms could face the same external 
financing barriers as small, unquoted firms. Obviously, size and quotation are not the proper 
classification criteria to investigate the euro-area firms under various financing conditions. 
Consequently, we would need an alternative methodology to identify firms that most probably 
face relatively worse/better financing conditions. The second interpretation would be that the 
empirical test based on the cash flow sensitivity of cash savings is not able to capture the 
                                                 
7
  Firms at the bottom (top) three deciles of the KZ index ranking are considered 
financially unconstrained (constrained), where the index is defined as: 
gsCashHoldin3151
Dividends36839Leverage1393Q2830Cashflow0021KZindex
×−
×−×+×+×−=
.
....
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behaviour of firms under different financing conditions. But then, we face the same problem as 
under the first interpretation, i.e. the lack of a reliable methodology to identify the financing 
conditions of euro-area firms. As a solution, we provide a purely empirical approach. In the 
next section, we introduce a more precise a priori classification of firms by ranking them in 
three groups based on the relationship between their financing needs and sources of funds 
(internal and external).  
In the subsequent section (subsection 2.4.2), we check the validity of the first 
interpretation, i.e. the financing conditions with respect to firms’ size and quotation, by 
classifying firms under different financing conditions and then by looking at the distribution of 
firms with financing problems according to differences in size and quotation. 
We investigate the second interpretation in more details in subsection 2.4.3. As can be 
seen from equation (1), the degree of financial constraints does not affect the level of the 
sensitivity. A relatively more constrained firm will not necessarily save more cash than a less 
constrained one. However, the proposed model should be able to detect the unconstrained firms 
based on the prediction that cash flow sensitivity of cash is not significantly different from zero 
for unconstrained firms. Hence, in our sample we look for firms with the best financing 
conditions and check whether the liquidity demand test is able to distinguish them from the rest 
of the sample. In addition, we provide an explanation for the sources of correlation between 
cash flow and cash savings other than the financing condition of the firm and investigate other 
determinants of the cash holdings. 
 
2.4  Financing constraints and the cash policy 
 
In this section a new classification scheme of financing conditions is described and an in-
depth analysis of the determinants of corporate cash policy is presented. With the help of this 
methodology we can answer the two main questions. First, whether the small, unquoted firms 
face relatively worse financing conditions relative to large, quoted firms, and second, whether 
firms with the best financing conditions can afford to have an irrelevant cash policy as 
suggested by ACW.  
 
2.4.1  Classification scheme 
 
The literature on financing conditions suggests that the sensitivity results depend 
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crucially on the a priori criteria used to identify whether a firm experiences financing 
constraints or not. For instance, Fazzari et al. (1988) and subsequent studies (for a literature 
overview see Schiantarelli, 1995, and Hubbard, 1997) define a priori four groups of firms based 
on the dividend payout ratio relying on the assumption that firms with lower payout ratios are 
more financially constrained. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) question the 
interpretation of the empirical results based on the Fazzari et al. (1988) classification scheme. 
They classify firms based on the availability and demand for funds using information from the 
managers’ report and financial accounts and they find regression results that contradict the 
previous literature. Moyen (2004) also shows that different measures used for the a priori 
classification (payout policy, asset size, bond ratings, commercial paper ratings, KZ index) pick 
up firms with very different characteristics and behaviours. While it is usual to consider as 
financially constrained firms those firms that face difficulties in obtaining external finance, 
there is no clear way described in the empirical literature to identify them. 
In this subsection, we introduce a new scheme that can be used to detect the presence of 
financing constraints. The classification takes into account information derived from balance 
sheet and profit and loss accounts. As Schiantarelli (1995) argues, one of the weaknesses of the 
previous literature is that firms are partitioned in groups with different financial status based on 
a single indicator, which may or may not be a sufficient statistic to assess the existence of 
financing constraints. Being aware of this shortfall, we try to use all the available information 
relying on accounting items. Our interpretation is then based on the interrelation of several 
financial variables within some scenarios. According to these scenarios, we decide whether the 
firm is relatively more or less financially constrained. 
Following Vermeulen (2002), we distinguish absolutely constrained, relatively 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Absolutely constrained firms are those that cannot get 
external finance, relatively constrained are those that can access only expensive external 
sources, and unconstrained firms are those that get new debt financing and pay, on average, the 
lowest financing costs available on the market. We construct our scenarios based on the 
interrelation of total investment, financing gap, financial debt and issuance of new shares 
obtained in the given year, and average interest payments on debt relative to interest rates 
charged in the local credit market. We also use a broader definition of the financing gap than 
the one defined by Vermeulen.
8
 Our definition is more related to the definition of Shiam-
                                                 
8
  Vermeulen (2002) defines the financing gap as the difference between fixed investment 
and cash flow. However, firms may have to invest also in inventories and accounts receivable. 
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Sunder and Myers (1999), considering the net increase in working capital as part of investment. 
The underlying idea is that if firms face financing gaps, they need to find other sources besides 
their current cash flow. Firms are considered as unconstrained when they face favourable 
external financing conditions, i.e. they can increase their leverage whenever it is needed with 
low financing costs relative to market conditions. We expect that the demand for financial debt 
decreases as its cost increases. Those firms that can get only expensive credits tend to use less 
external finance relative to the unconstrained firms and we consider those firms as constrained 
in the relative sense. And finally, we consider constrained in the absolute sense those firms that 
despite the financing gap do not get any credit or additional capital from the stock market. 
These firms need to use cash savings from the previous periods or liquidate current assets as 
additional source of finance. Table 2.3 summarises the criteria used in the classification. 
The second column shows the percentage of firm-years from the total sample of the given 
category. Total investment is positive in most of the cases. We consider negative investment 
(decrease in fixed assets plus non-cash current assets) as a sign of constraints since the firm is 
liquidating (relatively constrained type-4 and absolutely constrained type-2). In this case, we 
distinguish relatively or absolutely constrained firms based on their relation to external finance 
(given from the changes in total debt). 
 
Table 2.3: Firm-years’ classification 
Financing condition 
(% from total) 
Total 
investment 
Financing 
gap 
Changes 
in total 
debt 
Issue of 
new 
shares 
Interest 
payments 
Absolutely constrained firm-years 
1. (25%) ≥  0 ≥  0 ≤  0 ≤  0 - 
2. (9%) <  0 - ≤  0 - - 
Relatively constrained firm-years 
1. (9%) ≥  0 <  0 <  0 - - 
2. (36%) ≥  0 ≥  0 >  0 - tcRIR ,≥  
3. (1%) ≥  0 ≥  0 ≤  0 >  0 - 
4. (2%) <  0 - >  0 - - 
Unconstrained firm-years 
1. (3%) ≥  0 <  0 ≥  0 - - 
2. (14%) ≥  0 ≥  0 >  0 - tcRIR ,≤  
Note: tcRIR , represents the retail interest rate of the given country and year reported by ECB statistics. 
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The third column reports the financing gap, which is positive in most of the cases, 
indicating that the firms’ total investment is higher than the current cash flow. The two 
exceptions are the unconstrained type-1 and relatively constrained type-1. The first category 
covers the case when firms invest less than their current cash flow and they do not need 
external sources. We consider as relatively constrained those firms that invest less than their 
current cash flow and at the same time reimburse their credit. It is not certain if their investment 
is constrained by reimbursement or if they do not invest because of a lack of profitable 
investment opportunities. For the purpose of the study, we have to be rigorous in considering a 
firm as unconstrained and whenever there is a sign of possible constraints we define firms as 
relatively constrained.
9
 
In the fourth column, we look at the changes in total debt in order to see whether firms 
receive external finance whenever there is a need for it (positive total investment and financing 
gap). Unconstrained type-2 and relatively constrained type-2 firms get financial debt, as 
external sources. To distinguish these two types of firms, we consider the average interest 
payment on debt as the cost of credit showed in the last column. Being aware of the existence 
of country specificities in using data for firms located in various countries, we use as a 
benchmark the country-specific retail interest rates ( ), tcRIR . 
If a firm is not taking external finance despite having a positive financing gap, it is 
considered as absolutely constrained (absolutely constrained type-1). In case a firm with a 
positive financing gap does not take credit but still is able to issue shares, such as presented in 
column five, we consider it relatively constrained (relatively constrained type-3). We implicitly 
assume that issuing shares is more costly than debt financing because of the presence of 
asymmetric information,  as suggested by the pecking order theory of Myers (1984).  
After having classified each observation (firm-year), we apply a long-term view. For this, 
we look at the above-mentioned characteristics for three consecutive years. First, firms are 
defined as absolutely constrained if for three consecutive years they are categorised as 
absolutely constrained. Second, when firms are categorised as constrained (a combination of 
relatively and absolutely constrained or only relatively constrained firm-years) for three years, 
then they are considered constrained in the relative sense. Third, unconstrained firms are those 
                                                 
9
  For a robustness check we reproduce the main results of the paper using an alternative 
classification, where all firms with negative financing gap are considered unconstrained. 
Results do not change significantly and they are available upon request. 
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that are not included in the previous two categories. A firm is considered unconstrained if the 
financial constraints (absolute or relative) are present for a maximum of two consecutive years 
only. The final outcome of the classification is presented in Table 2.4 and the dynamic 
regression analysis presented in the next subsection is based on this long-term view 
classification. 
 
Table 2.4: Firms’ classification 
 
Final outcome 
No. of observation 
( firm-years) 
No. of firms % o firms 
Absolutely constrained firms 
 3,440 532 24% 
Relatively constrained firms 
 5,906 1238 57% 
Unconstrained firms 
 1,581 420 19% 
 
2.4.2  Firms’ characteristics and financial constraints 
 
We test the equality of the mean values of the different variables across the various firm-
groups using a t-test. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.5. Based on the t-statistics, 
there is no significant difference in the mean value of cash flow among the three groups of 
firms. Hence, profitability cannot be considered as a cause of being constrained. Investments in 
fixed assets, the second variable, is negatively related to financial constraints. This suggests 
that firms with similar cash flows invest differently based on the external financing conditions. 
Since constrained and unconstrained firms are equally profitable and have comparable internal 
sources (cash flow), unconstrained firms take more credit and invest more. 
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics across firm groups 
 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 
P-value 
)( RU =  
P-value 
)( AR =  
1. Cash flow   0.452 0.060 
U  0.091 0.083 0.076   
R  0.092 0.087 0.069   
A  0.089 0.085 0.069   
2. Investment rate   0.000 0.000 
U  0.117 0.076 0.154   
R  0.101 0.072 0.132   
A  0.082 0.057 0.124   
3. Sales growth   0.000 0.000 
U  0.106 0.085 0.393   
R  0.074 0.074 0.296   
A  0.048 0.052 0.239   
4. Leverage ratio   0.000 0.312 
U  0.326 0.315 0.175   
R  0.250 0.233 0.151   
A  0.247 0.220 0.167   
5. Paid interest rate   0.000 0.104 
U  0.065 0.052 0.063   
R  0.125 0.087 0.115   
A  0.121 0.084 0.115   
 
Note: The sample period is 1994-2003 including 2,190 firms located in the euro area with a total of 
10,927 observations. Cash flow is defined as profits after tax plus depreciation. Investments are 
calculated as the yearly increase in fixed assets plus depreciation. Both, investments and cash flow, are 
deflated by the beginning of period total assets. Sales growth is calculated as the first difference of the 
logarithm of annual sales. Leverage ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Paid interest rate is 
calculated as the ratio of the amount of interest paid divided by total debt. We assign the letter U  for 
unconstrained firms, R  for relatively constrained firms and A  for absolutely constrained firms. We test 
the hypothesis that the mean value of the variables of one group is not significantly different across firm 
groups using a t-test. P values of the t-test are presented in the last two columns. 
 
Looking at the third variable presented in Table 2.5, it is easy to detect a positive 
relationship between the absence of financial constraints and firms’ sales growth. The evidence 
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provided by the existing literature on the US for the constraints-growth relationship is 
contradictory. Our results are in line with the findings of Cleary (1999), which shows that firms 
that cut dividends, and therefore are considered as constrained firms, have lower market-to-
book ratio and sales growth. Whited and Wu (2004) also show that constrained firms have 
lower investment and sales growth.
10
 Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) analyse European firms and 
argue that high sales growth is an indicator of financial health and future profitability that 
opens up access to external finance. If we take into consideration the endogenous character of 
this relationship, it can be argued that less constrained firms do not have to give up profitable 
investment projects because of insufficient funds, so unconstrained firms can grow faster (see 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). 
Unconstrained firms, despite of the higher leverage that they display, face lower 
financing costs. The bankruptcy costs of leverage suggest a positive relationship, in the sense 
that higher leverage increases the bankruptcy cost and the higher risk should be compensated 
by higher financing costs. However, reliable firms with less volatile earnings should be able to 
increase leverage at low costs. The higher leverage of unconstrained firms is in line with the 
results obtained by Faulkender and Petersen (2003), which show that firms may be rationed by 
lenders, leading some firms to appear to be under-leveraged relative to unconstrained firms. 
Absolutely constrained firms pay a high cost for the credit obtained prior to the period under 
consideration and this could likely be the reason why they do not take any further credit 
obligations.
11
 The presented patterns of selected variables confirm the validity of our 
classification. 
Figure 1 shows that absolutely constrained firms have the highest percentage of cash 
savings. This confirms both the precautionary and the transaction cost hypotheses that firms 
facing difficulties in accessing external finance sources tend to hold higher cash levels over 
time (see Deloof, 2001, Ferreira and Vilela, 2004, and Whited and Wu, 2004).
                                                 
10  They use for the a priori classification an index measuring the shadow cost associated 
with raising new equity, which is the cost of external finance relative to internal finance. 
11
  It is worth noticing that in our classification, the cost of credit is not used as a criterion 
to define absolutely constrained firms. 
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Figure 2.1: Cash holdings
(1) 
Figure 2.2: Firms’ growth
(2) 
 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Absolutely constrained
Relatively constrained
Unconstrained
 
 
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Absolutely constrained
Relatively constrained
Unconstrained
 
Source: Bureau van Dijk and ECB calculation 
Note: (1) cash and cash equivalent / total assets 
Source: Bureau van Dijk and ECB calculation 
Note: (2) first difference of total assets/ 
beginning of period total assets 
 
It is important to notice that the cash savings of relatively constrained and unconstrained 
firms are not significantly different. The relatively significant amount of cash savings of 
unconstrained firms could be explained by the higher sales growth of this group of firms (see 
Opler et al., 1999). Another explanation is related to the specific characteristics of the European 
financial system. The most important external sources of finance for European companies are 
credits obtained from financial intermediaries instead of capital obtained from the stock market. 
Taking into consideration the penalty interest rates of delayed repayments, it is more costly for 
leveraged firms to be short of liquid assets. Additionally, liquidity could also be a criterion that 
can be used for obtaining credits, since firms with stable liquidity are usually considered as less 
risky. 
Looking at Figures 2.1 and 2.2, we can see the impact of general macroeconomic 
conditions on firms’ behaviour with respect to cash savings and firms’ growth. Cash holdings 
are lower in periods of favourable economic conditions and higher firms' growth (the 1996-
2000 period), while in periods of higher uncertainty and downturns the proportion of savings to 
total assets is increasing (after 2000). We can also conclude that absolutely constrained firms' 
cash flows fluctuate more strongly. These results are in line with the dynamics of liquidity 
management as a response to macroeconomic shocks in the US such as presented by ACW. 
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Table 2.6 shows the distribution of financially constrained firms among samples of 
different size and quotation. All groups of large, small, quoted and unquoted firms consist of 
similar percentages of absolutely constrained and relatively constrained firms. A slightly higher 
percentage of LEs are absolutely constrained compared to SMEs. These figures suggest that 
firm size and quotation cannot be used as indicators of financial status of euro-area firms 
particular to our sample.
12
 
 
Table 2.6: Financial constraints by size and quotation 
 
  A  R  U  Total 
Small No. of firms 213 511 154 878 
 % from Small 24% 58% 18% 100% 
Large No. of firms 177 404 144 725 
 % from Large 24% 56% 20% 100% 
SME No. of firms 107 327 101 535 
 % from SME 20% 61% 19% 100% 
LE No. of firms 482 1076 357 1915 
 % from LE 25% 56% 19% 100% 
Quoted No. of firms 120 282 99 501 
 % from Quoted 24% 56% 20% 100% 
Unquoted No. of firms 412 956 321 1689 
 % from Unquoted 24% 57% 19% 100% 
 
Note: Firms are defined as small (large) firms allocated in the bottom (top) three deciles of the size 
distribution and quoted firms are firms listed at a stock exchange. SME and LE defines the small and 
medium size enterprises and large enterprises based on the European Commission Standards. We assign 
the letter U  for unconstrained firms, R  for relatively constrained firms and A  for absolutely 
constrained firms. 
 
The results also confirm the previous evidence on the financing conditions of European 
firms. Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) find that firm size cannot be used as an indicator of 
                                                 
12
  The results for SMEs may be peculiar to the selected sample of firms, where on 
average the number of employees is 126 and the mean total assets is about 30 million euro. A 
different sample with very small firms might provide some differences in financing conditions 
among size and quotation groups. 
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financial status for a sample of German and UK firms. Chatelain et al. (2001) show that only in 
the case of Italian firms, investment expenditures of SMEs react more to cash flow movements 
than those of large firms. Similarly, Vermeulen (2002) finds no sign of worse financing 
conditions for unlisted French and Spanish firms relative to those listed on the market. A 
possible explanation for similarities across size and quotation groups is given by Mizen and 
Vermeulen (2005). Since the debt obtained from financial institutions is the most important 
external financing source of European firms, the classification based on the small-large and 
listed-unlisted characteristics do not separate European firms into those that obtain external 
financing relatively easier or harder. This is unlike the case for the American firms, where large 
quoted firms rely mostly on capital obtained from the stock market and the small firms face 
significantly worse financing conditions whenever their access to the stock market is denied. 
This could explain the different results obtained based on the European and the US market. 
 
2.4.3  Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings 
 
In this subsection we investigate the sources of cash flow sensitivity and its relation to the 
financing constraints. First, we estimate the ACW model for the three firm-groups based on the 
regression model described by equation (4). Second, we develop a dynamic model of inter-
temporal allocation of uses and sources of funds, incorporating in the model as explanatory 
variables all types of debt, such as trade credits, short- and the long-term debt. 
In the previous subsections, we identified the firm-group with optimal financing 
conditions for our sample as the unconstrained firms. Based on ACW’s liquidity irrelevance 
hypothesis, we expect that for this firm-group the estimated cash flow sensitivity of cash to be 
not significantly different from zero. 
Table 2.7 reports the results by fitting the instrumental variable model (equation 4) for 
each firm-group. The model is estimated with fixed effects and robust standard errors. The 
three columns report the estimates for absolutely, relatively constrained and unconstrained 
firms.  
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Table 2.7: Cash flow sensitivity of cash and financial constraints. Instrumental variable 
estimation with fixed effects 
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Dep. Var.: Cash savings A  R  U  
0α  -0.289 -0.217 -0.568 
 (-2.92)*** (-3.16)*** (-3.01)*** 
1α  0.332 0.282 0.567 
 (5.71)*** (5.51)*** (4.7)*** 
2α  0.014 0.025 -0.054 
 (0.46) (0.68) (-1.13) 
3α  0.029 -0.004 -0.089 
 (0.73) (-0.17) (-1.32) 
4α  -0.027 0.006 0.124 
 (-0.28) (0.07) (0.84) 
5α  -0.137 -0.078 0.052 
 (-0.81) (-0.49) (0.22) 
6α  0.029 -0.374 -0.270 
 (0.17) (-1.78)* (-0.68) 
7α  -0.145 -0.153 0.038 
 (-1.03) (-1.64)* (0.22) 
8α  0.176 0.131 0.022 
 (1.19) (1.87)* (0.11) 
9α  0.023 0.017 0.045 
 (2.71)*** (3.04)*** (2.85)*** 
Hausman test 50.85 57.36 63.72 
(prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 2908 4668 1161 
R
2 
0.03 0.04 0.02 
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Table 2.7: Cash flow sensitivity of cash and financial constraints. Instrumental variable 
estimation with fixed effects (Continued) 
Note: The sample comprises 2,190 firms from the euro-area with a total of 8,737 observations in the 
period 1994-2003. We assign the letter U  for unconstrained firms, R  for relatively constrained firms 
and A  for absolutely constrained firms. IV estimates with t statistics corresponding to heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are reported. The used instruments are the country and industry dummies and 
the initial stock of each asset: the first and second lag of tangible fixed assets, lagged intangible assets, 
lagged financial assets, lagged net working capital, lagged short-term debt and lagged sales. All 
regressions include time dummies (not reported in the table). The unobserved individual heterogeneity 
is controlled for by firm-fixed effects. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively.  
 
The sensitivities to the internal sources ( 1α ) are highly significant for all subsamples and 
their magnitude is the highest in the case of the unconstrained firms. These results are in line 
with the US evidence obtained by ACW (2004) using the KZ index as a priori classification 
and in contradiction with the rest of ACW’s (2004) empirical results. The significant cash flow 
sensitivity of unconstrained firms suggests that none of the firms can invest irrespectively of 
financing decisions. 
Similar to the results based on the different subsamples of sizes and quotation presented 
before, sales growth does not seem to capture the future growth opportunity ( 2α  and 3α ). The 
coefficients of the investments in tangible, intangible and financial fixed assets ( 4α , 5α  and 
6α ) have in most of the cases the expected negative sign but they are statistically not 
significant (except 6α  that is significant at 10% level). Net working capital ( 7α ) is negatively 
related to the cash holding changes, but it becomes significant at the 10% level only for the 
sample of relatively constrained firms. An increase in short-term debt ( 8α ) results in a 
significant (at 10% level) increase in savings in the case of relatively constrained firms, that is, 
of firms having access to external finance but paying a relatively higher cost for it. We estimate 
a significant positive size effect ( 9α ), which we explain through the particularity of our sample 
that large firms grow faster and consequently their cash reserves grow at a higher rate than for 
smaller firms. However, as mentioned before, the size proxy could capture some other effects 
not controlled in the regression. The estimated significant coefficients of the intercepts support 
this argument. Hence, in the followings we propose a dynamic model with additional control 
variables. 
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test can be rejected at the 1% significance level, 
which suggests that one should control for endogeneity. The selected instruments are those 
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described for the previous estimation of equation (4).  
As a next step, we propose a dynamic model with two-step system GMM estimation. We check 
the liquidity demand hypothesis in a dynamic framework using a technique that has been 
widely used in the investment sensitivity literature. The model allows past realisations of the 
lagged cash savings to affect its current cash savings. The long-term debt variable is also 
included as an additional external source of funds. We believe that these additional variables 
contribute significantly to the explanation of liquidity demand. The lagged dependent variable 
could reveal the mean reverting pattern of cash savings suggesting a desired level of cash 
positions. Long-term debt obligations could play an important role in cash policy mainly for 
two reasons. First, in the presence of a long-term investment project, firms can decide to 
allocate the obtained credit over time and not to invest the entire available amount in the first 
year. Hence, the amounts not invested in the first year could be held under the category of cash 
and cash equivalent. Second, highly leveraged firms have higher monthly interest obligations 
and the obligation of debt repayment in the future. As a result, cash management should play an 
important role in fulfilling their financial obligations. There are also differences in the uses of 
short- versus long-term external funds. While short-term debts could be used by firms to 
increase the cash reserves or to be invested in current assets, long-term debts are mostly 
associated with long-term investments. Moreover, the accessibility of short- and long-term debt 
could be influenced by different firm characteristics but both could play an important role in 
the cash policy of a firm. We expect a higher effect of long-term debt on the liquidity demand 
for unconstrained firms that are able to obtain such sources of funds. The proposed model to be 
estimated is: 
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 (5) 
In addition to the variables defined under the instrumental variable estimation model, we 
include in equation (5) the first lag of the dependent variable ( )1, −∆ tiCH , the first lag of 
intangible fixed investment ( )1, −∆ tiIFA  and the long-term debt ( ), tiLTD∆ . Past investment in 
research and development (as part of intangible assets) is included since it may indicate the 
growth potential of the company in addition to the sales growth variable. Instead of including 
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net working capital, we separate it into short-term uses and sources of funds, i.e. debtors (trade 
receivables) plus inventories ( ), tiDI∆  and trade credit (trade payable) ( ), tiCred∆ . Summary 
statistics of these additional variables are presented in Panel B of Table 2.1. Inventory stocks 
and debtors on the asset side increase more, with an average of 4.4 % of total assets, than trade 
credits, which increase on average by 1.5% of total assets. The change in long-term debt to 
total assets is on average 1%, while the increase in short-term debt to total assets is on average 
about 2%. Although the degree of economic development is fairly similar across countries in 
the euro area, differences in the institutional environment, in the importance of the banking 
sector and in affiliation to different business groups may play a role on firms’ behaviour.
13
 
Hence, we control for such country-specific effects by including country dummy variables. For 
the possibility that firms belonging to some particular industries have a higher desire to save 
cash, we also include industry dummies as a control variable. 
The dynamic GMM model controls for bias due to unobserved firm-specific effects and 
endogeneity through the lagged variables taken as instruments. The lagged dependent variable 
takes into account the adjustment of the actual cash holdings to their previous levels. Such 
adjustment could also indicate the existence of an active cash management policy. If firms have 
not adopted such a policy, we should expect an insignificant coefficient of the lagged cash 
savings. Under the irrelevance hypothesis, there is no unique optimal cash policy for 
unconstrained firms, and savings should fluctuate in an undetermined manner. A positive 
significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable would imply the existence of a target 
cash level, inconsistent with the irrelevant liquidity hypothesis. 
Table 2.8 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the GMM model. The 
significant negative values of the lagged dependent variable ( 1δ ) for all type of financing 
conditions point to the existence of a mean-reversion of cash savings, which, in turn, implies a 
target cash level and systematic cash savings. The cash flow sensitivity of cash ( 2δ ) has the 
highest coefficient for unconstrained firms.  The sensitivity measures are positive and 
significant at the 1% level for all type of firms, however the magnitude of the coefficient is 
lower than those estimated with the previous model. The lower values could be explained by 
the additional explanatory variables and the treatment with a different set of instruments.   
                                                 
13
  For instance, Deloof (2001) finds that Belgian firms’ intra-group relations reduce the 
need for liquid reserves and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) find that firms in EMU countries with 
superior investor protection hold less cash. 
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Table 2.8: Cash flow sensitivity of cash and financial constraints. Dynamic system GMM 
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Dependent var.:
1−
∆
it
it
TA
CH
 A  R  U  
0δ  -0.009 -0.067 0.130 
 (-0.33) (-1.43) (1.56) 
1δ  -0.112 -0.137 -0.137 
 (-3.74)*** (-2.82)*** (-2.79)*** 
2δ   0.191 0.190 0.388 
 (2.57)*** (2.63)*** (3.08)*** 
3δ  -0.006 -0.006 -0.014 
 (-0.49) (-0.43) (-0.76) 
4δ  0.011 0.019 -0.003 
 (1.24) (1.46) (-0.30) 
5δ  -0.071 -0.090 -0.182 
 (-1.85)* (-1.80)* (-2.75)*** 
6δ  -0.040 -0.015 -0.106 
 (-0.53) (-0.22) (-1.13) 
7δ   0.006 -0.034 0.021 
 (0.13) (-0.83) (0.42) 
8δ   -0.100 -0.130 -0.265 
 (-0.89) (-1.51) (-2.45)** 
9δ   -0.078 -0.146 -0.097 
 (-2.03)*** (-2.65)*** (-1.19) 
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Table 2.8: Cash flow sensitivity of cash and financial constraints. Dynamic system GMM 
(Continued) 
 
 A  R  U  
10δ   0.137 0.185 0.144 
 (2.43)*** (2.24)** (1.15) 
11δ  0.022 0.067 0.120 
 (0.69) (1.29) (1.68)* 
12δ  0.050 0.056 0.227 
 (1.54) (1.09) (2.85)*** 
 13
δ
 0.000 0.004 -0.008 
 (0.11) (1.12) (-1.23) 
N 2908 4668 1161 
Hansen test - χ2 
(prob.) 
199.08  
(0.71) 
191.31 
(0.82) 
137.33 
(1.00) 
AR(1) – z statistic -6.09 -5.37 -3.31 
(prob.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AR(2) – z statistic -0.44 -0.36 -1.54 
(prob.) (0.66) (0.73) (0.13) 
 
Note: The sample comprises 2,190 firms from the euro-area with a total of 8,737 observations in the 
period 1994-2003. We assign the letter U  for unconstrained firms, R  for relatively constrained firms 
and A  for absolutely constrained firms. Two-step system GMM estimates are presented with finite-
sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix (robust standard errors). The GMM instruments are 
the second to third lags of the variables. All regressions include time, industry and country dummies 
(not reported in the table). t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%. 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
None of the proxies for future investment opportunities measured by sales growth ( 3δ ), lagged 
sales growth ( 4δ ) and lagged investment in intangible assets ( 7δ ) are significant. Again, the 
insignificance of sales growth and intangible assets for the rest of the sample should be 
interpreted with more caution. It is more likely that these variables do not capture efficiently 
the future investment opportunity, rather than that savings are unaffected by future investment 
opportunities. Cash savings are used for inter-temporal allocation of investment in fixed assets 
of unconstrained (significant at 1% level), relatively and absolutely constrained firms 
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(significant at 10% level) as detected by the significantly negative coefficients of the tangible 
investment proxy  ( 5δ ). Investment in intangible assets  ( 6δ ) has the expected negative sign but 
is not significant. Investment in financial assets  ( 8δ ) affects significantly (at 5% level of 
significance) the cash savings of unconstrained firms. 
The sensitivities of cash savings to current operations (inventories and trade debt, 9δ  and trade 
credit, 10δ ) show the expected signs. They have a significant influence on the cash savings for 
absolutely and relatively constrained firms. The cash savings of absolutely and relatively 
constrained firms are affected neither by changes in short-term debt nor by long-term debt 
changes. The cash savings of unconstrained firms are positively affected by an increase in long-
term debt. The insignificant effect of debt in the case of absolutely constrained firms is not 
surprising, since, based on our classification criteria, they do not get new external sources in 
most of the years. For relatively constrained firms, which are able to obtain debt financing, 
changes in leverage do not influence significantly their cash reserves. The significant debt 
sensitivity of unconstrained firms is consistent with our expectation and it indicates that cash 
savings are used for inter-temporal allocation of both internal and external sources of funds. 
Firms can decide to allocate the obtained credit over time and not to invest the entire available 
amount in the first year. In addition, an increase in leverage of the firm could result in an 
increase of liquidity in order to fulfil the higher interest obligations and credit repayment in the 
future. Contrary to the estimates of the instrumental variables model, the estimated size effect 
and intercepts are not significant, which reconfirm the problem of the previously estimated 
ACW’s (2004) empirical model, caused by omitted variables. 
All regression models are accepted based on the Hansen test that confirms the validity of 
the selected instruments. The first-difference equation residuals are first-order autocorrelated 
( )1(AR ), just as expected based on the model specification. The rejection of higher order 
autocorrelation ( )2(AR ) indicates that the selected instruments are exogenous and the 
parameter estimates are consistent. Based on the two-step GMM estimation the robust 
covariance matrix is provided with finite sample correction of standard errors. 
In general, our results point to the fact that even firms under the best financing conditions 
operate in an imperfect market environment and save cash out of their realised profits 
proportional to future investment opportunities. Firms’ cash savings adapt to an optimal level 
and are positively affected by internal sources, irrespective of the difficulties to raise external 
financing sources. We find also evidence that the amount of external financing determines the 
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cash savings evolution for unconstrained firms. Firms without significant financing barriers 
still face higher external than internal costs of financing and they save cash in a systematic way 
to achieve an optimal inter-temporal allocation of financial resources. Since the cash flow 
already contains information about the firms’ future investment opportunities, unconstrained 
firms exhibit the highest sensitivity. Hence, the cash flow sensitivity does not reveal 
information on the financing condition of the firm. 
 
2.5  Conclusions 
 
This paper has developed a new classification scheme that can be used to detect the 
presence of financial constraints. Based on this new classification, we find that financially 
constrained firms that are unable to obtain external financing or face higher costs of borrowing 
invest at a lower rate and grow more slowly. They also hold relatively higher cash positions 
that grow substantially also under depressed economic conditions, confirming the 
precautionary cost hypotheses of holding cash.   The cash savings of unconstrained firms are 
positively affected by an increase in long-term debt. The significant debt sensitivity of 
unconstrained firms indicates that cash savings are used for inter-temporal allocation of both 
internal and external sources of funds. Firms can decide to allocate the obtained long-term 
credit over time. In addition, an increase in leverage of the firm could result in an increase of 
liquidity in order to fulfil the higher interest obligations and credit repayment in the future. We 
find that the distribution of financially constrained firms does not depend on the firm's size or 
its listing at a stock exchange. However, for a proper investigation of SMEs, a better coverage 
of small firms is needed than that provided in this paper. 
We provide evidence that all types of euro-area firms, regardless of their financing 
conditions, save their internal sources in a systematic pattern. The liquidity irrelevance 
hypothesis presented by Almeida et al. (2004) holds only for firms operating under perfect 
market conditions where internal and external financing sources are interchangeable. Such 
conditions can be hardly found, since even for those firms that are able to raise external sources 
under the best market conditions, there is a wedge between the internal and external costs of 
financing. Our results show that all firms are constrained to a certain degree by the imperfect 
market environment and consequently all of them have a determined cash policy. 
For firms under the best financing conditions, that we categorise as unconstrained, we 
estimate the highest cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings. This result, which appears puzzling 
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at first sight, can be explained as follows. First, similar to the findings of ACW (2004), when 
market imperfections are present, greater cash flow sensitivity of cash savings does not reflect 
higher financial constraints. The level of sensitivity is affected, apart from the precautionary 
savings, by future investment opportunities captured partly by the cash flow variable. Hence, 
the highest sensitivity of unconstrained firms simply reflects the high growth opportunities of 
this group of firms. While constrained firms save cash to hedge the fluctuations in their cash 
flow, unconstrained firms may save to boost future investments. Second, the cash flow 
sensitivity of cash should be interpreted in the light of the flow of external financing. We find a 
significant relationship between cash savings and the flow of long-term external sources. This 
can be explained by the fact that unconstrained firms use more intensively external financing 
sources, mostly long-term debt, to fund additional investments. In this case, cash holdings play 
an important role to balance the external and internal financing sources and the repayment 
obligations and interest costs. All these factors make liquidity relevant even for firms with the 
best financing conditions. We can conclude that the significance of cash flow sensitivity of 
cash savings does not provide reliable evidence to distinguish euro-area firms experiencing 
different financing conditions.
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Appendix -Data and sample selection 
 
Data on balance sheets and profit and loss statements are collected from the AMADEUS database of 
Bureau van Dijk. We start from a sample of non-financial firms providing consolidated items (15,972 
firms). For the sample period 1994-2003, we selected firms that provided information on the number of 
employees, total assets or turnover (12,519 firms). The sample size is further reduced when we included 
the following quality checks. First we checked that the reported balance-sheet items were positive and 
that the sum of the subcategories of a balance-sheet item did not differ more than 10% from the reported 
value of the item (9,164 firms). Then, we selected those firms reporting in their accounts values for our 
variables of interest (cash holdings, sales, tangible fixed assets, other fixed assets, intangible fixed 
assets, current assets, loans, long term debt and the interest paid) (6,825 firms). Finally, we retained 
only those firms reporting data for at least three consecutive years (2,821 firms). Our final sample 
consists of 2,190 firms after 1% trimming based on variables of cash flow and change in cash holdings.  
 
Figure A2.1: Size and country composition Figure A2.2: Industry-composition 
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Source: Bureau van Dijk and ECB calculations 
Total sample 2,190 firms 
Source: Bureau van Dijk and ECB calculations 
Total sample: 2,190 firms 
 
Note: SME and LE define the small and medium size enterprises and large enterprises respectively 
based on the European Commission Standards. SMEs are firms that satisfy two out of the following 
conditions: maximum number of 250 employees, maximum turnover of 407 million euro and maximum 
balance sheet total of 275 million euro. 
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3  IS THE GROWTH OF EURO AREA SMES CONSTRAINED BY 
FINANCING BARRIERS?  
 
3.1  Background and literature overview on financial dependence, growth 
opportunity and growth 
 
Corporate finance theory suggests that financial market imperfections like asymmetric 
information constrain the ability of firms to fund their investment projects. The financing 
constraints literature is mostly based on different measures of investment-cash flow and 
growth-cash flow sensitivities, which are assumed to indicate financing constraints. The 
sensitivity should show how extensively a firm needs to rely on internal funds to finance its 
investment projects. However, following the Kaplan and Zingales’ critique (1997; 2000), it has 
been shown that the higher sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow is not an 
appropriate indicator of financing constraints. The sensitivity may be magnified not only by the 
presence of financing constraints but also by growth opportunities and by the debt financing of 
the firm (see, for instance, Cleary, Povel and Raith, 2004; Boyle and Guthrie, 2003; Moyen, 
2004). Having these caveats in mind, other indicators of financing constraints need to be 
considered.  
We propose an alternative way to investigate the financing conditions of firms by 
focusing on firms’ ability to take advantage of their sector-specific growth opportunities and 
investigating whether firms can get the external sources induced by their technological demand 
for external financing. We assume that firms belonging to sectors that are more dependent on 
external financing sources or that have higher growth opportunities grow relatively faster in an 
environment of favourable financing conditions than firms which are less dependent on 
external financing sources or have lower growth opportunities. We assume that listed euro-area 
firms face the most favourable conditions to realise their financing need and growth 
opportunities and we call them benchmark indicators. The relationship between financing 
conditions and firms’ growth across firm sizes is investigated on the basis of these newly 
created indicators for the euro area, which reflect the sector-specific financing need and growth 
opportunities. With these benchmark indicators we analyse the financing conditions of different 
size groups and any significant deviation from the benchmark we take as a sign of financing 
barriers causing distortions in their realised growth. A significantly positive relationship 
  
 
44 
 
 
between firms’ realised growth and the benchmark indicators is taken as empirical evidence for 
favourable financing conditions. By contrast, in the presence of financing constraints, the 
firms’ realised growth is assumed to be limited by restrictions in the availability of financing, a 
fact that is even more emphasised in industries with strong growth opportunities.  In the long 
run, we investigate the time-invariant technology-induced need of external finance in 
explaining the relative importance of the firm size across sectors.  
There is extensive empirical evidence on the relationship between financing conditions, 
investment and firms’ growth. For instance, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that 
firms in countries with developed financial institutions obtain more external financing than in 
countries with less developed institutions, which has, in turn, a positive effect on firms’ growth 
(see also La Porta et al., 1998; Rajan and Zingales;1998). Moreover, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2005) find small firms to be the most affected by imperfections in the financial 
and legal system. In particular, focusing on small and medium-sized enterprises, which form an 
important part of the corporate landscape in the euro area, it is often argued that small firms, 
even with promising growth opportunities, find it difficult to raise external capital obtained 
with favourable terms and that they would finance their growth to a large extent through 
retained earnings (see, for instance, Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen, 1994; Yalcin, Bougheas 
and Mizen, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). The lack of external capital obtained with 
favourable terms is mostly explained by higher asymmetric information, lower available 
collateral and a higher idiosyncratic risk of small firms compared to larger ones.  
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are considered to be the engine of economic 
development but market and institutional failures impede their growth (see Snodgras and 
Biggs, 1996; Beck et al., 2005). Studies that discuss the growth constraints faced by SMEs and 
the role of financial and institutional development to overcome these constraints explore the 
differences across countries including in their studies both developed and developing countries 
(see for instance Berger and Udell; 1998, 2006; Galindo and Schiantarelli, 2003; Demirguc-
Kunt et al. 2006; Klapper et al., 2006). In this study we focus on euro-area countries, where 
cross-country differences in financial development are relatively lower and we emphasize the 
cross-size differences that facilitate our understanding of the financing and growth of euro-area 
non-financial firms. It is noteworthy that our final sample is one of the most comprehensive 
euro-area balance-sheets databases covering about 230,000 of micro and small firms over 10 
years.  
In this paper we find evidence that in the long run small and micro firms generally do not 
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specialise in sectors with high inherent reliance on external financing, showing that they tend to 
be more financially constrained than large firms. We also find that in the short run, medium-
size and large firms can adapt faster to the time-varying industry growth opportunities, from 
which we can conclude that their growth is not impeded by the availability of financial 
resources.  Results provided in this study are in contradiction with some previous European 
evidence. Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) find that firm size cannot be used as an indicator of 
financial status for a sample of German and UK firms. Chatelain et al. (2001) show that only in 
the case of Italian firms, investment expenditures of SMEs react more to cash flow movements 
than those of large firms. Similarly, Vermeulen (2002) finds no sign of worse financing 
conditions for unlisted French and Spanish firms relative to those listed on the market. The 
insignificant differences in the financing conditions of small and large firms concluded from 
previous studies could be explained either by an unreliable methodology of investment 
sensitivity of cash or by the less comprehensive database of micro and small firms. 
Our results are in line with the finding of studies based on firm-level survey data (The 
World Business Environment Survey) covering more than 80 countries and a large number of 
small firms. Shiffer and Weder (2001) find that small firms face higher growth obstacles than 
medium-size or large firms. Beck et al. (2006) show that size, age and ownership are the most 
reliable predictors of firms’ financing constraints.
14
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and size 
classification. Section 3 briefly discusses some stylised facts of euro-area firms across size-
groups. Our principal investigations and empirical results are reported in section 4. Section 5 
contains some robustness checks, and the final section concludes the paper. 
 
3.2  Data 
 
For the investigation of the relationship between financing conditions and growth of non-
financial enterprises in the euro area, we use a comprehensive sample of firm-level data of 
euro-area listed and unlisted non-financial enterprises, excluding firms in the agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and mining sectors, collected from the AMADEUS database of the Bureau van 
Dijk. AMADEUS is especially useful because of its large coverage of firms not listed on the 
                                                 
14  For a literature overview, see Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006). 
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stock market and includes very small firms.
15
  
The original data set contains financial information on about 2.6 million private and 
publicly owned firms across eleven euro-area countries in the period 1990-2004 (see appendix). 
For our analysis, we exclude the first three years because of the poor coverage and lose one 
additional year by constructing the variables of interest as the first difference of the balance 
sheet items. By imposing several quality checks, 1% trimming based on the main variables and 
a minimum of 3 consecutive years, the size of our final sample is reduced further to 259,929 
firms with about one million observations. It predominantly consists of unquoted firms with 
only 4,391 observations of quoted firms (see appendix). 
Whenever available, we use the consolidated annual accounts as these are considered to 
be most suitable for providing information about the financial situation of a company with 
subsidiaries. However, a large number of euro-area non-financial firms provide only 
unconsolidated accounts. To control for double accounting within these two samples, those 
subsidiaries which are owned by a parent company (more than 24.9% ownership) are identified 
on the basis of subsidiaries and ownership information and excluded from the sample. This is a 
problem not taken into consideration by previous studies (see for instance Chatelain et. al., 
2002; Wagenvoort, 2003).  
As there is a one-to-one match between the three-digit SIC and NACE sector 
classification for most of the sectors, we rely on the three-digit SIC-NACE correspondence 
table whenever it is possible. In addition, for comparability with previous findings on 
investigations across industry sectors, we construct a classification similar to the one used in 
Rajan and Zingales (1998).
16
 This classification is mainly based on the two-digit SIC code and 
results in 47 sectors.  
Size classes are defined following the European Commission classification
17
, i.e. the 
                                                 
15  At the same time, a major shortcoming of AMADEUS is the different coverage across 
euro area countries.  
16  Our classification differs slightly. First, we combine some subgroups within the 
manufacturing sector based on a minimum number of 10 firms per industry. It results in 29 
different manufacturing sectors while Rajan and Zingales consider 36 manufacturing sectors. 
Second, in addition to the manufacturing sector we analyse other sectors as well. 
17
  For the definition of micro small and medium-sized enterprises see the enterprise and 
industry publications of the European Commission: “The new SME definition, user guide and 
model declaration, based on the Commission Recommendation” (2003/361/EC). 
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classification criteria are based on the number of employees and on a joint condition of either 
total assets or turnover. Since many firms in the sample do not report their number of 
employees, total assets and turnover are used as a joint condition to classify such firms and 
retain them in the sample (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1: Definition of size classes 
Type of firms Employees  Total Assets  Turnover 
Micro < 10 and < 2 mio. EUR or < 2 mio. EUR 
Small < 50 and < 10 mio. EUR or < 10 mio. EUR 
Medium < 250 and < 50 mio. EUR or < 50 mio. EUR 
Large > 250 or > 50 mio. EUR or > 50 mio. EUR 
If the number of employees is missing:   
Micro   < 2 mio. EUR and < 2 mio. EUR 
Small   < 10 mio. EUR and < 10 mio. EUR 
Medium   < 50 mio. EUR and < 50 mio. EUR 
Large   > 50 mio. EUR or > 50 mio. EUR 
In addition to our main sample of listed and unlisted firms, we create a second sample of 
listed non-financial firms only, based on the Thomson Financial DataStream database. This 
sample is used for constructing two benchmark indicators: the sector-specific indexes of growth 
opportunities and external financing need, following the approach by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). By using listed euro-area firms for constructing the benchmark indicators, we assume 
that listed firms in the euro area have generally a wide spectrum of financing instruments 
available and are thus largely financially unconstrained.  
The sample of about 2,300 firms and about 25,000 observations contains financial 
information of publicly owned non-financial corporations across euro-area countries in the 
period from 1985 to 2004. For the benchmark sample we use the same sector breakdown as 
described for the AMADEUS sample and we exclude the years before 1993 because of poor 
coverage. The final sample for the calculation of the benchmark indicator on growth 
opportunities consists of 18,841 firm-year observations and 1,742 firms. For the calculation of 
the benchmark indicator on financing needs it consists of 14,139 firm-year observations and 
1,168 firms. 
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3.3  Financing conditions and growth across firm sizes in the euro area - 
some stylised facts 
 
In this section we investigate briefly some stylised facts for various firm sizes, which 
might provide insight into financing constraints and growth. The pecking order theory of Myers 
(1984) suggests that firms prefer raising funds from retained earnings, since due to asymmetric 
information and/or transaction costs the cost of external financing is generally higher (see also 
Myers and Majluf, 1984). Hence, a higher profitability of a firm can thus be considered as an 
indicator of better financing conditions, the general ability of a firm to invest in positive net 
value projects and of fewer barriers to a firm’s growth. At the same time, however, higher 
internal funds in the form of cash reserves might indicate that firms face higher transaction 
costs of raising outside funds or to convert other assets into cash. Following the precautionary 
reason of holding cash, one can expect that liquid funds are higher if there is a higher 
probability of a shortage of funds in the future.   
Looking at the return on assets ratio (ROA) presented in Figure 3.1 we find evidence that 
large firms are significantly more profitable than other firm size groups. We therefore expect 
large firms to be in a better position to realise their growth opportunities within a given sector. 
As can be seen in the graphs, the profitability of large firms is more volatile which also 
suggests that these firms can adapt better to growth opportunity shocks. This is also in line with 
our assumption that listed firms, which are predominantly large in the euro area, are the most 
unconstrained firms. We find a less clear distinction in the profitability between micro, small 
and medium-sized firms.  
At the same time, we also find evidence that small firms hold relatively higher levels of 
cash and cash equivalents (see Figure 3.2), whereas the cash holdings of the medium-sized 
firms are more comparable with the level of cash holdings of large firms. Assuming that cash 
holdings have a higher importance for firms with less access to external financing sources and 
are used to protect against unexpected shortfalls in cash flow, motivated by the costly 
liquidation of assets in order to obtain readily available cash, we can conclude that small firms 
are likely to be more financially constrained. An alternative explanation could be that firms 
with higher current liabilities are liable to face greater uncertainty regarding short-term 
refinancing and therefore hold more cash for an unexpected need to reduce their debt. The 
precautionary reason of holding cash is also emphasised by the empirical literature. Faulkender 
(2002) shows that small US firms with a higher cost of financial distress and greater 
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information asymmetries hold more cash than larger firms (see also Deloof, 2001; Ferreira and 
Vilela, 2004; Opler et. al.,1999).  
 
Figure 3.1: Return on assets (ROA) (%)  Figure 3.2: Cash holdings to total assets (%) 
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Sources: AMADEUS, ECB calculations Sources: AMADEUS, ECB calculations 
 
Note: The annual growth is calculated as the first difference of sales (total assets) divided by the 
beginning of year sales (total assets). Ratios are calculated for each size group by first 
aggregating the financial items of all firms belonging to that group for each year and, as a second 
step, yearly ratio of the four size groups and the whole sample is calculated. Calculations are 
based on the sample of 4,806,876 observations with about 1 million firms.  
 
In line with our hypothesis that there should be a positive relationship between financing 
conditions and firms’ ability to realise their sector-specific growth opportunities and financing 
need, we find evidence that large firms grow faster on average. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show that 
firms’ size is generally positively related to the annual growth rate of sales and total assets. At 
the same time, the development in total assets has been more cyclical for large than for small 
firms in 2001 and 2002. The declining rate of growth of firms’ total assets during 2001 and 
2002 reflects the decrease in sales, investment and profitability at that time, which was most 
pronounced for large firms.  
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Figure 3.3: Annual growth of sales (%) Figure 3.4: Annual growth of total assets (%) 
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Sources: AMADEUS, ECB calculations Sources: AMADEUS, ECB calculations 
 
Note: The annual growth is calculated as the first difference of sales (total assets) divided by the 
beginning of year sales (total assets). Ratios are calculated for each size group by first 
aggregating the financial items of all firms belonging to that group for each year and, as a second 
step, yearly ratio of the four size groups and the whole sample is calculated. Calculations are 
based on the sample of 4,806,876 observations with about 1 million firms.  
 
3.4  Barriers in growth across size groups – methodology and empirical 
results 
 
The importance of financing sources and their effect on firms’ value and its growth is 
documented in different branches of the corporate finance literature focusing on the capital 
structure, financing constraints and financial development across countries. However, it is 
difficult to establish with confidence the direction of the causal mechanism of financing and 
growth, i.e., to decide whether unavailability of financing sources are responsible for the lower 
growth, or whether firms lack the profitable investment projects and consequently do not need 
external financing. In order to control for this causality problem we follow the Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) basic assumption that financing development, and in our case the financing 
condition of the firm, should disproportionately affect firms belonging to different industries. 
The industry-specific characteristics are captured with benchmark indicators. The assumptions 
of our study can be summarised as follows. First, industries typically dependent on external 
financing can grow faster than the rest of the industries only if financing sources are available. 
Second, the industry-specific characteristics can capture the growth potential, i.e. the profitable 
investment projects. Industries with good investment projects can grow faster than other 
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industries only when the necessary financing can be obtained. Based on these two assumptions 
we build our main test hypothesis of financing conditions across size groups presented below. 
In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we describe the calculation of the industry-specific financing need 
and growth opportunities. The summary statistics of the main variables are presented in 
subsection 4.3. The main test of the financing conditions across size-groups is conducted with 
alternative econometric models that are presented in subsection 4.4. 
 
3.4.1  Benchmark indicators  
 
We follow the approach originated by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and assume that there 
are technological reasons why some industries depend more on external finance than others. 
However, we extend this approach in two ways. First, instead of using the Rajan and Zingales’ 
(1998) index calculated based on the US data, we calibrate the approach specifically to the euro 
area. We use a sample of euro-area listed companies for the construction of the two alternative 
benchmark indicators. Second, in addition to the manufacturing sector investigated by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), our study includes each non-financial sector. 
Since listed euro-area firms have access to a variety of financing sources (both securities 
and loans) and can take the best advantage of global growth opportunities through international 
markets, we assume that these firms face the least frictions in accessing external finance. 
Consequently, the reliance on external financing of the firms belonging to a given industry 
should reflect the industry’s need for external finance. In a similar manner, we suppose that 
growth differences across industry sectors of listed euro-area firms reflect the reallocation of 
capital to firms in the sectors with the best growth opportunities. We also assume that a global 
shock to growth opportunities is best captured by listed firms, as they are in the best position to 
adapt to such a shock and realise changed growth opportunities. 
The benchmark financing need indicator is based on the amount of investment of a 
representative (median) largely unconstrained euro-area firm, which cannot be financed 
internally through cash flow, and hence has to be financed externally. It is calculated as: 
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indExtFinDep  denotes the external financing dependence and it is defined broadly as the 
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difference between fixed investment and firms’ available internal funds divided by the fixed 
investment. Investment in non-financial fixed assets ( itInv , ) is calculated as the first difference 
in tangible and intangible fixed assets plus depreciation. Net cash flow ( itCF , ) is defined as 
cash flow (profit for the period plus depreciation) minus the increase in non-cash current assets 
(inventories plus receivables) plus the increase in trade credit. The ratio is calculated in two 
steps. First, the firm-level financing need is computed by aggregating the investment and net 
cash flow over the whole sample period (1994-2004). The aggregation over the years smoothes 
temporal fluctuations. In a second step we calculate the sector median, which we consider as 
the sector-specific technological demand for external financing. 
The second benchmark indicator that we use represents the sector-specific growth 
opportunities, proposed by Fisman and Love (2004).  
 
( ) 





−= ∑ −
t
ititindind tSalesSalesMedianGOp )max(/lnln ,1,          (2) 
indGOp  denotes the benchmark growth opportunities indicator and it reflects the sector-specific 
growth of a representative (median) largely unconstrained euro-area firm based on the sample 
of listed non-financial enterprises in the euro area. The index is calculated as the sector median 
of firms’ average sales growth ( itSales ,ln ) over the sample period.  
 
 3.4.2  The relationship between the two benchmark indicators  
 
We expect a positive relationship between the two benchmark indicators. More precisely, 
based on the assumption that listed firms face the best financing conditions of the economy, the 
sales growth of these firms can adapt quickly to changes in global growth opportunities as it 
should be best supported by the availability of external capital. Hence, listed firms should have 
a high ability to realise their growth opportunities as they have the best chances to realise their 
external financing need. External capital can be obtained through debt financing or equity 
financing. It should be noted that the financing need indicator captures both sources while it 
does not comprise the financing from the internal cash flow of the current activity.
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Figure 3.5: Financing need –benchmark Figure 3.6: Growth opportunities-
benchmark 
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Sources: Thomson Financial DataStream, ECB calculations 
 
Note: The financing need indicator is calculated with the aggregated items over the period 1994-
2004 for each firm. The growth opportunities indicator is calculated as the averaged yearly sales 
growth for each firm. As a second step the sector specific median is calculated for both 
indicators. 
 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 point indeed to the expected positive relationship of the two 
indicators. For the purpose of our investigation the ranking of the industries is more important 
than their absolute value. On the first position, with the highest growth opportunities and 
financing need is the Business services sector. The General building contractors sector (that 
belongs to the construction sector) has a high ranking in both classifications. The 
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Communications sector has the highest growth opportunities ranking with about 15% annual 
growth taken as an average of the period 1993-2004. However, based on the financing need 
indicator it seems that the firms in this sector rely less intensively on external financing, which 
could be owing to exceptionally high realised profits. By contrast, firms in the Office and 
Computing manufacturing sector have a high need of financing. 55% of their investments in 
tangible and intangible assets are financed by other sources than their realised profit. The high 
need for external financing sources is also reflected by the relatively higher average sales 
growth of about 10% per year. On the lower part of the financing need ranking list are the 
Glass, Furniture and Apparel manufacturing sectors showing a financing surplus (negative 
financing need). The surplus, however, most probably does not result from high profits, but 
rather from low investment. These industries are also ranked on the lower part based on the 
growth opportunities, all facing a sales growth not higher than an annual 5%.  
The rank correlation of the two benchmark indicators presented in Table 3.2 shows a 
significant positive correlation of about 0.40, thus confirming the expected positive relationship 
between the two indicators. 
 
Table 3.2: Spearman rank correlation of benchmark indicators and firms’ realised growth 
across firm sizes 
 
 Fin. Need Growth Op. Firms’ Realised Growth 
 Benchmark Benchmark Micro Small Medium Large 
Fin.Need - Benchmark 1.00      
Growth Opp. - 
Benchmark 
0.40* 1.00     
Realised Growth-Micro 0.19 0.19 1.00    
Realised Growth-Small 0.19 0.39* 0.64* 1.00   
Realised Growth-Med. 0.30* 0.46* 0.42* 0.65* 1.00  
Realised Growth-Large 0.22 0.49* 0.31* 0.36* 0.54* 1.00 
 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 5 % level. 
 
In order to gain some insights into the relationship between firms’ realised growth and the 
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sector-specific benchmark financing need and growth opportunities, their rank correlations are 
presented in Table 3.2. The realised growth is calculated for each of the 47 industries as the 
weighted average of the firms’ growth. The table presents the realised growth across firm sizes 
and relates it to the two benchmark indicators. In the case that the correlation between the 
realised growth of the firm size group and the benchmark indicators is low, this might give an 
indication of financial constraints. According to our hypothesis this would imply that firms in 
this firm size group are on average less able to realise their growth opportunities or financing 
need than a financially unconstrained firm.  
It turns out that the benchmark financing need indicator is less correlated with the firms’ 
growth and is significant only in the case of medium-sized firms. This might be the case as the 
ability to adapt to growth opportunity shocks dominates in the short term, whereas mainly in 
the long term the technological financing need is relevant and determines the shares of the firm 
size across sector. The correlation among firms’ growth and the sector-specific benchmark 
growth opportunities increases with size. These results support our hypothesis that larger firms 
can adapt faster to growth opportunities, given that they are less financially constrained. 
 
3.4.3  Summary statistics  
 
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A reports the values of the 
variables for the overall sample while panel B focuses on the differences across size groups. All 
in all, we have 1.4 million observations.  
On average the rate of growth of firms is 9% while the median is 4%, indicating that there 
is a tail of considerably higher values. Looking at panel B, we can see that larger firms grow 
faster than smaller ones and that their distribution is more homogenous. We use as a measure of 
the financial systems’ performance (financial development indicator) the amount of bank credit 
to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. A larger market for bank loans indicates that more 
intermediation and thus more monitoring of loans and pooling of resources take place in a 
financial system. On average the bank loans to GDP is 0.84 and it varies from 0.35 to 1.55 
across countries. From panel B, we do not see big differences in the financial development 
indicator across size groups and this is indirect evidence that size groups are distributed evenly 
across countries. Total assets are, as expected, increasing by size group. The variable Young is 
a dummy variable that takes value 1 when firms are younger than 10 years and 0 otherwise. On 
average, 40% of firms are considered young and the proportion is higher for smaller firms.  
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Looking at leverage variables (short-term and long-term debt to total assets), we do not 
find much difference across size groups.
18  
On average the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
is 0.08 while that of short-term is slightly higher at 0.10. 
With respect to the cost of financing, we find that the average interest rate borne, as 
indicated by the ratio of interest paid to total debt, by micro and small firms is generally higher 
than that of large firms. On average the interest rate is 21% for small firms and 16% for large 
firms. As firms might not only be constrained by the amount of credit received but also by the 
price of credit, this might also be an indication of the higher relevance of financial constraints 
for small firms.  
 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics by size groups 
 
Panel A: All firms No. of Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firms' Growth (% change 
in total assets) 
1,421,753 
 
0.09 
 
0.04 
 
0.24 
 
-1.00 
 
1.45 
Industrial Financing need 1,421,753 0.16 0.13 0.22 -0.69 0.58 
Industrial growth 
opportunity shocks 
1,421,753 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.30 
Bank loans to GDP  1,421,753 0.84 0.86 0.13 0.35 1.55 
Logarithm of total assets 1,393,776 6.95 6.78 1.41 4.16 11.16 
Young 1,421,753 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Sales growth 1,392,332 0.08 0.05 0.23 -0.51 1.46 
Trade Credit to total assets 1,421,753 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.00 30.86 
Short-term debt to total 
assets 
1,421,753 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.00 27.52 
                                                 
18  It should be noted, however, that in a less restricted sample of about 4 million 
observations and value-weighted averages we find that smaller firms have a relatively lower 
long-term debt-to-assets ratio. As long-term debt is the most important external source to fund 
long-term investment projects, this could be an indication that smaller firms face higher 
financing constraints than large firms. Small firms either try to compensate a possible lack of 
long-term external capital by short-term debt or they need to reduce their fixed investments. 
Moreover, small firms rely to a larger extent on trade credit in relation to their total assets than 
large firms. 
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics by size groups (Continued) 
 
Panel A: All firms No. of Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Long-term debt to total 
assets 
1,421,753 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.00 37.68 
Cash flow tot total 
assets 
1,393,202 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.20 0.38 
Interest paid  to total 
debt 
630,679 0.20 0.14 0.19 0.01 1.00 
Adjustment term 739,900 -0.50 -0.54 0.56 -1.91 1.56 
     
Panel B: Size groups Micro Small Medium Large 
 Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
Firms' Growth (% 
change in total assets) 
0.07 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.06 
Industrial Financing 
need 
0.17 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.13 
Industrial growth 
opportunity shocks 
0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Bank loans to GDP  0.86 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.81 0.82 0.86 0.83 
Logarithm of total assets 5.91 5.89 7.45 7.43 9.08 9.18 10.21 10.47 
Young 0.55 1.00 0.41 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Sales growth 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.07 
Trade Credit to total 
assets 
0.19 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.18 
Short-term debt to total 
assets 
0.09 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.08 
Long-term debt to total 
assets 
0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Cash flow tot total 
assets 
0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 
Interest paid  to total 
debt 
 0.21    0.15     0.20    0.14     0.17     0.11     0.16     0.09    
Adjustment term -0.53   -0.59 -0.50 -0.54 -0.35    -0.34    -0.27    -0.28    
 
3.4.4  Financing constraints test based on the benchmark indicators  
 
Before testing the financing conditions across size groups we regress firms’ growth 
(Model I) and firms’ size (Model II) relying on the financial development multiplied with the 
growth opportunity and financing need. The crucial difference between the two benchmark 
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indicators is that the growth opportunity is a time-varying indicator capturing the technological 
innovations while the financing need is a time-invariant proxy of technological need of external 
sources. Consequently, we separate the role of the across-country financial development into 
the short- and long-run effects. Fisman and Love (2004) show that the long-term effect is better 
captured by the relationship of financing need and the size of the industry (the shares of the 
industry in the total output of the country). In our case of firm-level data, the size refers to 
firms’ size, which is the accumulated past growth rates of the firms. The short-term relationship 
is proposed to be captured by the effect of growth opportunities on firms’ growth.    
The long-run relationship is estimated with model 1: 
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        (3) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total assets of firm i  and time t  ( tiTA ,log ), the proxy 
for firms’ size. External financing dependence ( lExtFinDep ) is the benchmark indicator of 
industry sector l , calculated in subsection 3.1. Financial development ( tkDevF ,. ) is the proxy 
of the financial system performance of the country k  and time t , measured by the bank loans 
to GDP. We select this indicator from the set of financial system performance measures (size of 
the capital market, financial innovations and market completeness) since it could affect both 
listed and unlisted firms. We control for the age of the firm through a dummy variable 
( tiYoung , ) that equals 1 if the age of the firm is less than 10 years. In addition, we control for 
year, country, industry and year-industry effects. The time-country aspects identify the cyclical 
behaviour of each economy. Table 3.4 presents the results for model 1. t statistics are reported 
in parentheses. 
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of Model 1. Dependent variable: firms’ size 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
kl DevFinGrowthOp .×  0.178 0.196   
 (0.93) (1.15)   
kl DevFinExtFinDep .×    0.276 0.369 
   (2.16)** (3.14)*** 
tiYoung ,   -0.615  -0.615 
  (-62.2)***  (-62.2)*** 
2R  0.37 0.41 0.38 0.41 
N  1,421,753 1,421,753 1,421,753 1,421,753 
 
Note: All regressions include the year, country, industry and year-industry dummies 
(not reported in the table). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively.  
 
As expected, the estimate for the external financing dependence-financial developments 
coefficient is positive significant with and without the dummy variable controlling for firm age 
(columns 1 and 2). We estimate alternative specifications where instead of external financing 
dependence we use the growth rate indicators and we find an insignificant relationship 
(columns 3 and 4). Based on these results we can conclude that the size of the firm is 
determined in the long run by the financing conditions, since firms are larger in industries with 
higher external financing dependence in countries with better financial development. Based on 
the results of columns 3 and 4, we can see that time-varying growth opportunities do not 
influence significantly the firms’ size. 
As a next step, the short-term relationship is estimated with model 2:  
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where tiGrowth ,  is the percentage change of the total assets of the  firm i  between time 1−t  
and t . The main variable of interest here is the growth opportunity-financial development 
coefficient, where lGOp  represents the growth opportunity of industry l . Results are presented 
in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Estimation results of Model 2. Dependent variable: firms’ growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
kl DevFinGrowthOp .×  0.073 0.074   
 (2.82)*** (3.89)***   
kl DevFinExtFinDep .×    0.045 0.039 
   (2.42)** (2.12)** 
tiYoung ,  0.040   0.040 
 31.66   (31.64)*** 
2R  0.38 0.40 0.41 0.46 
N  1,421,753 1,421,753 1,421,753 1,421,753 
 
 Note: All regressions include the year, country, industry and year-industry dummies (not 
reported in the table). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
The results of columns 1 and 2 indicate a significant positive correlation among industry-
specific growth opportunities and realised growth of the firm, which is higher in countries with 
more available bank loans (higher financial development). When we use the alternative 
industry benchmark, the external financing dependence instead of the growth opportunity, the 
coefficient is still positive but its magnitude is lower and it is less significant (see columns 3 
and 4). We can draw two important conclusions. First, firms are growing faster in the industries 
with good growth opportunities in countries with higher financial development. Second, the 
time-varying growth opportunity shock indicator is a better proxy for the firms’ growth than 
the external financing dependence. The results of model 1 and model 2 support the findings of 
Fisman and Love (2004) that financially developed economies are specialised in financially 
dependent industries in the long run, and allocate resources to industries with high growth 
opportunities in the short run.  
The main focus of the study, however, is the across-size differences in firm’s growth and 
whether it is constrained by financing sources.  The results of model 1 provide evidence that in 
the long run the firms depending on external financing can reach a greater size in countries with 
better financing conditions. This suggests that size is an endogenous variable, conditional on 
the availability of sources.  Model 2 shows that firms grow faster in industries with good 
growth opportunities in better financing conditions.  Further on, we investigate with more 
details the growth of different size-groups, whether firms of different sizes can take advantage 
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of industrial growth opportunities in a similar manner and how important the country’s 
financial development for each size-group is. Based on our hypothesis, whenever a given size-
group is not able to follow the industry-specific growth opportunities, there is a sign of 
constraints. In such cases firms of the given group are growing unrelated or less dependent on 
the growth opportunities (good investment projects) and we conclude that such distortions are 
caused by inelastic financing sources, unable to adapt to growth opportunity shocks.   
With the help of Model 3 we can investigate the growth dependence on the time-varying 
growth shocks across size-groups: 
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The dependent variable is the percentage change of the total assets of the firm i  between 
time 1−t  and t . The dummy variables tiMic , , tiS , , tiM ,  and tiL ,  denote the micro, small, 
medium and large firms, respectively, as defined according to the classification described in 
section 2 (see Table 3.1). We use as an additional control variable the size of the firm measured 
by the logarithm value of total assets.  
All variables are estimated separately for each size group with four size dummies. For our 
interpretation the most important are the coefficient estimates from 6α  to 9α , showing whether 
the industrial growth opportunities are reflected in the growth of the size-group. Results are 
presented in Table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6: Estimation results of Model 3. Dependent variable: firms’ growth 
 
 (1) (2) Only unquoted firms 
tikl MicroDevFinGrowthOp ,. ××  0.030 0.023 
 (0.44) (0.34) 
tikl SmallDevFinGrowthOp ,. ××  0.250 0.239 
 (4.12)*** (3.97)*** 
tikl MediumDevFinGrowthOp ,. ××  -0.104 -0.054 
 (-1.16) (-0.62) 
tikl eLDevFinGrowthOp ,arg. ××  -0.107 0.138 
 (-1.7) (2.3)*** 
til MicroGrowthOp ,×  -0.052 -0.046 
 (-0.89) (-0.81) 
til SmallGrowthOp ,×  -0.093 -0.085 
 (-1.67) (-1.54) 
til MediumGrowthOp ,×  0.332 0.285 
 (4.18)*** (3.66)*** 
til eLGrowthOp ,arg×  0.551 0.283 
 (8.48)*** (4.53)*** 
titi MicroYoung ,, ×  0.055 0.055 
 (26.61)*** (26.83)*** 
titi SmallYoung ,, ×  0.062 0.062 
 (117.78)*** (125.39)** 
titi MediumYoung ,, ×  0.050 0.049 
 (178.72)*** (191.41)*** 
titi eLYoung ,, arg×  0.022 0.020 
 (115.81)*** (85.29)*** 
titi MicroTA ,,ln ×  0.044 0.045 
 (19.73)*** (20.52)*** 
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Table 3.6: Estimation results of Model 3. Dependent variable: firms’ growth (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) Only unquoted firms 
titi SmallTA ,,ln ×  0.038 0.038 
 (17.84)*** (18.49)*** 
titi MediumTA ,,ln ×  0.033 0.033 
 (17.31)*** (17.94) 
titi eLTA ,, argln ×  0.026 0.027 
 (17.62)*** (18.49)*** 
2R  0.16 0.16 
N  1,421,753 1,417,362 
 
Note: All regressions include the year, country, industry and year-industry dummies (not 
reported in the table). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
The first column presents the coefficients estimated from the whole sample and in the 
second column the results are based on the sample of unlisted firms. Since the benchmark 
growth opportunity indicator is based on the euro-area listed firms, the exclusion of listed firms 
from the main sample could influence mostly the coefficient estimates of medium and large 
firms. We estimate a positive significant relationship among the growth and the industrial 
growth opportunity only for medium and large firms with a coefficient of 0.33 and 0.55, 
respectively. Even more interesting are the estimated coefficients of the first four variables ( 4α  
to 7α ), where only the coefficient of small firms is positive and significant. Based on these 
estimates we can conclude that growth of the very small firms is unrelated to growth 
opportunities shocks, and they are unable to adapt even if the country’s financial development 
is favourable. Small firms are able to grow faster in industries of good growth opportunities, 
but only in countries with a developed financial system. And finally, the medium and large 
firms are able to take advantage of growth opportunity shocks irrespective of the country’s 
financial development. This could be explained by the less significant differences of financial 
development across countries. However, most probably the results are driven by the possibility 
of these firms to access financing sources of different countries through the international stock 
market, or through their subsidiaries operating in other countries. The coefficient of the 
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industrial growth opportunity is decreasing as expected, when listed firms are excluded from 
the sample but it stays positive and significant (column 2).  
The main results do not change significantly, reconfirming that large firms are in better 
conditions to take advantage of the technology-based industrial growth opportunities. There is a 
positive size effect and it is slightly higher for smaller firms. Young firms grow faster 
irrespective of the size group to which they belong.   
 
3.5  Robustness checks 
 
3.5.1  Alternative specification 
 
To check the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients, we propose an alternative 
specification adjusting for the co-integration of the firms’ growth with its sales’ growth. 
Additionally, we add some firm-level financial ratios as explanatory variables that could 
influence the firm’s growth. These variables also shows how sensitive is the growth to 
alternative financing sources, like short- and long-term debt and internal finance.  
The model is specified as: 
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As additional control variable an adjustment term ( 2, −tiAdjTerm ) is included that controls 
for the long-term relationship between growth and sales growth. It is calculated as the 
difference among second lag of total assets and sales and since it is a correction term, we 
expect a negative sign of coefficient. tiSalesGr ,  denotes the sales growth. tiSTD ,∆  is the yearly 
change of short-term debt scaled by the total assets, tiLTD ,∆  is the annual change in long-term 
debt divided by total assets and tiCF ,  denotes the current cash flow. The estimated results are 
presented in Table 3.7 for the whole sample and for the sample of only unlisted firms.
  
 
65 
 
 
Table 3.7: Estimation results of Model 4. Dependent variable: firms’ growth 
 
 (3) (4) Only unquoted 
firms 
tikl MicroDevFinGrowthOp ,. ××  0.130 0.121 
 (2.0)** (1.85)* 
tikl SmallDevFinGrowthOp ,. ××  0.248 0.236 
 (3.8)*** (3.71)*** 
tikl MediumDevFinGrowthOp ,. ××  -0.324 -0.311 
 (-3.8)*** (-3.72)*** 
tikl eLDevFinGrowthOp ,arg. ××  -0.112 -0.082 
 (-2.0)** (-1.50) 
til MicroGrowthOp ,×  -0.136 -0.130 
 (-2.3)** (-2.15)** 
til SmallGrowthOp ,×  -0.203 -0.193 
 (-3.6)*** (-3.47)*** 
til MediumGrowthOp ,×  0.328 0.317 
 (4.3)*** (4.32)*** 
til eLGrowthOp ,arg×  0.271 0.251 
 (4.8)*** (4.58)*** 
titi MicroTA ,,ln ×  0.058 0.058 
 (59.1)*** (60.17)*** 
titi SmallTA ,,ln ×  0.047 0.047 
 (73.1)*** (74.44)*** 
titi MediumTA ,,ln ×  0.040 0.040 
 (79.6)*** (80.82)*** 
titi eLTA ,, argln ×  0.033 0.033 
 (62.5)*** (63.66)*** 
tiYoung ,  0.022 0.022 
 (17.0)*** (16.84)*** 
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Table 3.7: Estimation results of Model 4. Dependent variable: firms’ growth (Continued) 
 
 (3) (4) Only unquoted 
firms 
tihSalesGrowt ,  0.354 0.354 
 (52.2)*** (51.87)*** 
2, −tiAdjTerm  -0.061 -0.061 
 (-63.8)*** (-64.53)*** 
tiShortTDebt ,∆  0.544 0.544 
 (15.2)*** (15.14)*** 
tiLongTDebt ,∆  0.430 0.430 
 (6.8)*** (6.77)*** 
tiCashFlow ,  0.162 0.161 
 (24.4)*** (24.58)*** 
2R  0.34 0.34 
N  729,524 728,381 
 
Note: All regressions include the year, country, industry and year-industry dummies (not reported in 
the table). *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Sales growth is positively related to firms’ growth with a coefficient of 0.35 and the 
adjustment term is negative, as expected. From the set of financial variables included, the long-
term debt has the highest influence on the firms’ growth with a coefficient estimate of 0.55. 
Different from the previous estimations the micro and small firms’ growth are negatively 
correlated to the growth opportunity, and its magnitude is reduced in the countries with better 
financing development. More importantly, the main results are in line with the previous 
interpretation, i.e. the medium and large firms’ growth is positively related to the industrial 
growth opportunities, indicating the elasticity of their financing sources that makes it possible 
to adapt to the time-varying industry shocks.   
 
3.5.2  Alternative test of financing constraints across size-groups 
 
As a robustness check on whether firms’ size matters for growth, we computed the 
  
 
67 
 
 
percentage of firms that use external financing to fund growth, especially long-term external 
financing. We follow Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (1998; 2002) approach based on the 
“percentage of sales” financial planning model (see also Higgins, 1977). According to this 
model, it is possible to estimate for each firm the maximum rate of growth at which it can grow 
when only internal funds or short-term borrowing are available.
19
 In particular, we can 
calculate the following three ratios: 
(a)  the maximum internally financed growth rate as: )1/( ttt ROAROAIG −= , where tROA  is 
the firm’s return on assets; 
(b)  the maximum growth rate that can be attained if the firm uses only short-term external 
financing is defined as:   )1/( ttt ROLTCROLTCSFG −= , where tROLTC  is the return on 
long-term capital (assets that are not financed by new short-term credit).  
(c)  the maximum sustainable growth rate:   )1/( ttt ROEROESG −= , where tROE  is the 
return on equity. This indicator measures the growth rate of firms that obtain long-term 
financing (debt and/or equity) by issuing public or privately placed securities or by borrowing 
from the financial sector. 
We calculate the proportion of firms that grow at rates that exceed those estimated rates across 
size groups. The outcomes are presented in Table 3.8, which confirms our previous findings. 
Large firms are on average growing more than predicted by their availability of internal or 
external financing means. Among micro firms, only 45% of firms can exceed the growth rate 
financed by internal sources, and this percentage increases by size to 60% for large firms. In a 
similar manner, among micro firms about 37% of the firms exceed the growth rate financed by 
short-term credit and internal sources, while from the group of large firms about 51% of the 
firms finance their investments by long-term external capital. The results show that micro and 
small firms rely less on external sources, and consequently they grow more slowly.  
 
                                                 
19
  In particular the external financing need of a firm at time t ( tEFN ) growing at tg  
percent a year is given by the equation: ttttt bEarningsgAssetsgEFN **)1(* +−= , where tb  
is the proportion of the firm’s earnings that are retained for reinvestment at time t and it is 
assumed to be 1. The first term on the right-hand side is the required investment for a firm 
growing at tg  percent. The second term is the internally available capital for investment. The 
model makes several implicit assumptions about the relation between the firm’s growth and the 
tEFN  (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002, pp.346-347). 
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Table 3.8: Proportion of firms growing faster than predicted 
 
 Proportion of firms that exceed their: 
 
Internally financed 
growth rate 
Max. short term-
financed growth rate 
Max. sustainable 
growth rate 
Micro  45.22% 36.55% 31.81% 
Small 55.02% 43.66% 37.67% 
Medium 60.45% 50.38% 44.37% 
Large 60.79% 50.76% 43.75% 
 
 
3.6  Conclusions 
 
We test whether firm size matters for an efficient reallocation of financial resources 
following a sector-specific positive growth shock. Such a response can only be efficient if 
firms’ financial sources are elastic enough for the required investment, i.e. if firms are able to 
get additional external financing to realise their improved growth opportunities. Consequently 
such efficiency reveals some information on the financing conditions of the firm. In the long 
run, the role of time-invariant technological need for external finance is investigated in 
explaining the relative importance of the firm size across sectors. In this case firm size can be 
considered as an endogenous outcome of the “accumulated” financing constraints. 
For large and medium firms we find that industries with higher growth opportunities are 
able to grow relatively faster compared with firms in other sectors, indicating an environment 
of favourable financing conditions. These firms are able to adapt to the time-varying industrial 
growth opportunity shocks in the short run and to specialise in industries with a high natural 
reliance on external financing on the long run.  
By contrast, for the micro and small firms we find evidence for the presence of financing 
constraints. Firms’ realised growth is limited by the availability of resources and, therefore, 
firms are less able to realise their sector-specific financing need or growth opportunities.   
The country-specific financial development (banking sector) seems to overcome these 
constraints for small firms, but it does not facilitate the growth of micro firms. In this context, it 
seems relevant to investigate separately the group of micro and small firms with respect to the 
financing tools and policies able to facilitate their access to external finance. Using an indicator 
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of growth funding, we also find that micro and small firms finance a smaller share of their 
investment and working capital with external financial sources than large firms. In general, we 
can conclude that firm size does matter for the financing condition of the euro-area firm. 
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Data Appendix 
Table A3.1: Sample construction (AMADEUS)  
 Description No. of firms No of firm-years 
  (1993-2004) (1993-2004) 
1. Euro area 2,625,759 14,937,948 
2. Non-financial sectors, excluding agriculture, 2,290,293 13,205,890 
 forestry, fishing and mining
20
   
3. Non-negative balance sheets items 2,280,066 12,992,609 
4. Consistent balance sheet items at 5%
21
 1,630,597 7,502,835 
5. Total assets and operating revenue not 
missing 
1,457,036 6,484,567 
6. Determined sector classification 1,224,975 5,602,635 
 (not missing NACE and SIC code)   
7. Active legal status
22
 1,168,846 5,354,892 
8. Controlled sample for double accounting 
(excluding subsidiaries owned by more than 
24.9% by a firm from the sample) 
1,078,013 4,806,876 
9. Trimming of data removing the upper and 
lower 1 percentile of the total asset 
distribution + Including only observations 
where three consecutive years of data are 
available 
259,929 1,421,753 
                                                 
20   
Excluded sectors: A-Agriculture and related service activities, B-Fishing, operation of 
fish hatcheries and fish farms, C-Mining and quarrying, J-Financial intermediation, L-Public 
administration and defence, compulsory social security, M-Education, N-Health and social 
work, O-Other community, social and personal service activities, P-Private households with 
employed persons, Q- Extra-territorial organisations and bodies. 
21
  It is checked if the sum of the sub-items equals the item provided in the database. 
When not all sub-items are provided, it is ensured not to be greater than the item to which it 
belongs, like cash and cash equivalent   other current assets.  
22
  Firms are selected with legal status defined as “Active”, “Active (default of 
payments)”, “Active (receivership)”. Firms are excluded under legal status defined as 
“Bankruptcy”, “Dissolved”, “Dissolved (demerger)”, “Dissolved (merger)”, “In liquidation”, 
“Inactive (no precision)”, “Credito incobrable”, “Naar buitenland”, “Not classified” or “Not 
defined”. 
 
 
  
 
74 
 
 
Table A3.2: Sample distribution by countries (AMADEUS) 
 
  No. of firms No. of firm-years 
1. Austria 38 144 
2. Belgium 3,926 26,638 
3. Finland 10,305 50,493 
4. France 137,229 768,511 
5. Germany 469 1,806 
6. Greece 5,687 31,269 
7. Italy 36,421 217,431 
8. Luxembourg 46 241 
9. Netherlands 648 4,208 
10. Portugal 536 2,218 
11. Spain 64,624 318,794 
 
Table A3.3: Sample distribution by sectors (AMADEUS) 
 
 No. of firms No of firm-years 
Construction 35,911 189,718 
Manufacturing 77,418 448,834 
Utilities 1,621 8,987 
Wholesales and retail sales 101,106 542,248 
Transport and communications 16,788 92,238 
Services 27,085 139,728 
 
Table A3.4: Sample description by quotation (AMADEUS) 
 
 No. of firms No of firm-years 
Quoted 259,226 1,417,362 
Unquoted 703 4,391 
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Table A3.5: Sample description by size (AMADEUS) 
 
 No. of firms No of 
firm-years 
No. of 
employees 
(mean) 
Total assets 
(mean) 
Turnover 
(mean) 
Micro 143,981 654,073 5.3 511.3 825.6 
Small 91,798 578,395 21.8 2,606.7 4,141.7 
Medium 20,198 160,450 87.6 13,104.2 17,730.7 
Large 3,952 28,835 1,801.2 432,867.9 401,902.0 
 
Table A3.6: Sample distribution by countries of the benchmark sample (Thomson Financial 
DataStream) 
 
  Sample for financing need Sample for growth opportunities 
  N -firms N-firm-years N-firms N-firm-years 
1. Austria 30 427 39 484 
2. Belgium 46 590 71 760 
3. Finland 68 814 93 1,041 
4. France 297 3,637 484 5,188 
5. Germany 308 3,811 484 5,225 
6. Greece 116 1,147 200 1,740 
7. Ireland 20 320 23 343 
8. Italy 115 1,314 143 1,554 
9. Luxembourg 7 59 10 89 
10. Netherlands 69 1,006 84 1,185 
11. Portugal 29 332 38 435 
12. Spain 63 682 73 797 
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Table A3.7: Benchmark indicators: sector-specific financing need and growth opportunities 
(Thomson Financial DataStream) 
 
Sectors SIC code Fin.Need Benchmark Gr.Opp. Benchmark 
General building contractors 15 0.56 0.12 
Other contractors 17 0.13 0.09 
Food products 20 -0.01 0.07 
Beverages and Tobacco 21 -0.11 0.03 
Textile 22 0.11 0.03 
Spinning 228 0.53 0.00 
Apparel 23 -0.31 0.05 
Wood products 24 0.03 0.03 
Furniture 25 -0.40 0.05 
Paper and products 26 0.23 0.05 
Printing and publishing 27 -0.02 0.07 
Other chemicals 28 0.12 0.07 
Synthetic resins 282 -0.04 0.04 
Drugs 283 0.03 0.08 
Petroleum and coal products 29 0.03 0.07 
Rubber products 30 0.17 0.11 
Plastic products 308 0.06 0.07 
Glass 321 -0.69 0.05 
Pottery 324 0.14 0.07 
Non-metal products 327 0.04 0.07 
Iron and steel 331 0.33 0.08 
Nonferrous metal 334 0.47 0.09 
Metal products 34 -0.14 0.04 
Machinery 35 -0.06 0.08 
Office and computing 357 0.55 0.10 
Electric machinery 36 -0.02 0.09 
Radio 366 -0.11 0.02 
Transportation equipment 37 0.24 0.09 
Motor vehicle 371 0.14 0.08 
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Table A3.7: Benchmark indicators: sector-specific financing need and growth opportunities 
(Continued) 
 
Sectors SIC Fin.Need Benchmark Gr.Opp. Benchmark 
Professional goods 38 0.37 0.12 
Other industries 39 -0.25 0.05 
Water transportation 44 0.13 0.05 
Transportation by air 45 0.18 0.06 
Transportation services 47 0.41 0.08 
Communications 48 0.09 0.15 
Electric, gas, and sanitary 49 0.08 0.07 
Wholesale trade--durable 
goods 
50 0.15 0.09 
Wholesales -Office eq. and 
computers 
504 0.46 0.12 
Wholesale trade--
nondurable goods 
51 0.25 0.07 
General merchandise tores 52 0.51 0.12 
Food stores 54 0.11 0.12 
Apparel and accessory 
stores 
56 -0.10 0.10 
Furniture, hom  furnishings  57 0.30 0.04 
Eating and drinking places 58 0.02 0.11 
Miscellaneous retail 59 0.01 0.12 
Hotels, rooming houses 70 0.33 0.07 
Business services 73 0.58 0.15 
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4. DISCOUNT OR PREMIUM? NEW EVIDENCE ON CORPORATE 
DIVERSIFICATION OF UK FIRMS  
 
4.1  Motivation 
 
There is an ongoing debate in the finance literature whether corporate diversification 
decreases or increases the value of shareholders. Whereas a lower market value is documented 
for both cases, conflicting arguments result from the interpretation of the documented valuation 
discount. The basic question is whether the act of corporate diversification destroys value or 
whether the lower market valuation causes firms to diversify in search of better opportunities 
and ultimately increases value. We provide additional evidence on this relationship by 
investigating the endogeneity of the diversification decision relying on a market largely ignored 
in the previous literature. 
The scarce empirical evidence for the UK suggests that diversified companies are traded 
with a discount of about 15% (Lins and Servaes, 1999). However, Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) find that the large European mergers and acquisitions (M&A) bids in the 1990s are 
motivated by synergies and about 60% of M&A have positive total wealth gains. Hence, there 
is also evidence that European companies intend to maximize shareholders’ value through 
M&A, which is one of the ways to diversify. We provide new evidence on the UK 
conglomerates by investigating two research questions. First, we examine whether the 
valuation discount of UK conglomerates is attributed to the diversification or it is caused by 
other characteristics. By controlling for endogeneity, we evaluate the impact of diversification 
on firm value. Second, we look at the reasons to diversify in the UK with respect to the 
findings for the US. 
Previous literature on UK conglomerates considers diversification status as an exogenous 
variable without taking into consideration the influence of other variables on the diversification 
decision. We measure the effect of diversification on firm value by taking into account the 
possibility of endogeneity. Following Campa and Kedia’s (2002) methodology, we assume that 
the decision to operate as a diversified firm is a function of industry-, firm-specific 
characteristics and macroeconomic effects. The choice of the organizational structure is 
considered as the endogenous outcome influenced by these variables. In addition, we rely on an 
extended sample period relative to previous studies for the UK. The benchmark stand-alone 
firms to which the segments of diversified firms are compared include also de-listed firms as a 
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result of M&A or bankruptcy. These dead companies are on average discounted and some of 
the companies become the new unit of the diversified firm through M&A. Hence, the ignorance 
of dead companies in the calculations could influence the calculated discount. By incorporating 
dead firms in the calculations of excess value we correct for a possible upward bias of the 
diversification discount (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002). 
We also analyse the determinants of diversification simultaneously with the possible 
causes of lower market value of conglomerates. The crucial difference between the two 
branches of the literature, with the value-decreasing versus value-increasing diversification 
findings, lies in the explanation of the negative excess value. Campa and Kedia (2002) argue 
that the characteristics of firms that diversify may cause firms to be discounted. Thus, firm 
characteristics that may determine the lower market value are investigated in more detail. In 
particular, we identify the variables that determine firms to operate as a diversified firm and 
they could also decrease the excess value. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 comprises the literature overview. 
Section 3 describes the data sample, excess value calculations and summary statistics. Section 4 
presents the estimation methodology together with the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes 
the paper/is the conclusion. 
 
4.2  Literature Overview 
 
Over the past decade, an extensive finance literature has emerged focusing on the 
relationship between corporate diversification and market valuation of firms. Theoretical 
arguments suggest that diversification may have both value-enhancing and value-reducing 
effects. One potential benefit of corporate diversification can be a more efficient resource 
allocation through an internal capital market, especially when the external capital market is 
relatively less developed (Stein, 1997; Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). 
Other arguments are a greater debt capacity as a result of the coinsurance effect; lower taxes 
arising from the tax code’s asymmetric treatment of gains and losses; managerial economies of 
scale; and increased market power, as a result of cross-subsidized predatory pricing 
(Matsusaka, 2001; Maksimovic and Philips, 2002; Burch, Nanda and Narayananuse, 2002). 
The potential costs of diversification are value-decreasing investments and inefficient 
allocation of capital among divisions of diversified firms (Lamont (1997), Scharfstein (1998), 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000). Berger and Ofek (1995) show that the value loss can be 
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explained by over-investment and cross-subsidization of diversified firms. Other studies 
emphasize the agency costs of diversified firms (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997; Hyland and 
Diltz, 2002; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). Another destroying effect of diversification may 
be information asymmetries, which can appear between central and divisional managers and 
between inside managers and outside investors (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). 
Since diversification could have both value destroying and value enhancing effects, there 
is the need of empirical investigations analyzing the effect of corporate diversification. 
However, previous empirical research on the diversification consequences shows contradicting 
results. A great amount of studies provide empirical evidence on the value-destroying effect of 
corporate diversification. These studies compare the market value of firms operating in 
multiple lines of business to the value of a portfolio of stand-alone firms operating in the same 
industries as the conglomerate. From the methodological point of view mostly the simple 
pooled OLS estimation technique is used. Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that the diversification 
discount is consistent with the view that diversification hurts performance. Berger and Ofek 
(1995) find an average value loss from diversification of about 15% and the results obtained by 
Servaes (1996) also exhibit a large diversification discount in the period of the conglomerate 
merger wave. Based on the estimated discount, a significant number of studies suggest that 
diversification has not been beneficial for US corporations, and the firms have not been able to 
exploit the potential benefits (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
Our paper is in line with the more recent literature that emphasise the value-increasing 
effect of diversification. Following Campa and Kedia (2002), the characteristics of diversified 
firms, which make the benefits of diversification greater than the costs, may also cause firms to 
be discounted. The discount is attributable to other factors than diversification and these factors 
influence both the firm value and the decision to diversify. After controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics in the decision to diversify a diversification premium is obtained. 
Supporting evidence for this hypothesis is presented by studies which analyse firms prior 
to diversification. Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) find that much of the value reduction 
occurs because the firm acquires already discounted business units, and not because 
diversification destroys value. Villalonga (2004) and Hyland (2002) find supporting evidence 
for the presence of a discount before diversification takes place, which is consistent with 
Maksimovic and Philips’ (2002) value-maximizing theory. Whited (2001) finds also no 
evidence for inefficient allocation of investments of conglomerates. She argues that the 
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estimated discount should be attributed to the measurement errors in Tobins’ Q. In addition, 
Gomes and Livdan (2004) provide a theoretical model to illustrate the optimality of 
diversification for large mature firms, since in this way they can overcome the decreasing 
returns nature of the single-sector technology. Their theoretical model and its application to an 
artificial panel predict for diversified firms in general lower market to book values relative to 
focused firms despite the result that diversification is optimal. 
 
4.3  Sample, Excess Value and Summary Statistics 
 
The sample consists of the constituent companies of the FTSE all-share index listed on 
the London Stock Exchange over the 1998 – 2003 period and de-listed companies (both 
diversified and specific firms) which provide balance-sheet, profit and loss statements for the 
selected period. Firms are considered as diversified when they report sales or profits in two or 
more segments as defined by the two-digit SIC code level. Single-segment firms are those with 
only one reported segment or those with more than one reported segment but the main segment 
accounts for more than 90% of total sales and total profits. Our calculations rely on the sample 
of diversified firms, regardless of the time of diversification. In line with the previous literature 
on UK diversification, we analyze only unrelated diversification.
23
 
We start with the entire list of 697 firms included in the FTSE all-share index and the list 
of 3,261 dead firms collected from Thomson Financial Datastream. From the list of dead firms 
those that were active and provide data for the period between 1998 and 2003 (526 firms) are 
selected. We exclude years when firms report segments in the financial sector and years in 
which the sum of segment sales deviated from total sales by more than 1%. Firm-years with 
one of the firms’ segments in a miscellaneous product area are also excluded whenever this 
segment’s sales account for more than 10% of total sales or total profit. If this unidentified 
segment accounts for less than 10% of both total sales and total profits, the firm’s segment 
sales reported in the miscellaneous product area we include into the firm’s major segment. 
In addition, we apply the criteria introduced by Berger and Ofek (1995) and widely used 
in the previous literature. This criteria is based on the exclusion of observations for which total 
                                                 
23  Related diversification means that firms operate in industry segments with similar two-
digit SIC codes but different three- or four-digit SIC codes. In case of unrelated diversification 
firms operate in different industry segments based on two-digit SIC codes. Evidence on the US 
suggests that there is no discount for related diversification (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002). 
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sales are less than £11 million as well as extreme excess values greater than 1.386 or smaller 
than – 1.386. The final sample consists of 796 current and dead firms with 2,252 firm-years. 
Current firms are those that are listed in 2003 on the London Stock Exchange. Dead companies 
are those de-listed firms that were removed from the market during the period between 
1998 and 2003 due to M&A, bankruptcy or other reasons. The selected final sample facilitates 
a comparison with the existing literature (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lins and Servaes, 1999; 
Campa and Kedia, 2002). Table 4.1 reports the sample selection details. 
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Table 4.1: Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Current firms  Dead firms  
 
Number of 
firms 
Number of 
firm-years 
 Number of 
firms 
Number of 
firm-years 
1. Non-financial firms in FTSE 
all share index constituent list 
480 1,848 
1. Non-financial dead firms that 
report accounting items in the period 
1998 – 2003 
526 1,176 
2. Firms with total sales deviated 
from sum of segments sales less 
than 1% or one of the segment 
with less than 10% is in 
unidentified segment 
475 1,834 
2. Firms with total sales deviated 
from sum of segments sales less than 
1% or one of the segment with less 
than 10% is in unidentified segment 
462 1,044 
3. Firms with total sales more 
than £11 million 
459 1,747 
3. Firms with total sales more than 
£11 million 
399 883 
4. Firms with excess value 
smaller than 1.386 or greater than 
-1.386 
433 1,496 
4. Firms with excess value smaller 
than 1.386 or greater than -1.386 
363 756 
      
Final sample: current and dead 
firms 
Number of firms: 796    
 Number of firm-years: 2,252    
 
Note: The constituent list of FTSE all share index is based on the list drawn on September 30, 2003. Current firms are those that are listed in 2003 on the London 
Stock exchange and observations are collected for the period between 1998 and 2003. Dead companies are firms removed from the market during the period between 
1998 and 2003 due to merger, acquisition, bankruptcy or other reasons. 
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The market value of conglomerates relative to the single-segment firms is analyzed by 
Berger and Ofek’s (1995) excess value measure where the imputed value is calculated as: 
 
∑
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1
. (1) 
The term ( jss SMV )/  represents the market-to-sales ratio for the median single-segment firms 
belonging to the industry sector that corresponds to the segment j  of the diversified firm.
24
 sS  
and sMV  are total sales and market value of the median single segment firm, respectively. jS  
denotes the sales of segment j  of the diversified company. n  is the number of segments in 
diversified firms. Relying on the imputed value (1), the excess value can be calculated as: 
 
IV
MV
EV ln= , (2) 
where MV  is the end of the year market value of common equity plus the book value of debt 
and preference capital of a given company. 
The excess value (2) measures the actual value of firms relative to the median single-
segment firm operating in the same industries in that year. This makes the excess value 
measure industry- and time-neutral.
25
 When the market value of
 
conglomerates is less than the 
weighted sum of imputed divisional values we get a negative excess value. A negative excess 
value indicates a valuation discount, whereas positive excess values are indicative of a 
premium. For the firm’s imputed value calculation in the sample of benchmark single-segment 
firms we include those firms that were de-listed from the market. Our sample includes also 
diversified firms that operate in industries without single-segment firm counterparts. In such 
cases, the imputed value is calculated based on the median capital to sales ratio of the closest 
industry group. 
The characteristics of single-segment and diversified firms are examined with the average 
value of firm size (total assets and total capital), the leverage ratio, profitability (the ratio of 
                                                 
24  Within the Berger-Ofek methodology assets or earnings can be used instead of sales. 
Since we can get consistent segment data only for sales, we avoid using the other two variables. 
25  However, time patterns in the excess value measure can arise due to changes in the 
distribution of single-segment firms as well as the entry and exit of the firms in the sample 
(Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
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operating income to sales and the ratio of EBIT to sales), firm’s growth (the first difference of 
total assets to sales ratio) as well as the excess value. The summary statistics of current and 
dead firms in Table 4.2 show that dead companies are approximately five times smaller (based 
on total assets and total capital), have lower profitability (based on median values of operating 
income to sales and EBIT to sales) and lower excess values (both single- and multi-segment) 
compared to current firms. This suggests that the absence of dead companies from the sample 
may lead to an upward bias in the diversification discount. 
Diversified firm-years account for 36% of the sample. Based on total assets and total 
capital, diversified firms are twice as big as single-segment companies. Since an average 
single-segment company possesses total assets of £1,121 million, diversified companies’ assets 
are valued at £2,210 million. The differences in total assets and total capital between single- 
and multi-segment firms are even bigger when we look at the median values. Hence, a proper 
evaluation of the effect of diversification on firm value should take into account firms’ size. 
Theoretically, one of the benefits of diversified firms is the greater debt capacity as a 
result of the coinsurance effect. From the sample statistics in Table 4.2 we see that leverage is 
higher for diversified firms than for single-segment companies. This confirms the theoretical 
expectation that diversified firms take advantage of the coinsurance opportunity. Looking at the 
profitability measures (EBIT/sales and operating income/sales), we find no evidence for worse 
performance of diversified companies. However, the average growth of diversified firms is 
lower compared to focused firms, which could affect negatively their market value. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Total assets Total capital 
Leverage 
ratio 
Operating 
income/sales 
EBIT/sales 
Firms growth/ 
sales 
Excess value 
 Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. 
Current firms 2069.57 243.05 2846.08 301.453 0.221 0.200 0.032 0.080 0.039 0.090 0.130 0.056 0.010 0.000 
Single-segment f. 
(897 firm-years) 
1647.29 169.31 2257.01 232.642 0.197 0.170 0.007 0.080 0.014 0.090 0.160 0.055 0.033 0.010 
Multi-segment f. 
(599 firm-years) 
2701.93 624.80 3728.20 649.453 0.258 0.240 0.068 0.090 0.076 0.090 0.078 0.057 -0.023 -0.020 
Dead firms 413.277 76.551 614.102 77.671 0.222 0.200 0.012 0.060 0.021 0.070 0.139 0.046 -0.120 -0.090 
Single-segment f. 
(544 firm-years) 
253.403 76.073 359.271 78.553 0.226 0.210 -0.006 0.060 0.003 0.060 0.148 0.050 -0.107 -0.070 
Multi-segment f. 
(212 firm-years) 
823.522 76.786 1268.00 75.140 0.211 0.170 0.058 0.080 0.070 0.090 0.108 0.036 -0.153 -0.115 
Final sample-all 
firms 
1513.55 169.01 2096.80 208.821 0.221 0.201 0.025 0.077 0.033 0.083 0.132 0.054 -0.033 0.000 
Single-segment f. 
(1441 firm-years) 
1121.07 130.86 1540.58 164.342 0.208 0.183 0.002 0.072 0.010 0.077 0.156 0.054 -0.020 0.000 
Multi-segment f. 
(811 firm-years) 
2210.90 354.60 3085.09 365.822 0.245 0.226 0.065 0.086 0.074 0.091 0.083 0.055 -0.057 -0.051 
 
Note: Total assets and total capital are expressed in £ million. Total capital is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt and preferred 
capital. Leverage ratio is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Firms’ growth is calculated as the first difference of total assets divided by sales. 
Excess value is the ratio of firm value to its imputed value and it measures the actual value of firms relative to the median single-segment firms operating in the 
same industries in the given year. Current firms are those that are listed in 2003 on the London Stock Exchange. Dead firms are removed from the market during 
the 1998 – 2003 period due to merger, acquisition, bankruptcy or other reasons.
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4.4  Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we address the following issues. First, we present empirical findings 
using the pooled OLS method to provide a comparison with the previous literature on UK 
data (subsection 4.1). Second, the determinants of diversification are analysed. Based on 
macroeconomic effects, industry- and firm-specific characteristics the diversification 
probability is estimated (subsection 4.2). Third, we allow the diversification dummy to be 
endogenously determined and estimate the effect of diversification on firms’ market value. 
Following Campa and Kedia (2002) the estimated probability is used as an instrument in the 
general two-stage least squares model. In this way, endogeneity is taken into consideration 
and the effect of diversification on firms’ value can be obtained (section 4.3). Fourth, we 
investigate the firms’ growth correlation with the macroeconomic environment and its 
influence on the firms’ decision to diversify and the excess value (section 4.4). 
 
4.4.1  Pooled OLS Estimation 
 
The regression specification is as follows: 
 
itititit eXDEV +′++= βδα . (3) 
it
EV  denotes the firms’ excess value as defined above, α  is a constant, and 
it
D  the 
diversification dummy, which takes the value 1 if the firm operates in more than one industry 
and 0 otherwise. 
it
X  represents the set of firm characteristics that could influence the excess 
value. The control variables approximate firm size (natural logarithm of total assets) 
it
TA , 
profitability (ratio of operating income to sales) 
it
PR  and leverage (ratio of total debts to total 
assets) 
it
LEV .
1
 
it
e  represents the error term. 
Estimation results are reported in Table 4.3. There are differences in the estimated 
coefficient of the discount dummy across years, which suggest that year-specific 
characteristics should be taken into consideration in a pooled estimation. Furthermore, for the 
year 2003 only a few observations are available and as a result the yearly estimates for 2003 
should be interpreted with caution. Since the pooled regression excluding the year 2003 
                                                 
1  Part of the previous literature also uses capital expenditure as a control variable to 
approximate investment. Such data are not available to us. 
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(results not reported but available upon request)
 
do not change significantly the pooled results, 
the sample 1998 – 2003 is used through the rest of the calculations. 
When looking at the whole period, we find a positive and significant size effect on the 
excess value. The effect of profitability on the firms’ excess value is positive but not 
significant, while the coefficient of leverage is positive and significant. More importantly, the 
diversification discount is about 9% and it is significant. The estimated smaller diversification 
discount compared to previous evidence (Lins and Servaes, 1999) could be attributed to the 
survivor bias corrected in our investigation. Another possible explanation could be the 
different analyzed time period, which may suggest that the valuation discount of diversified 
firms decreased over time from 15% (1994) obtained by Lins and Sevaes (1999) to 9% 
estimated in the current paper. The rest of the estimated coefficients correspond to the 
previous findings.  
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Table 4.3: Estimation of the Diversification Discount over Time 
 
 α  itD  itTA  itPR  itLEV   
2
R  N  
        
1998 -0.44 -0.13 0.04 -0.06 0.06 0.01 463 
 (-2.08)** (-2.12)** (1.92)* (-1.25) (0.35)   
1999 -0.38 -0.08 0.02 0.68 0.26 0.03 494 
 (-1.79)* (-1.31) (1.29) (3.45)*** (1.74)*   
2000 -0.37 -0.11 0.03 0.27 0.05 0.01 425 
 (-1.70)* (-1.63)* (1.51) (1.97)** (0.32)   
2001 -0.91 -0.08 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03 406 
 (-3.97)*** (-1.24) (3.75)*** (0.69) (0.03)   
2002 -0.27 -0.08 0.02 0.22 0.18 0.04 376 
 (-1.15) (-1.21) (0.97) (3.58)*** (1.06)   
2003 -0.64 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.43 0.01 88 
 (-1.30) (.68) (0.85) (0.59) (1.13)   
        
1998-2003 -0.50 -0.09 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.02 2252 
 (-4.96)*** (-3.07)*** (4.51)*** (1.16) (2.21)**   
 
Note: The estimated regression equation is 
itititit
eXDEV +′++= βδα , where α  is a constant, 
it
EV  denotes the excess value and 
it
D  is the diversification dummy, 
which takes the value 1 if the firm operates in more than one industry and 0 otherwise. 
it
X  contains control variables as the firm size 
it
TA , profitability 
it
PR  and 
leverage ratio 
it
LEV . t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 2R  is the adjusted 
coefficient of determination and N  the number of observations.  
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4.4.2  Probit Estimation 
 
To investigate the determinants of diversification the diversification probability is 
estimated using three types of variables which could influence the firms’ decision to function as 
a single- or multi-segment firm. These variables measure industry-, macroeconomic- and firm-
specific characteristics. The firms’ decision to operate as a multi-segment firm is determined 
by: 
ititit
YP µγ +′= , (4) 
where itY  is the set of exogenous variables and itµ  denotes an error term. The latent variable 
itP  is not observable. itD  takes on values of 0 or 1 according to the following rule: 
 



 >
=
otherwise
P
D itit
 0,
0if,1
. (5) 
The estimated probability of a positive outcome of equation (4) is: 
 
( ) ( )itititit YYDProbP γφ ′=== 1ˆ , (6) 
where (.)φ  denotes the standard normal distribution. itPˆ  is used in the next subsection as an 
instrument in the general two-stage least squares model. For a theoretical discussion of the 
probit model see Maddala (1983). 
itY  is the set of observable variables including firm-specific variables, macroeconomic 
and business trend variables as well as industry dummies. The firm characteristics are operating 
income to sales )( itPR , leverage )( itLEV , the square value of both variables 
2( itPR , )
2
itLEV , 
dividends )( itDIV  and size dummies. The size dummy variables are defined based on four size-
groups: firms with total capital less than £50 million )1( itS , firms with total capital between 
£50 and £150 million )2( itS , firms with total capital between £150 and £500 million )3( itS  
and firms with total capital more than £500 million )4( itS . 
Based on the theoretical argument that diversified firms take advantage of greater debt 
capacity by a coinsurance effect, we expect a positive correlation between leverage and the 
diversification probability. Operating income to sales ratio and dividends can be considered as 
variables capturing firms’ performance. Following the hypothesis of value-decreasing 
investments and inefficient allocation of capital among divisions of diversified firms (Lamont, 
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1997; Scharfstein, 1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000) we can expect a negative impact 
of performance on the diversification probability. However, if we accept the hypothesis of a 
more efficient resource allocation through an internal capital market (Stein, 1997; Hubbard and 
Palia, 1999; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002), positive coefficients of profitability and dividends 
are expected. Hence, the effect of profitability and dividends can be either positive or negative, 
confirming one of these two hypotheses. As the firm grows in size, marginal productivity falls 
and becomes unprofitable for the firm to invest additional resources in ongoing activities 
(Gomes and Livdan, 2004). Hence, large firms have higher benefits from diversification and 
based on this we expect a positive size effect. 
The business trend and macroeconomic variables are the yearly real growth of gross 
domestic product )(
it
GDP , the number of announced domestic M&A in a year expressed in 
thousand of firms )( itNMA , the value of M&A expressed in £ hundred billions )( itVMA  as 
well as two year dummies itY1999(  and )2001itY .
27 We expect a negative GDP effect, since 
under deteriorating economic conditions firms are facing higher economic and financial risks 
and diversification could be a solution to decrease it. We include M&A activities because this 
is one of the ways in which a firm changes its diversification status besides internal growth and 
restructuring the existing operations. Hence, we expect a positive coefficient for both variables. 
Other year-specific effects not captured by the GDP and M&A activities are controlled by the 
year-dummies. Year-specific variables are important in the model, since they capture the 
decision to diversify without influencing directly the excess value of the firm. 
Industry-specific effects are controlled through industry dummies. Each dummy variable 
represents one of the industry divisions defined by the one-digit SIC codes. These are the 
following industry divisions: 
- extraction of minerals and ores other than fuels, manufacture of metals, mineral products 
and chemicals )2( itIND , 
- metal goods, engineering and vehicles )3( itIND , 
- other manufacturing )4( itIND , 
- construction )5( itIND , 
- distribution, hotels and catering, repairs )6( itIND , 
- transport and communication )7( itIND , 
                                                 
27  Other year-dummies are dropped from the model due to multi-collinearity. 
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- business services )8(
it
IND  and 
- other services )9( itIND . 
In the case of single-segment firms the industry dummy takes the value 1 if the firm operates in 
the given industry and 0 otherwise. The industry dummy variables for diversified firms take a 
value between 0 and 1 based on the share of segment sales in total sales. The sum of all 
industry variables for a given diversified firm takes the value 1. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the probit model are reported in Table 4.4. Column 
2 and 3 represents the estimates of the model including all variables mentioned above. The null 
hypothesis that the model does not have greater explanatory power than an intercept only 
model is rejected at the 1% significance level according to the likelihood ratio test. For the 
interpretation of the results we present also the marginal effects of the explanatory variables 
calculated at its sample mean.28 
When looking at the set of firm characteristics, the influence of profitability on 
diversification probability is positive but not statistically significant. The effect of leverage is 
nonlinear and significant. Leverage is positively related to the diversification probability. 
However, based on the coefficient of the square value of leverage, it can be argued that firms 
with leverage above a given rate exhibit a lower probability to diversify. We find a significant 
positive dividend coefficient, which confirms the value-increasing effect of diversification. 
This result is in line with the findings of Schoar (2002) that conglomerates are more productive 
than stand alone firms. With respect to size, we observe a monotonic increase in coefficients of 
different size dummies itS1( , itS2  and )4itS , which can be interpreted as evidence of a positive 
size effect of diversification probability.29 The probability to act as a diversified firm is 
significantly higher for firms with total capital higher than £500 million )4( itS  than for small 
firms with total capital less than £50 million )1( itS . This can be explained by the higher 
possible benefits and higher capacities of large relative to small firms to diversify. 
 
                                                 
28  The marginal effect presents the change in the probability caused by an infinitesimal 
change in each independent variable. In the case of the dummy variables the marginal effect 
shows the change in probability for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
29  One of the size groups need to be excluded because of perfect multi-collinearity 
resulting in a singular matrix. We choose to exclude the itS3  size group, in order to observe the 
coefficients of very large and very small firms itS1( , )4itS . 
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Table 4.4: Probit Model Estimation of Diversification Status 
 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Marginal 
Effect 
α  -1.75 (7.00)***  -1.74 (9.20)***  
itPR  0.03 (0.23) 0.011   
2
itPR  0.01 (0.34) 0.002   
itLEV  1.84 (4.39)*** 0.673 1.81 (4.43)*** 0.667 
2
itLEV  -2.38 (3.74)*** -0.874 -2.25 (3.60)*** -0.826 
itDIV  0.02 (5.84)*** 0.008 0.02 (6.05)*** 0.008 
itS1  0.03 (0.37) 0.013   
itS2  0.16 (1.98)** 0.061 0.14 (1.86)* 0.051 
itS4  0.63 (8.27)*** 0.236 0.59 (8.70)*** 0.224 
itGDP  -0.35 (2.98)*** -0.129 -0.20 (3.30)*** -0.072 
itNMA  3.01 (4.89)*** 1.104 2.65 (5.68)*** 0.975 
itVMA  0.29 (1.54) 0.105   
itY1999  0.20 (2.16)** 0.076 0.13 (1.86)* 0.050 
itY2001  -0.08 (0.89) -0.028   
itIND2  0.07 (0.36) 0.024   
itIND3  0.25 (1.65) 0.093   
itIND4  0.15 (1.00) 0.057   
itIND5  0.19 (1.06) 0.070   
itIND6  -0.06 (0.41) -0.022   
itIND7  0.01 (0.08) 0.005   
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Table 4.4: Probit Model Estimation of Diversification Status (Continued) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Marginal 
Effect 
itIND8  -0.60 (3.81)*** -0.220 -0.70 (8.20)*** -0.256 
itIND9  0.32 (1.83)* 0.116   
N  2252  2252  
)(γL  -1298.47  -1308.26  
)21(~ 2χLR  346.38***  296.79***  
2χ>P  0.00  0.00  
Pseudo 2R  0.12  0.11  
 
Note: The estimated equation is ititit YP µγ +′= , where itP  is the unobservable diversification 
probability. itY  is the set of observable variables including a constant α , industry dummies, firm-
specific variables and macroeconomic and business trend variables. The firm characteristics are 
profitability measured with operating income to sales itPR , leverage ratio itLEV , the square value of 
both variables 
2
itPR  and 
2
itLEV  as well as dividends itDIV . From the four size dummies three are 
included itS1( , itS2  and )4itS . Business trend and macroeconomic variables are the yearly GDP 
growth itGDP , the number of announced domestic M&A expressed in thousands of firms itNMA , the 
value of M&A expressed in £ hundred billions itVMA  as well as year dummies itY1999  and 
itY 2001 . The variables from itIND2  to itIND9  are the industry dummies based on the one-digit SIC 
codes. N  is the number of observations, )(γL  denotes the maximised value of the log-likelihood, LR  
is the likelihood ratio test distributed as )21(2χ  and 2χ>P  is the probability of test statistic that the 
slope coefficients are all equal to zero. The marginal effect is defined as the change in probability for an 
infinitesimal change in each independent continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the 
probability for dummy variables. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
The estimated coefficient of GDP growth is negative and significant at 1% level. This 
confirms the hypothesis that firms are more likely to operate as diversified firms in a recession. 
During economic downturns firms search for new productive opportunities and they diversify. 
The coefficients on the M&A variables are positive and significant at the 1% level only in the 
case of itNMA . This shows that in a more active market for corporate control there is a higher 
probability to diversify through M&A. 
The year-dummy 1999 has a significant positive influence on the probability to operate as 
a diversified firm. One of the explanations could be that in 1999 the European M&A market 
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was almost as large as in the US and the number of hostile acquisitions jumped from 10 bids 
yearly to 369 bids (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). The year-dummy 2001 has an insignificant 
and negative influence on the probability to diversify. In line with this result, the year 2001 is 
characterized by an abrupt decline in M&A activities. The estimates of yearly dummies 
reinforce our previous conclusion that changes in M&A activities significantly affect the 
diversification probability. 
The decision to operate as a diversified firm is not significantly influenced by industry 
characteristics with the exception of the business services industry division. This industry 
division includes the business, the renting of movables, the owning and the dealing real estates 
sub-sector with a high percentage (more than 80%) of the complete industry division. The 
coefficient is negative, which shows that firms operating in these industries are more likely to 
operate as single firms or as a diversified firm in related segments.30 Moreover, we re-estimate 
the probit model excluding the insignificant variables. The results are provided in the fourth 
and fifth column of Table 4.4. There is no significant difference between coefficients and 
estimated probability of the two models with and without insignificant variables. 
 
 4.4.3  Instrumental Variables Estimation Model 
 
In this subsection, we recalculate the valuation effect of diversification, relying on Campa 
and Kedia’s (2002) instrumental variables estimation methodology. Since Campa and Kedia 
(2002) analyze separately the “diversifying” and “refocusing” firms, our sample include 
diversified as well as focused firms, regardless of the time of diversification. We include all 
listed and de-listed (death) companies even if they do not change their organizational structure 
in a given period. We consider “not changing” their status also a decision in the sense that they 
decide to remain focused or to remain diversified as a result of the changes in the firm’s 
environment. 
The simultaneous equation framework consists in the first stage of the estimation of 
equation: 
 
itititit rXPD +′+= βθ ˆ , (7) 
                                                 
30  Related diversification in this case means that firms operate in industry segments with a 
similar two-digit SIC code and different three-digit SIC codes. 
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where 
it
D  denotes the diversification dummy defined above and itX  is the set of exogenous 
explanatory variables also used in equation (3). itPˆ  is the estimated probability from equation 
(4) and itr  represents the error term. In the second stage, the fitted values of the diversification 
dummy itDˆ  are used as an independent variable in the estimation of excess value: 
 
itititit eXDEV +′++= βδα ˆ . (8) 
Firm-characteristics influence both the decision to operate as a diversified firm and the value of 
the firm. Hence, firm-specific variables contained in itX  are included in both stages of the 
instrumental variables estimation. The set of exogenous explanatory variables includes size, 
profitability and leverage. Using squared values of the profitability measure, we capture its 
non-linear effect on diversification discount and firm value. The squared values of other control 
variables did not significantly influence the firms’ excess value and therefore are excluded 
from the final regression model. 
It is possible to investigate the validity of the selected instruments. We need variables 
that influence the diversification status while being uncorrelated with the excess value of the 
firm. Since the measure of excess value is by construction independent of any industry and time 
effect we can easily select the proper variables. All industry- and year-specific characteristics 
satisfy this condition. Another necessary condition of a good instrument in terms of the rank 
condition requires that the coefficient θ  in equation (7) is significantly different from zero, 
which implies that the selected instruments are highly correlated with the diversification 
dummy. Such a condition can be tested explicitly and the resulting tests are presented in the 
first stage regression of the general two-stage least squares model.31 
The results of the instrumental variables estimation are presented in Table 4.5. In the first 
stage regression the coefficient of the probability variable is highly significant. This shows that 
the rank condition is satisfied. In the second-stage regression all explanatory variables are 
already exogenous and the estimated coefficients are consistent. t-statistics are calculated based 
on the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The diversification discount turns to a 
                                                 
31  Additional tests, like the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test and the test of 
excluded instruments based on the Hansen-Sargan statistic also support the validity of the 
selected instrument. Empirical findings are not reported but available upon request. 
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premium of 30%.32 In order to check the validity of the implemented model, we test for 
endogeneity using the Hausman (1978) test, which is based on the difference between the OLS 
estimator and the instrumental variables estimator. The null hypothesis can be rejected at the 
5% significance level, which suggests that endogeneity is present and should be controlled. 
The estimated premium is similar to those obtained for US firms and in contradiction to 
the existing evidence for the UK market. Campa and Kedia (2002) find a 30% premium. 
Villalonga (2000) shows that after controlling for diversification motives a mean discount of 
8% turns into a statistically significant premium of 34%. Our result is in line with the profit-
maximizing neoclassical model developed by Maksimovic and Philips (2002), where firms 
optimally choose the number of segments depending on their comparative advantage. They 
show that the negative excess value of conglomerates is consistent with profit maximization. 
We can conclude that firms are likely to diversify or to remain diversified, driven by value-
increasing motivation, when there are net gains to diversification and remain focused in case of 
net costs to diversifying. The refocusing event is explained by the same logical argumentation. 
 
Table 4.5: Instrumental Variables Estimation Results of Excess Value on Endogenous 
Diversification Dummy 
 
 First Stage Regression Second Stage Regression 
 Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
α  -0.02 (0.28) -0.22 (1.81)* 
it
Dˆ   0.30 (2.50)** 
itTA  0.04 (5.90)*** 0.01 (0.29) 
itPR  0.01 (0.12) 0.24 (4.63)*** 
itLEV  -0.01 (0.15) 0.12 (1.59) 
2
itPR  -0.00 (0.03) 0.03 (4.60)*** 
itPˆ  0.22 (11.67)***  
                                                 
32  As a robustness check, we re-estimated the regression equations with a GMM model. 
For an exactly identified model, the efficient GMM and the instrument variable estimators 
should coincide and this was confirmed by our estimations. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 4.5: Instrumental Variables Estimation Results of Excess Value on Endogenous 
Diversification Dummy (Continued) 
 
 First Stage Regression Second Stage Regression 
 Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
2R  0.14  
N  2252 2252 
Hausman test  14.73 
2χ>P   0.01 
 
Note: The first stage equation is itititit rXPD ++= βθ ˆ , where itD  is the diversification dummy, itPˆ  
the estimated probability and itX  includes a constant α , the logarithm of total assets itTA , 
profitability itPR , leverage ratio itLEV  and the square of the profitability 
2
itPR . The second stage 
equation is itititit eXDEV +′++= βδα ˆ . itEV  denotes the excess value, α  a constant and itDˆ  the 
instrumented diversification dummy. itX  is defined as in the first stage. 
2R  is the adjusted coefficient 
of determination and N  the number of observations. The Hausman (1978) test of no endogeneity is 
rejected at 5% level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 4.4.4  Macroeconomic Effects and Firms’ Growth 
 
In this subsection, we investigate in more detail the determinants of the lower market 
value of conglomerates relative to focused firms. We look for possible characteristics that make 
the benefits of diversification greater than the costs of diversification, and also cause firms to 
be discounted. First, we look at the estimation results of the probit model in Table 4.4, which 
shows the effect of different variables on the decision to diversify. Second, we analyse from the 
list of these variables the ones that may cause firms to be discounted. 
When looking at the OLS findings in Table 4.3 and the simultaneous equations estimates 
in Table 4.5, size has a positive effect on the diversification decision and the market value. 
Large firms have a higher market value and a higher probability to diversify. As a result, size 
characteristics are important for the diversification decision but they do not cause a negative 
excess value. As expected, more profitable firms have a higher market value, but profitability 
does not significantly influence the decision to diversify. Leverage plays a significant role in 
the probit model and in the excess value equation. Diversified firms have in general a higher 
leverage but again leverage does not decrease the excess value. Based on size, profitability and 
leverage, we do not find any explanation of the lower market valuation of conglomerates. 
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Campa and Kedia (2002) find that the US firms with lower profitability and lower level of 
investment in current operations are more likely to diversify. However, the coefficients are not 
significant. 
Whereas for US firms the macroeconomic conditions do not significantly influence the 
probability to diversify, we find a significant negative effect. In periods of high GDP growth 
firms tend to focus and in periods of economic downturns more firms diversify or they remain 
diversified. Some firms’ growth opportunities could be more affected by unfavorable economic 
environment and they react to it by diversifying. In this case, diversification is a strategy to 
avoid less favorable market valuation. 
Next, firms’ growth correlation with the macroeconomic environment is investigated by 
re-estimating the major regressions of our analysis including the firms’ growth as a control 
variable.33 The findings on the effect of firms’ growth on diversification decision and excess 
value are reported in Table 4.6. The previously estimated diversification premium does not 
change significantly. More importantly, firms’ growth explains a significant part of the excess 
value evolution based on both OLS and instrumental variables estimations. Including firms’ 
growth in the initial equation, the diversification discount obtained from the OLS model is 
decreasing significantly. 
Based on the first and second stage regressions, firms’ growth contributes to excess value 
and diversification. There is a positive and significant effect on the excess value of the firm and 
a negative and significant effect on the decision to diversify or to remain diversified. Firms 
with lower growth have lower excess value and face a higher probability to diversify. We can 
conclude that there is a positive relationship between macroeconomic growth, firms’ growth 
and excess value on the one hand and a negative relationship of firms’ growth and 
diversification on the other hand. 
 
                                                 
33  Firms’ growth is calculated as the first difference of total assets divided by total sales. 
We omit the information on the first year of each firm and any firm-year when the previous 
firm-year is missing. 
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Table 4.6: Estimating the Diversification Discount/Premium with Firms’ Growth 
 
        OLS Estimation Instrumental Variables Regression 
  First Stage Regression Second Stage Regression 
 Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic) 
α  -0.50 (4.28)*** 0.01 (0.07) -0.28 (1.67)* 
it
D  -0.06 (1.70)*  0.28 (1.93)** 
itG  0.07 (3.46)*** -0.05 (2.98)*** 0.09 (2.93)*** 
itTA  0.03 (3.10)*** 0.04 (3.99)*** 0.01 (0.28) 
itPR  0.67 (6.97)*** -0.03 (0.40) 0.64 (5.33)*** 
itLEV  0.19 (2.22)** 0.00 (0.01) 0.17 (2.04)** 
2
itPR  0.24 (5.53)*** -0.01 (0.32) 0.23 (3.97)*** 
itPˆ   0.24 (9.45)***  
2R  0.07 0.14  
N  1374 1374 1374 
 
Note: The OLS estimation is based on the equation itititit eXDEV +′++= βδα , where itEV  
denotes the excess value, α  a constant and itD  the diversification dummy. itX  contains firms’ growth 
itG , the natural logarithm of total assets itTA , profitability itPR , leverage ratio itLEV  and square value 
of profitability 
2
itPR . The first stage equation of instrumental variables estimation is 
itititit rXPD ++= βθ ˆ , where itD  is the diversification dummy and itPˆ  the estimated probability. itX  
includes a constant α  and the set of variables defined in the OLS equation. The second stage equation 
is itititit eXDEV +′++= βδα ˆ . itEV  denotes the excess value and itDˆ  the instrumented diversification 
dummy. itX  is defined as in the OLS equation. 
2R  is the adjusted coefficient of determination and N  
the number of observations. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
There is a great amount of literature which provides evidence that corporate 
diversification destroys shareholders’ value. These findings are mainly based on simple OLS 
estimations, assuming that the diversification status is an independent variable. In this study, 
we provide additional evidence that the diversification is endogenous, i.e., firms choose to 
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follow a diversification strategy determined by firm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions 
and M&A activities. The investigation of UK companies is instructive, because no other major 
European country has more in common with the US from the corporate governance 
perspective. 
We can draw three major conclusions based on our empirical results. First, UK firms’ 
decision to operate as a diversified company is determined by firm characteristics, 
macroeconomic conditions regardless of the industry in which they operate. The only exception 
is the business services industry sector, where firms are more likely to remain focused or to 
diversify only in related industries. 
Second, after controlling for endogeneity, the diversification discount of UK firms of 
about 9% turns to a significant premium of 30%. The evidence of a premium is consistent with 
the value-maximization theory of diversification, which considers firm diversification as 
efficient capital allocation. Our estimated premium corresponds to recent results for the US. 
This paper brings contradictory evidence to previous findings on the UK market, which 
supports the agency theory of diversification arguing that managers pursue their own interests 
at the expense of shareholders’ value. 
Third, by explaining the lower market valuation of diversified firms relative to focused 
firms, we find evidence of significant macroeconomic effects, which explain both a negative 
excess value and diversification. Firms’ growth is correlated with macroeconomic 
developments and it explains a significant part of the market value evolution of firms. 
Moreover, the group of firms with lower growth affected by macroeconomic environment 
diversify with a higher probability. These findings are in line with argumentation by Burch, 
Nanda and Narayanan (2002) that firms with lower growth and insufficient value-creation 
opportunities have incentives to operate as diversified firms and, in turn, increase their market 
power.
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5  INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY: 
THE CASE OF THE JANUARY ANOMALY  
 
5.1  Motivation and literature overview on market anomalies 
 
Since the late 1970s, researchers have discovered several seasonal patterns in stock 
returns that constitute a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis. Regularities in stock 
returns or stock market anomalies comprise, among many others, the January effect 
(abnormally high returns in January), the Monday seasonal (significantly lower Monday 
returns), and the size effect (higher average risk-adjusted returns for small stocks). In this 
paper, we focus on the following aspect of stock market anomalies: if stock returns exhibit 
exploitable regularities, then smart traders are expected to take advantage of these patterns, 
thereby earning abnormal profits. Consequently, on stock markets with a sufficiently large 
number of smart traders, anomalies are supposed to disappear as the trading of this investor 
group arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns. 
Recent empirical findings suggest that institutional investors play the role of smart traders 
on stock markets and, therefore, may have an impact on stock market anomalies. Institutional 
investors can be characterized as informed traders who speed up the adjustment of stock prices 
to new information, thereby rendering the stock market more efficient. Institutions can obtain 
an informational advantage by exploiting economies of scale in information acquisition and 
processing. The marginal costs of gathering and processing information are lower for 
institutional than for individual traders. In addition, institutional investors may be better trained 
and have superior resources than individual investors. Moreover, for many years it has been 
common practice of companies to inform securities analysts in advance about company-
specific news, and only recently have regulatory measures been launched (namely the SEC’s 
Regulation FD) to prevent this habit. Hence, institutional investors’ trading decisions may be 
stronger information-driven than those of individual investors. 
Dennis and Weston (2001) support this view by providing evidence for U.S. stock 
exchanges that institutions are better informed than individual investors. Cohen, Gompers, and 
Vuolteenaho (2002) show that institutional investors push stock prices towards their 
fundamental values by exploiting individual traders’ sentiment. Following Barber and Odean 
(2005), individual investors display attention-based buying behavior, whereas institutions do 
not exhibit this kind of non-fundamental trading pattern. The impact of institutional trading on 
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stock market anomalies has recently been covered by two papers. Kamara (1997) and Chan, 
Leung, and Wang (2004) highlight the role of institutional investors on the Monday seasonal. 
They present evidence for U.S. stock markets that an increase in institutional ownership 
decreases the magnitude of the Monday effect. Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that an 
increase in institutional trading is partly responsible for the disappearance of Banz’ (1981) 
small stock premium.34 
In this study, we focus on the impact of institutional trading on a third major anomaly, 
namely the January effect.35 Two of the most prominent explanations for the January effect 
refer to the specific trading behaviors of individual and institutional investors. First, the tax-
loss-selling hypothesis explains the January anomaly with tax-motivated trading of individual 
investors. As the end of the year approaches, individual investors sell stocks that declined in 
value in order to realize tax losses. After the turn of the year they re-invest in these securities, 
which pushes stock prices up (Ritter, 1988). Second, the window-dressing hypothesis suggests 
that institutional investors’ portfolio rebalancing activities are responsible for the January 
anomaly. Institutions are evaluated relative to their peers and, therefore, buy winners and sell 
losers in order to present respectable year-end portfolio holdings (Lakonishok et al., 1991). The 
findings in Sias and Starks (1997) are favorable for the tax-loss-selling hypothesis and show 
that individual traders are primarily responsible for the January anomaly. 
This study highlights the impact of institutional traders on the January effect in Poland 
and Hungary. The history of both emerging stock markets provides a unique institutional 
environment to investigate the influence of individual and institutional investors on the January 
anomaly. In Poland, the pension system reform on May 19, 1999, separates the history of the 
stock market into a period of predominantly individual trading and a period dominated by 
institutional trading. Similarly, in Hungary, private pension funds were founded in 1997 and 
started their financial activities in 1998. Before 1998, primarily small individual investors 
populated the Hungarian stock market. 
                                                 
34  Another strand of the finance literature views institutions as investors which induce 
non-fundamental dynamics in stock returns due to their specific trading behavior. The main 
arguments in this context are investment activities relying on herding, positive feedback 
trading, and window-dressing strategies (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Badrinath and Wahal, 2002; Griffin, 
Harris, and Topaloglu, 2003). 
35  Empirical evidence on the January effect can be found in, for example, Reinganum 
(1983), Gultekin and Gultekin (1983), and Ritter (1988). 
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The pension system reform in both countries changed the investor structure drastically 
due to the enrichment of the old pay-as-you-go system with a privately managed pension funds 
pillar. Since 1999, these pension funds are the most important group of institutional investors 
on the Polish and Hungarian stock markets. In addition to the change of the investor structure, 
in both countries capital gains taxes do not exist, which rules out the tax-loss-selling hypothesis 
as a rationale for the January effect. Consequently, if a January effect can be detected in the 
data during the period before the entrance of pension fund investors in both stock markets, then 
it must be driven by an anomalous trading behavior of Polish and Hungarian individual 
investors. We exploit the shift in the institutional environment in both emerging capital markets 
to provide evidence on the impact of individual and institutional investors’ trading decisions on 
the January anomaly. 
Relying on the institutional background of the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets, 
we contribute to the literature answering the following two questions. First, is there evidence in 
favor of a January effect during the period of individual trading? If this is the case, we can 
conclude that individual investors’ non-fundamentally driven trading decisions led to the 
January anomaly. Second, in which way did Polish and Hungarian pension fund investors 
contribute to the January anomaly after 1999 and 1998, respectively? In case pension funds 
exhibit window-dressing behavior, we expect a strengthening effect on the January anomaly. In 
contrast, if pension funds’ trading decisions are more influenced by fundamental information, a 
dampening effect on unusually high stock returns in January can be expected.36 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional 
background for Poland and Hungary. Section 3 characterizes the data set, while the 
econometric methodology is described in section 4. Section 5 contains the empirical findings, 
and section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
                                                 
36  It is obvious that the date of entrance of pension funds into the stock market plays an 
important role in the following investigation. Similarly, one branch of the literature studies the 
impact of the introduction of futures markets on stock return anomalies of the underlying spot 
market (Kamara, 1997; Szakmary and Kiefer, 2004). In our investigation, we can exclude an 
influence from the introduction of futures markets because these markets were established 
earlier (January 16, 1998, in Poland and March 31, 1995, in Hungary) than when the 
appearance of pension fund investors on the stock markets took place. 
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5.2  Institutional Background 
 
5.2.1  Poland 
 
Re-established in 1991, the Polish stock market has grown rapidly during the last decade 
in terms of both the number of companies listed and market capitalization. In comparison to the 
two other European Union accession countries in the region, namely the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, the capitalization of the Polish stock market is significantly higher. It is comparable 
to that of the smaller mature European stock markets like Austria and was about 70 billion U.S. 
dollars at the end of 2004 (Warsaw Stock Exchange, 2005). 
The major change in the investor structure on the Polish stock market has its origin in the 
pension system reform. In 1999, the public system was enriched by a private component, 
represented by open-end pension funds. Participation in this component, often called the 
“second pillar”, is mandatory for employees below certain age. They are obliged to transfer 
7.3% of their gross salary to the government-run social insurance institute called Zakład 
Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (ZUS), which in turn transfers the collected contributions to the 
pension funds. The first transfer of money from the ZUS to the pension funds took place on 
May 19, 1999. This date marks a significant change of the investor structure on the Polish stock 
market. In 1999, about 20% domestic institutional investors and 45% domestic individual 
investors traded at the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Over time the proportion of domestic 
institutional traders has increased, whereas the relative importance of individual investors has 
decreased. In 2004, approximately one-third of the investors were domestic individuals, and 
about one-third were national institutions. Constantly about one-third of the investors on the 
Polish stock market adhere to the group of foreign investors. 
While before May 19, 1999, the majority of traders were small, private investors, after 
that date pension funds became important players on the stock market in Poland. There were 
also some mutual funds active in the market, but they had relatively small amounts of capital 
under management. Moreover, the role of corporate investors, i.e., companies investing their 
capital surpluses, was very small. This unique institutional characteristic allows us to compare 
the period before May 19, 1999 – characterized by predominantly non-institutional trading – 
with the period after that date, when pension funds as institutional investors started to act on the 
stock market. 
The number of pension funds in the 1999–2003 period varied between 15 and 21. The 
change in their number occurred mainly due to some acquisitions of smaller funds by larger 
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ones. It is important to note, however, that their structure as well as the structure of the assets 
under their management remained invariant. By the end of 2003, 17 pension funds operated in 
the Polish stock market with about 8 billion U.S. dollars under management. In comparison, 
Polish insurance companies and mutual funds had only 3 and 1 billion U.S. dollarsof assets, 
respectively. In 2003, pension funds invested about 3 billion U.S. dollars in stocks listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. Their stock holdings predominantly consist of large-capitalization 
stocks that are listed in the blue-chip index WIG20 and usually belong to the Top 5 in their 
industries. Therefore, pension funds have become important players on the Polish stock market 
with the potential to affect stock prices. 
Concerning capital gains taxation, until the end of 2003 capital gains made by domestic 
individual investors were tax-exempt and dividends were subject to a 15% withholding tax. 
Since January 1, 2004, capital gains have been taxed at a uniform 19% rate. The tax rate for 
dividends was raised from 15% to 19%. However, the number of firms paying dividends is 
low. 
 
5.2.2  Hungary 
 
The Budapest Stock Exchange, re-established in 1990, experienced a significant increase 
in its capitalization, attaining about 6 billion U.S. dollars in 1996, mainly due to the 
privatization of Hungary’s bigger state-owned companies such as Mol, OTP, Gedeon Richter, 
and Matav. In the following years, the stock market went through a phase of continuous 
growth, reaching a capitalization of 30 billion U.S. dollars at the end of 2004. 
The introduction of a three-pillar pension system on January 1, 1998, had an important 
influence on the Hungarian stock market because a growing share of households’ savings was 
channeled to stock market investments through pension funds. Since 1998, individuals can 
choose between the mandatory public system – the first pillar – and the mandatory private 
system. Open-end private mandatory pension funds represent the second pillar of the 
Hungarian pension system. The first 38 mandatory private funds started their activities in 1998 
with 134 million U.S. dollars of assets under management and about 1.3 million members. The 
third pillar consists of voluntary pension funds, which can be both open-end and closed-end 
funds and also play an important role with a comparable amount of assets.37 
                                                 
37  The first voluntary pension funds started their activity already in 1994. However, the 
assets under their management were marginal at that time. 
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The establishment of the private mandatory pension funds in 1998 was beneficial and 
stimulating for voluntary pension funds. The year 1998 can therefore be considered as the year 
when pension funds appeared as institutional investors on the Hungarian stock market. 
However, compared to the institutional framework in Poland, the exact date of entrance of 
pension funds into the Hungarian stock market is less clear-cut and hardly traceable. Whereas 
for Poland, May 1999 is known as the start date of pension funds’ investment activities and is 
well-documented as such, the investment activities of Hungarian pension funds seemed to 
develop gradually over the year 1998. Detailed information on this issue is practically not 
available. Consequently, we choose January 1, 1999, as the start date of increased institutional 
ownership on the Hungarian stock market to ensure that the entire post-event period is 
characterized by intensive institutional trading. The pension funds’ capital was growing during 
the following years and, by the end of 2004, amounted to 4 and 2.5 billion U.S. dollars for the 
mandatory and voluntary pension funds, respectively. 
The number of pension funds decreased over time, mainly due to acquisitions, and by the 
end of 2004, 18 private and 75 voluntary pension funds remained in the market. Contrary to 
other countries, where pension funds participate directly in the stock market, in Hungary an 
increasing number of pension funds entrusted their assets to investment fund managers. 
Consequently, the impact of pension funds on stock market prices should be evaluated by 
means of portfolio managers’ investment activities. At the end of 2004, 23 investment fund 
managers had under their management 4.9 billion U.S. dollars of pension fund assets, 5.2 
billion U.S. dollarsof investment fund assets, and 3.7 billion U.S. dollars of contributions from 
other sources. Notwithstanding the assignment of pension funds’ assets to portfolio managers, 
their investment activities have to adhere to the pension funds’ investment regulations specified 
by law. In addition, the accumulated accounts can be invested in the longer term since 
contributions are not accessible before retirement. 
In Hungary, no capital gains tax applies if gains are achieved on the Budapest Stock 
Exchange or any other stock exchange in the European Union.38 While dividends received by a 
Hungarian company from another Hungarian company are tax-exempt, for individuals the 
dividend withholding tax is 20%. Pension funds are not subject to tax on the proceeds of the 
                                                 
38  Within the personal income tax system, capital gains from stock market transactions 
are considered as interest-type income and are not taxed. For capital gains on transactions not 
qualified as a stock exchange deal, the tax rate was 20% before and 25% after 2005. For a short 
period of time in 2001–2002, stock market gains were also taxed with a 20% rate. 
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funds. Proceeds are taxed only when they are paid out to the contributors, at rates depending on 
whether the proceeds are qualified as interest, dividends, or capital gains. 
 
5.3  Data 
 
The data for Poland contain daily closing prices for all stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange in the period from October 3, 1994, to March 31, 2004.39 These time series were 
directly provided by the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Altogether, the sample comprises 278 firms 
over the indicated sample period. The time series are stock-split adjusted and corrected for 
outliers to assure that our results are not driven or distorted by a few extreme values. For this 
purpose, the 0.5% of highest and lowest returns observed in the data set are excluded from the 
investigation and, therefore, deleted from all sub-samples. 
To investigate the impact of the pension funds’ investment activities, we construct two 
sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks as follows. We calculate a measure of each 
stock’s institutional coverage by dividing the aggregate pension fund holdings of that stock by 
the overall aggregate pension fund holdings in a particular year. This measure can be 
interpreted as the percentage share of a particular stock in the aggregate pension fund holdings. 
A stock is defined as actively institutionally traded in a given year if the measure of relative 
institutional holdings exceeds 1%.40 
                                                 
39  The selection of the start date is due to the following reasoning. Shortly after its re-
opening, the Polish stock market experienced a stock price increase of 924% from May 6, 
1993, to March 8, 1994, and a subsequent crash. Furthermore, it was not until October 3, 1994, 
that trading on the Warsaw Stock Exchange was extended from four days to five days a week. 
Starting our inquiry at the beginning of October 1994 ensures that the empirical findings are 
neither distorted by the bubble and crash periods nor affected by the change in trading 
frequency. 
40  We drop stocks with only marginal institutional coverage as for these stocks 
institutional trading behaviour may not have a large impact on stock returns. The 1% cut-off 
point is arbitrarily chosen but proved to be an acceptable compromise for the purpose of our 
study. On the one hand, it allows us to eliminate those stocks which are not at all or only 
marginally covered by institutional investors and to come up with a limited number of stocks 
that are actively traded by institutions. On the other hand, the size of the resulting sub-samples 
is still sufficient for econometric testing. 
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We calculate this measure for all stocks and all years separately during the 1999–2003 
period and end up with five yearly measures of relative pension fund holdings for each 
individual stock. A stock is included in the first sample of actively institutionally traded stocks 
if the pension fund holding measure of this stock exceeds the 1% level in at least three out of 
the five years. This amounts to 60% of the post-event period. In an alternative, less strict 
definition a stock has to exceed the 1% cut-off point in at least two of the five years, i.e. during 
40% of the post-event period. These criteria result in the identification of 20 stocks for the 
stricter definition and 28 stocks for the less strict definition of institutionally traded shares. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.1 provide additional information about these stocks. Whereas 
Polish pension fund investors do not have a preference for stocks of a specific sector, they 
concentrate their investments on large firms’ stocks. 
For Hungary, the data consist of daily closing prices for the stocks listed on the Budapest 
Stock Exchange in the period from January 3, 1994, to December 31, 2004. The time series 
were obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. Altogether, the cross-section of the sample 
comprises 84 firms. The same trimming procedure was applied to the data set as described 
above for the Polish case. In contrast to Poland, we do not have reliable information regarding 
stock splits, dividends, and other impact factors on stock returns. This provides an additional 
reason for the exclusion of 0.5% of the extreme stock return observations in both tails of the 
distribution.
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Table 5.1: Stocks Actively Traded by Institutional Investors 
 
Poland Hungary 
Company Sector Company Sector 
Institutionally traded stocks (strict definition) 
Agora Media Antenna Broadcasting 
BPH Banking Borsodchem Chemicals 
BRE Banking Danubius Hotels 
BSK Banking Demasz Electricity Supply 
Budimex Construction Egis Pharmaceuticals 
Computerland IT Fotex Retail trade 
Dębica Chemicals Magyar Telekom Telecommunications 
Echo Construction MOL Oil/Natural Gas 
Kęty Metals NABI Engineering/Machinery 
KGHM Metals OTP Banking 
Orbis Hotels Pannonplast Plastics industry 
PBK Banking Pick Szeged Food products 
Pekao Banking Rába Machinery 
PGF Wholesale & Retails Richter Pharmaceuticals 
PKN Chemicals Synergon IT 
Prokom IT TVK Chemicals 
Stomil Chemicals Zalakerámia Construction 
Świecie Wood and paper   
TPSA Telecommunications   
WBK Banking   
Additional institutionally traded stocks (less strict definition) 
BIG Banking Graboplast Textile 
ComArch IT Prímagáz Gas services 
Elektrim Telecommunications   
Kredyt Bank Banking   
Netia Telecommunications   
Optimus IT   
Softbank IT   
śywiec Food   
 
Note: The table presents the stocks identified as actively traded by institutional investors and the 
corresponding sectors. The selection criteria are described in the text. When applying the stricter (less 
strict) definition, 20 (28) Polish and 17 (19) Hungarian companies are included in the sub-samples of 
institutionally traded stocks. 
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To determine a sub-sample of institutionally traded stocks for the Hungarian stock 
market, we requested the portfolio holdings of all Hungarian pension funds. The pension funds’ 
replies show that their stock market investment decisions closely mirror the composition of the 
main stock index BUX. In the sample of Hungarian stocks actively traded by institutional 
investors, we therefore focus on the stocks included in the BUX. Information on the BUX 
composition was provided by the Budapest Stock Exchange for the 1996–2004 period. 
Contrary to Poland, we do not use a 1% cut-off criterion because the BUX is dominated by 
very few stocks with high weights. Hence, a cut-off point as the one mentioned above would 
considerably reduce our sample in size. The number of stocks included in the institutional 
sample would be too small to conduct a cross-sectional investigation. 
For a strict definition of institutionally traded stocks that is roughly in line with the 
selection criterion for Poland, we use all stocks that are included in the BUX for at least 60% of 
the time in the post-reform sample period from 1998 to 2004. This definition results in the 
identification of 17 institutionally traded stocks. For a less strict definition, we require inclusion 
in the BUX for at least 40% of the same time period. The less strict definition increases the 
sample of institutionally traded stocks to 19. We use these two sub-samples of 17 and 19 stocks 
to investigate the effect of institutional trading on the Hungarian stock market. Columns 3 and 
4 of Table 5.1 list the Hungarian companies selected together with their sector affiliation. 
 
5.4  Methodology 
 
In the empirical investigation we distinguish between the impacts of predominantly 
individual versus institutional investor groups on stock returns in January. First, the hypothesis 
is investigated that individual investors exhibit anomalous trading behavior and cause 
abnormally high stock returns in January. Second, we analyze the hypothesis that institutions 
are informed traders relying on fundamental information and, consequently, that the entrance of 
pension funds on the stock market dampens the anomalous January effect. If the contrary holds, 
the trading behavior of pension funds can be ascribed a positive contribution to higher stock 
returns in January relative to other months of the year, which would be in line with the 
window-dressing hypothesis. 
The hypotheses are investigated within a panel framework and separately tested for 
different sub-samples of stocks from Poland and Hungary. The advantages of a panel data 
model over a purely time-series investigation of index data or individual shares are manifold 
(see, e.g., Baltagi, 2001). Most importantly, unobs
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controlled for that would otherwise have to go undetected and could generate biased results. 
Specifically, the following one-way error component regression model is run: 
 
 tiiti
Inst
ttti eurJANJANr ,1,3210, +++++= −ββββ , (1) 
where the subscript i  denotes the cross-sectional and t  the time-series dimension of the 
data set. The dependent variable is the daily stock return tir , , calculated as the logarithmic 
difference in prices )/ln(100 1,,, −= tititi PPr . tiP ,  denotes the individual stock price at the close of 
every trading day. tJAN  is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 in January 
throughout the whole sample period. The dummy variable InsttJAN  is 1 only for those January 
observations that fall into the period of increased institutional trading at the Warsaw and 
Budapest Stock Exchanges, i.e. beginning with January 2000 for Poland and January 1999 for 
Hungary. In addition, we allow for stock returns autocorrelation in the time-series dimension 
by including the lagged dependent variable 1, −tir  as an additional explanatory variable.
41 iu  
denotes an unobservable firm-specific random effect, and tie ,  is the remainder disturbance. 
In the above specification, a positive and significant parameter 1β  provides evidence in 
favor of a January effect in stock returns. For the interpretation of the parameter 2β , three 
cases have to be distinguished. First, a negative and significant coefficient 2β  indicates a 
reduction of positive January stock returns (estimated by 1βˆ ) due to the entrance of pension 
funds as institutional investors into the market. Second, if 2β  is positive and significant, then 
institutional investors’ trading behavior is in line with the window-dressing hypothesis because 
a strengthening of the January anomaly can be observed. Third, if 2β  is statistically 
insignificant, institutions do not have an influence on the January anomaly. The sum )( 21 ββ +  
provides a measure of the magnitude of the January effect in the period of increased 
institutional trading. 
In addition to testing the hypotheses separately for the different sub-samples described in 
the text, we estimate the following joint model with several dummy and interaction variables: 
                                                 
41  A potential bias in the parameter estimates is not an issue in this setting due to the large 
time-series dimension of the data. We can, therefore, rely on asymptotic properties and obtain 
consistent parameter estimates (Baltagi, 2001). 
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 tiitii
Inst
titti euPOSTINSTINSTJANINSTJANr ,43210, )()( ++++⋅+⋅+= βββββ , (2) 
where all previously introduced variables are defined as in equation (1).42 In addition, the 
indicator variable iINST  equals 1 for those companies included in the sample of institutionally 
traded stocks and is 0 otherwise. tPOST  is a dummy variable with value 1 for the period of 
increased institutional trading and 0 otherwise. The interaction variables )( it INSTJAN ⋅  and 
)( i
Inst
t INSTJAN ⋅  correspond to tJAN  and 
Inst
tJAN , respectively, in regression equation (1) 
when the latter is run for the institutional sub-samples. 
The model specified above is estimated for both sub-samples of institutionally traded 
stocks. We henceforth refer to the version estimated with the more strictly defined institutional 
dummy iINST  as equation (2a) and to the less strictly defined one as equation (2b). The 
coefficients 1β  and 2β  can be interpreted as described for equation (1). In addition, 3β  
captures possible systematic differences between average stock returns of the institutional and 
the control sample, and 4β  displays aggregate factors that affected average stock returns over 
time in the same way for institutionally traded and non-traded shares. 
Finally, we investigate whether the decrease in the magnitude of the January anomaly 
takes place gradually over a longer period or within a relatively short period of time. This 
question is relevant because it helps us to assess whether the observed results are really due to 
the appearance of institutional investors on the stock market. To accomplish this task, we use a 
rolling estimation window technique and run the regression: 
 
 tiitti euJANr ,, +++= βα , (3) 
where all variables are defined as in equation (1). Starting in October 1994 for Poland and 
in January 1994 for Hungary, we estimate this regression for a three-year time period and 
obtain a parameter estimate of β . This parameter is an estimate of the average January effect 
during the estimation period. Then we move the estimation window by one month toward the 
end of the sample and estimate regression (3) again. We end up with a time series of β  
                                                 
42  The lagged dependent variable is dropped from the regressor list for the sake of brevity 
since its inclusion did not alter our empirical findings. 
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estimates which can be plotted and subjected to a visual investigation afterwards. 
 
5.5  Empirical Results 
 
First, summary statistics and regression results are presented separately for the two sub-
samples of stocks actively traded by institutional investors, a control sample of all stocks 
excluding the stocks identified as institutionally traded as well as the whole sample reflecting 
the entire Polish and Hungarian stock markets. Hence, we are able to analyze the impact of the 
Polish and Hungarian pension system reform on stock returns not only through time – before 
and after the pension funds’ appearance as institutional traders on the stock market – but also in 
a cross-sectional dimension, i.e. among stocks more actively traded and those nearly non-traded 
by institutional investors. 
To gain some first insight into the seasonal patterns inherent in our data, daily average 
stock returns for January and for February to December are reported in Table 5.2. Daily mean 
stock returns in January are positive and higher than average stock returns between February 
and December for all samples. Furthermore, for both institutional sub-samples (Panels A1, B1, 
A2, B2) we observe higher average January stock returns during the 1994–1999 (1994–1998) 
period relative to the years 2000–2004 (1999–2004) for Poland (Hungary). This also refers to 
the whole samples (Panels D1, D2) which include all stocks listed on the respective stock 
exchange. Interestingly, for the Polish control sample (Panel C1) we observe an increase of 
average stock returns over time, whereas Hungarian stock returns (Panel C2) are slightly lower 
in the 1999–2004 period compared to the 1994–1998 sub-sample. 
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Table 5.2: Average Daily Stock Returns 
 
Poland    Hungary   
Sample Period January 
February – 
December 
 Sample Period January 
February – 
December 
Panel A1: Institutional Sample I ( 20=N )  Panel A2: Institutional Sample I ( 17=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.3964 0.0624  1994 – 1998 0.4471 0.0368 
2000 – 2004 0.1618 0.0186  1999 – 2004 0.0849 -0.0166 
1994 – 2004 0.2452 0.0382  1994 – 2004 0.1993 0.0010 
Panel B1: Institutional Sample II ( 28=N )  Panel B2: Institutional Sample II ( 19=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.3902 0.0642  1994 – 1998 0.4523 0.0369 
2000 – 2004 0.1758 -0.0331  1999 – 2004 0.0662 -0.0176 
1994 – 2004 0.2546 0.0110  1994 – 2004 0.1973 0.0018 
Panel C1: Control Sample ( 250=N )  Panel C2: Control Sample ( 65=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.0004 -0.0582  1994 – 1998 0.1841 -0.0556 
2000 – 2004 0.0190 -0.0361  1999 – 2004 0.1134 0.0568 
1994 – 2004 0.0131 -0.0452  1994 – 2004 0.1410 0.0115 
Panel D1: Whole Sample ( 278=N )  Panel D2: Whole Sample ( 84=N ) 
1994 – 1999 0.0586 -0.0406  1994 – 1998 0.2611 -0.0287 
2000 – 2004 0.0385 -0.0357  1999 – 2004 0.0976 0.0319 
1994 – 2004 0.0450 -0.0378  1994 – 2004 0.1588 0.0084 
 
Note: Mean stock returns are calculated as simple arithmetic averages of daily stock returns. The overall 
sample period is from October 3, 1994 to March 31, 2004, for Poland and from January 3, 1994, to 
December 31, 2004, for Hungary. The years 1999 and 1998 mark the dates of the Polish and the 
Hungarian pension system reforms, respectively. N  denotes the number of stocks. 
 
Table 5.3 displays the empirical findings for Poland. When looking at the results for the 
two sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks (Panels A and B), we find evidence in 
favor of a pronounced January effect in the period when the Polish stock market was dominated 
by individual investors. The estimated coefficients of the January effect are about 0.36. All 
coefficient estimates of the dummy variable 
t
JAN  are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The empirical findings in favor of a January effect are insofar interesting as during the period 
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of predominately individual trading capital gains taxes did not exist in Poland. Hence, the tax-
loss-selling hypothesis can be ruled out as a rationale for higher stock returns in January. We 
can therefore conclude that Polish stock returns dynamics exhibit an anomalous January effect 
during the period prior to the entrance of institutional investors, which may be explained by 
individual investors’ sentiment.43 
Moreover, for both institutional samples the magnitude of the January effect decreases in 
the period after the pension fund investors’ entrance into the stock market, measured by the 
coefficients of the institutional investors dummy InsttJAN . The estimated parameter values are 
statistically significant and about –0.22. Thus, the significant negative parameter estimates of 
the institutional investors dummy reject the window-dressing hypothesis. The anomalous 
January effect in stock returns does not entirely disappear after the entrance of pension funds as 
institutional investors into the Polish stock market. However, its magnitude becomes 
substantially lower. 
The results are robust towards the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 1, −tir . For 
both institutional samples, the coefficient of 1, −tir  is positive and significant, which can be 
explained by the implications of strategic trading models (Kyle, 1985; Barclay and Warner, 
1993). Rational informed investors spread their trades over time to conceal information. By 
breaking up a large order into several smaller trades, institutional investors reduce the overall 
price impact. Moreover, price impacts may be inversely related to market liquidity (Madhavan 
and Smidt; 1993). This suggests that the benefits of trading over a longer horizon are greater in 
thin relative to liquid stock markets, which, in turn, implies an increase in trade duration and a 
decrease in order size.
                                                 
43  The existence of a January effect in stock returns without capital gains taxes is not new. 
Tinic, Baroni-Adesi, and West (1987) provide evidence for Canada and Jones, Pierce, and 
Wilson (1987) for the U.S. before capital gains were taxed in these countries. 
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Table 5.3: Empirical Results for Poland 
 
Equation Const  tJAN  
Inst
tJAN  1, −tir   
Panel A: Institutional Sample I ( 20=N ) 
(1)  0.0399***  0.3512*** -0.2306**  0.0148***  
 (0.0151) (0.0829) (0.1015) (0.0053)  
(1)  0.0382**  0.3582*** -0.2347**   
 (0.0152) (0.0830) (0.1017)   
Panel B: Institutional Sample II ( 28=N ) 
(1)  0.0114  0.3730*** -0.2089**  0.0225***  
 (0.0133) (0.0714) (0.0882) (0.0044)  
(1)  0.0104  0.3787*** -0.2134**   
 (0.0144) (0.0717) (0.0886)   
Panel C: Control Sample ( 250=N ) 
(1) -0.0535***  0.0559*  0.0065 -0.0336***  
 (0.0059) (0.0341) (0.0408) (0.0017)  
(1) -0.0452***  0.0456♣  0.0186   
 (0.0060) (0.0344) (0.0411)   
Panel D: Whole Sample ( 278=N ) 
(1) -0.0445***  0.1069*** -0.0317 -0.0277***  
 (0.0055) (0.0310) (0.0372) (0.0016)  
(1) -0.0378***  0.0963*** -0.0200   
 (0.0055) (0.0313) (0.0375)   
Equation Const  )( it INSTJAN ⋅  )( i
Inst
t INSTJAN ⋅  iINST  tPOST  
(2a) -0.0700***  0.3872*** -0.2796**  0.0791***  0.0450*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0991) (0.1215) (0.0189) (0.0112) 
(2b) -0.0718***  0.4086*** -0.2608**  0.0534***  0.0464*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0814) (0.1008) (0.0161) (0.0113) 
 
Note: The estimated models are (1) tiiti
Inst
ttti eurJANJANr ,1,3210, +++++= −ββββ  and (2) 
tiitii
Inst
titti euPOSTINSTINSTJANINSTJANr ,43210, )()( ++++⋅+⋅+= βββββ , where stock 
returns are calculated as )/ln(100 1,,, −= tititi PPr . tJAN  (
Inst
tJAN ) denotes a dummy variable which 
takes on the value 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (during the period of increased 
institutional trading at the Warsaw Stock Exchange). iINST  is a dummy variable indicating a stock’s 
affiliation to the stricter (less strict) sub-sample of institutionally traded shares for equation 2a (2b). 
tPOST  is a dummy with value 1 for the period of increased institutional trading. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, and ♣ at the 19% level. 
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The estimated results for the control sample (Panel C) consisting of all stocks except for 
the 28 institutionally traded ones reinforce the above findings. The coefficients of the dummy 
variable 
t
JAN  are positive and significant at the 10% and 19% levels. Hence, we find at least 
weak evidence indicating that a January effect exists in returns of non-institutionally traded 
stocks. In contrast to the results for the two institutional samples, the parameters for 
Inst
tJAN  
are statistically insignificant. For stocks not actively traded by Polish pension fund investors, 
the magnitude of the January effect does not decrease during the period after May 19, 1999.44 
The statistically insignificant parameters for 
Inst
tJAN  in the control sample emphasize that the 
estimated decrease in the two institutional samples is caused by the institutions’ trading 
behavior and not by other factors.45 In addition, the estimated coefficient of the variable 
Inst
tJAN  for the whole market is not significant either, which suggests that the January effect 
for the market as a whole continues to be driven by individual investors. 
The empirical findings on the joint model (2) are reported at the bottom of Table 5.3 for 
the more strictly defined dummy iINST  (equation 2a) and for the less strictly defined version 
(equation 2b). The empirical results confirm the findings on a pronounced January effect for 
actively institutionally traded Polish stocks and the substantial decrease in the anomaly’s 
magnitude after the entrance of pension funds into the stock market. In addition, actively 
institutionally traded stocks earn significantly higher returns relative to the rest of the stocks. 
The period of increased institutional trading is accompanied by higher average stock returns 
compared to the period before the pension system reform. 
The findings for Hungary in Table 5.4 are consistent with the ones for the Polish stock 
market and support the pension funds’ impact on the January anomaly. The estimation results 
                                                 
44  Given the marginal level of significance of the tJAN  coefficients, we run separate 
regressions investigating whether a January effect exists in the post-event period. The values of 
the coefficients of the January dummy variables are slightly higher relative to the ones reported 
in Table 3 and are significant at the 1% level. Hence, a January effect exists in the period after 
May 19, 1999, in non-institutionally traded Polish stocks. 
45  The January effect in the pre-event period is substantially higher for institutionally 
traded stocks compared to the stocks in the control sample. A reason for this finding may be the 
extreme illiquidity of a subset of stocks in the control sample. As our study focuses on the 
evolution of January stock returns over time instead of the level of the January effect for 
particular stocks, we do not further explore this issue. 
 121 
 
 
for the two sub-samples of actively institutionally traded stocks (Panels A and B) show a 
pronounced January effect in the period before the investment activities of Hungarian pension 
funds. The estimated parameters of the dummy variable tJAN  are about 0.44 and are 
statistically significant. In line with the results for Poland, the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as a 
rationale for higher January stock returns can be ruled out because capital gains are not taxed in 
Hungary. Moreover, the anomalous January effect decreases drastically after the entrance of 
pension funds into the stock market with statistically significant coefficients for 
Inst
tJAN  of 
about –0.36. The findings are robust concerning the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. 
The estimated parameters are positive and significant, supporting the implications of strategic 
trading models and market liquidity outlined above.
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Table 5.4: Empirical Results for Hungary 
 
Equation Const  tJAN  
Inst
tJAN  1, −tir   
Panel A: Institutional Sample I ( 17=N ) 
(1)  0.0003  0.4357*** -0.3541***  0.0331***  
 (0.0138) (0.0832) (0.0991) (0.0051)  
(1) -0.0021  0.4405*** -0.3544***   
 (0.0201) (0.0837) (0.0998)   
Panel B: Institutional Sample II ( 19=N ) 
(1)  0.0012  0.4449*** -0.3822***  0.0309***  
 (0.0132) (0.0770) (0.0932) (0.0048)  
(1) -0.0006  0.4468*** -0.3807***   
 (0.0181) (0.0774) (0.0939)   
Panel C: Control Sample ( 65=N ) 
(1)  0.0094  0.1701*** -0.0575 -0.0500***  
 (0.0111) (0.0605) (0.0760) (0.0033)  
(1)  0.0115  0.1726*** -0.0707   
 (0.0112) (0.0608) (0.0765)   
Panel D: Whole Sample ( 84=N ) 
(1)  0.0067  0.2555*** -0.1598*** -0.0309***  
 (0.0087) (0.0481) (0.0598) (0.0027)  
(1)  0.0062  0.2518*** -0.1622***   
 (0.0098) (0.0484) (0.0603)   
Equation Const  )( it INSTJAN ⋅  )( i
Inst
t INSTJAN ⋅  iINST  tPOST  
(2a) -0.0139  0.4801*** -0.4135*** -0.0246  0.0563*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0994) (0.1190) (0.0223) (0.0179) 
(2b) -0.0156  0.4849*** -0.4397*** -0.0218  0.0581*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0909) (0.1108) (0.0216) (0.0179) 
 
Note: The estimated models are (1) tiiti
Inst
ttti eurJANJANr ,1,3210, +++++= −ββββ  and (2) 
tiitii
Inst
titti euPOSTINSTINSTJANINSTJANr ,43210, )()( ++++⋅+⋅+= βββββ , where stock 
returns are calculated as )/ln(100 1,,, −= tititi PPr . tJAN  (
Inst
tJAN ) denotes a dummy variable which 
takes on the value 1 in January throughout the whole sample period (during the period of increased 
institutional trading at the Warsaw Stock Exchange). iINST  is a dummy variable indicating a stock’s 
affiliation to the stricter (less strict) sub-sample of institutionally traded shares for equation 2a (2b). 
tPOST  is a dummy with value 1 during the period of increased institutional trading. *** denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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The empirical results of the control sample (Panel C) also indicate that a January effect 
exists in the period before Hungarian pension funds invested on the stock market. The 
estimated parameters of 
t
JAN  are positive and significant at the 1% level. In line with the 
findings for Poland, the magnitude of the January effect is smaller for non-institutionally traded 
shares relative to stocks actively institutionally traded. More importantly, the estimated 
coefficients of the dummy variable InsttJAN  are not statistically significant. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that the estimated decrease in the two institutional samples is caused by 
institutions’ trading behavior and not by other factors. The decrease in the magnitude of the 
January effect is also observed for the whole market. In addition, the findings for the joint 
model support the empirical results discussed above. 
All results presented are calculated for a sample where 0.5% of extreme stock returns in 
both tails of the distribution were dropped. As a check of robustness, we repeated the above 
analysis using the sample without excluding the outliers. The results for Poland are 
qualitatively identical. The same holds for Hungary except for the findings of the control 
sample. For this sub-sample, very few large return outliers seem to impact the findings and 
justify our outlier correction. Moreover, we re-run all regressions including lagged returns of 
the S&P 500 index. The findings are qualitatively the same and do not change our main 
conclusions.46 
Last, we present the findings of the rolling estimation of equation (3). For Poland, the 
estimated β  coefficients are displayed in Figure 5.1. The upper graph is the estimate for the 
institutionally traded sample including 20 stocks, the lower graph for the institutional sample 
with 28 stocks. All data points left of the first vertical marker contain January data from only 
the pre-event period, all points right of the second vertical marker only include January stock 
returns from the post-event period. The coefficients in between the two vertical lines were 
obtained from samples covering January stock returns from both the post- and the pre-event 
periods. In consistence with our theoretical proposition, we observe a drastic decline of the β  
parameter over time. For the pre-event period, β  estimates are large. The inclusion of post-
event data leads to a decrease in the estimated β  coefficients. Once there are only data from 
post-event January stock returns included in the sample (the data to the right of the second 
vertical marker), β  estimates sharply decline and stabilize on a considerably lower level. Thus, 
we observe a decreasing January effect exactly at the time when Polish pension fund managers 
                                                 
46  The results of both robustness checks are not reported but available on request. 
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entered the market.47 
Figure 5.1: Rolling Estimation Results for Poland 
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Note: Regression results of equation (3) for 20 (upper graph) and 28 (lower graph) 
institutionally traded stocks. The figures display the evolution of the β  coefficient over time.
                                                 
47  These results are robust to the length of the estimation window and the size of the shift. 
We used estimation windows of 18, 24, and 30 months and obtained comparable results. 
Similarly, when moving forward the window by one week instead of one month, the results are 
almost identical. 
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Figure 5.2 shows the estimated β  coefficients for the two Hungarian institutional sub-samples. 
The β s are calculated in the same manner as for Poland. During the period before the first 
marker, the estimated β  coefficients are about 0.50. They decline drastically to values around 
0.10 after the first January stock returns from the post-event periods are included in the 
regressions. After the second vertical marker, the estimated β  parameters increase slightly and 
then fall to zero. Given the fact that, contrary to the Polish market, we do not have a certain 
well-known starting point for institutional trading on the Hungarian stock market, the evidence 
is naturally not as clear-cut as the evidence for the Polish market. The tendency of falling β  
coefficients, however, is nevertheless strong. 
 
Figure 5.2: Rolling Estimation Results for Hungary 
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Figure 5.2: Rolling Estimation Results for Hungary (Continued) 
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Note: Regression results of equation (3) for 17 (upper graph) and 19 (lower graph) institutionally traded 
stocks. The figures display the evolution of the β  coefficient over time. 
 
5.6  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The increase in the number of institutional investors trading on stock markets world-wide 
since the end of the 1980s has been associated with a rising interest on the part of financial 
economists in institutions’ impact on stock prices. One branch of literature investigates the 
effect of an increase in institutional ownership on the magnitude of stock market anomalies. 
This paper adds to the evidence available on the Monday effect (Kamara, 1997; Chan, Leung, 
and Wang, 2004) and the size effect (Gompers and Metrick, 2001) by providing empirical 
results on the impact of institutional trading on the January effect. 
Our results shed light on the causes for the anomaly and enhance the understanding of the 
relationship between asset prices and the investor structure of stock markets. The major 
difference between previous studies and ours is the unique institutional framework we exploit 
to investigate the role of institutional investors for the January anomaly. After the pension 
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system reforms in Poland on May 19, 1999, and in Hungary in 1998, pension fund investors 
became a large fraction of traders on the stock market. In contrast, before these dates the 
majority of traders were small, private investors. Moreover, capital gains taxes did not exist in 
Poland and Hungary during the period of predominantly individual trading. 
The institutional features of the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets enable us to 
investigate the role of individual and institutional investors on the magnitude of the January 
effect. Our empirical findings are twofold. First, we can empirically confirm that there is a 
significant January effect in Polish and Hungarian stock returns driven by the trading behavior 
of individuals. Due to the lack of capital gains taxes we cannot rely on the tax-loss-selling 
hypothesis as a rational explanation for the January effect. Instead, our findings suggest that 
higher stock returns in January during the period before the pension system reforms in both 
countries are the result of possibly sentiment-driven investment decisions by individual 
investors. 
Second and more importantly, our empirical results show that the increase in institutional 
trading on the Polish and the Hungarian stock markets had a significant dampening effect on 
the magnitude of the January anomaly. Our evidence is comparable to the results found in 
Kamara (1997) and Chan, Leung, and Wang (2004) for the Monday effect as well as Gompers 
and Metrick (2001) for the size effect in the U.S. The window-dressing hypothesis is not 
supported. The empirical evidence indicates that trading by Polish and Hungarian pension 
funds to a certain extent arbitrages away seasonal patterns in stock returns and, therefore, 
increases the efficiency of both stock markets. The price effect of irrational trading patterns 
seems to be partly eliminated by rational investors.
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6  CONCLUSIONS  
 
The aim of this thesis was to provide new empirical evidence in some highly relevant 
fields of European corporate finance and capital markets. The traditional research approaches 
and methodologies developed in studies focusing on the US market are checked and, whenever 
it is needed, alternative approaches pertinent for the European case are proposed. The 
investigation concentrates on topics of financing constraints, corporate diversification and the 
institutional investors’ influence on the stock market anomalies. 
The first article has developed a new classification scheme that can be used to detect the 
presence of financing constraints in the euro area. Based on this new classification, the findings 
show that financially constrained firms that are unable to obtain external financing or face 
higher costs of borrowing invest at a lower rate and grow more slowly. They also hold 
relatively higher cash positions that grow substantially under depressed economic conditions, 
confirming the precautionary cost hypotheses of holding cash. The results also suggest that all 
firms save cash out of their cash flow in a systematic way, since they operate under market 
imperfections where liquidity is relevant for the intertemporal allocation of capital. This is in 
line with the transaction cost motive of holding cash. The fixed costs of borrowing induce firms 
to raise external funds infrequently and to use cash holdings as a buffer. Hence, regardless of 
the degree of financing constraints, each firm has its optimal amount of cash holdings. The 
liquidity irrelevance hypothesis holds only for firms operating under perfect market conditions 
where internal and external financing sources are interchangeable. Consequently, we can 
conclude that the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings cannot be used for testing financing 
constraints of euro-area firms. 
In the second article an alternative method of investigation of the euro-area financing 
conditions is proposed. The focus is oriented towards the firms’ ability to take advantage of 
their sector-specific growth opportunities and whether they can get the external sources induced 
by their technological demand for external financing. It is tested whether firm size matters for 
an efficient reallocation of financial resources following a sector-specific growth shock. Such a 
response can only be efficient if firms’ financial sources are elastic enough for the required 
investment, i.e. if firms are able to get additional external financing to fulfil their improved 
growth opportunities. For large and medium firms it is found that industries with higher growth 
opportunities are able to grow relatively faster compared with firms in other sectors, indicating 
an environment of favourable financing conditions. These firms are able to adapt to the time-
varying industrial growth opportunity shocks in the short run and to specialise in industries 
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with a high natural reliance on external financing on the long run.  
The third article provides evidence that corporate diversification is endogenous. In the 
special case of UK conglomerates it is found that firms choose to follow a diversification 
strategy determined by firm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and M&A activities. 
After controlling for endogeneity, the diversification discount of UK firms of about 9% turns to 
a significant premium of 30%. The evidence of a premium is consistent with the value-
maximization theory of diversification, which considers firm diversification as efficient capital 
allocation. The premium estimated by this study corresponds to the results of recent studies 
conducted on US firms. At the same time, it brings contradictory evidence to previous findings 
for the UK market that supported the agency theory of diversification arguing that managers 
pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders’ value. 
In the last article of this thesis the effect of institutional investors on the January stock 
market anomaly is investigated. The Polish and Hungarian pension system reforms and the 
associated increase in investment activities of pension funds are used as a unique institutional 
characteristic to provide evidence on the impact of individual versus institutional investors on 
the January effect. The robust empirical results provided by this study suggest that the increase 
in institutional ownership has reduced the magnitude of an anomalous January effect induced 
by individual investors’ trading behaviour. 
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